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The f i r s t chapter of this thesis examines some of the Pauline 
material concerning charismatic experience and argues that such 
experience i s bound up with the experience of grace. This grace is 
the grace of Christ and consequently involves s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l love 
and a sharing in the sufferings of Christ. The second chapter takes 
a broad look at Rahner's thought, bringing out his concern with 
experience of the S p i r i t and the charismatic nature of his theology. 
The t h i r d chapter examines the philosophical influences behind 
Rahner's thought. This is an essential task since Rahner's 
metaphysics of knowledge provides the framework for his 
understanding of experience of God in grace and the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger influences the way Rahner thinks about grace. The 
fourth chapter shows the importance of love for Rahner's 
understanding of experience of God and i s the philosophical 
counterpart to the exegetical material i n the f i r s t chapter. The 
f i f t h chapter examines the nature of Rahner's understanding of grace 
and i t s christocentric character, picking up a theme started in the 
second chapter. The s i x t h chapter questions the adequacy of 
Rahner's understanding of God's involvement with the world. The 
seventh chapter develops the notion of charismatic transformation 
and points to a deficiency in Rahner's thought i n this area, due to 
an inadequate pneumatology and also, a point developed in the 
previous chapter, the i n a b i l i t y to posit change in God which 
compromises Rahner's understanding of God's involvement with the , 
world. The f i n a l chapter examines the corporate nature of the 
charismatic experience and corrects the individualistic bias in 
Rahner's thought. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The r e a l i t y of experience of the S p i r i t i s of crucial significance to 
Rahner's theology and for him: 'the givenness of a genuine, ori g i n a l 
experience of God and his S p i r i t is of fundamental importance'.'' In 
an interview given i n 1974 Rahner recounted how a pentecostalist 
came to v i s i t him. He told how this man spoke of baptism in the 
S p i r i t , about 'breaking through into a f i n a l stage of Christian 
existence' and into the freedom of God. Rahner commented on this as 
follows: 
He was r e f e r r i n g to an experience that is conceivable but 
which with most of us i s spread out over an entire l i f e . 
What drives one to despair about this i s how naively such 
people absolutely i d e n t i f y their inspirations, their sense of 
peace, freedom, and being led by the Holy S p i r i t with the 
immediate and direct intervention of God.^ 
For Rahner this sort of view is based on poor theology which 
too easily i d e n t i f i e s one's own experiences as direct interventions 
of God and involves a simplistic understanding of prayer. Rahner is 
concerned that what i s required i s a theology that is not 
r a t i o n a l i s t i c but rat i o n a l , that i s not clever talk that w i l l deter 
people from praying or experiencing the S p i r i t but which w i l l 
'ensure that such pneumatic-enthusiastic movements w i l l not simply 
peter out in the near future'.^ 
Pastoral concerns motivate this thesis, since i t is an attempt 
to develop an adequate theology of experience of the Sp i r i t in order 
to help people interpret and understand their religious experience. 
A l l too often charismatic s p i r i t u a l i t y and theology have had 
damaging pastoral consequences. This i s caused by three factors i n 
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particular,"^ 
F i r s t l y this may be because of a narrow interpretation of 
'experience of the Holy S p i r i t ' which leads to the action of the 
S p i r i t being seen i n interventionist terms, as miraculous 'signs and 
wonders', or in other experiences defined as 'religious', as opposed 
to a much broader understanding of God's action. We shall see how 
both the Pauline account and Rahner's theology have this broad 
understanding of experience of the S p i r i t which means that 
potentially i t can embrace a l l areas of l i f e . Secondly this may be 
due to an authoritarian outlook both in personal beliefs, i,e. 
dogmatism and fundamentalism, and in submission to hierarchical 
structures and regimes. We shall see how Rahner's theology combines 
autonomy and responsibility with dependence on God. Thirdly this 
may be because the charismatic movement uses the language of 
mature s p i r i t u a l development and deep mystical experience; i t talks 
of ' l e t t i n g go' and l e t t i n g God take over. But in order to reach 
this level of maturity a clear sense of one's own identity i s 
required, whereas many people get involved in the charismatic 
movement precisely because they are not sure of their own identity; 
the r esult i s 'a kind of s p i r i t u a l act of suicide'.® We shall see 
that Rahner does not s u f f i c i e n t l y develop the aspect of personal 
development and growth and we w i l l look at another Jesuit 
theologian, Donald Gelpi, i n order to see how his charismatic 
theology adds to Rahner's, pa r t i c u l a r l y i n this area. 
As this thesis i s examining the charismatic nature of Rahner's 
theology i t i s f i r s t necessary to obtain a d e f i n i t i o n of the term 
charismatic. Therefore the f i r s t chapter examines the Pauline 
material concerning experience of the S p i r i t and argues that such 
experience i s bound up with the experience of grace. This grace i s 
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the grace of Christ and consequently involves s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l love 
and a sharing i n the sufferings of Christ. The second chapter takes 
a broad look at Rahner's thought, bringing out his concern with 
experience of the S p i r i t and the charismatic nature of his theology. 
The t h i r d chapter examines the philosophical influences behind 
Rahner's thought, a necessary exercise since Rahner's metaphysics of 
knowledge provides the framework for his understanding of 
experience of God in grace, and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger 
influences the way Rahner thinks about grace. The fourth chapter 
shows the importance of love for Rahner's understanding of 
experience of God, and i s the philosophical counterpart to the 
exegetical material i n the f i r s t chapter. The f i f t h chapter examines 
the nature of Rahner's understanding of grace and i t s Christocentric 
character, picking up a theme started in the second chapter. The 
six t h chapter questions the adequacy of Rahner's understanding of 
God's involvement with the world. The seventh chapter develops the 
notion of charismatic transformation and points to a deficiency in 
Rahner's thought in this area, which is due to an inadequate 
pneumatology and also, a point developed in the previous chapter, 
the i n a b i l i t y to posit change i n God which compromises Rahner's 
understanding of God's involvement with the world. The f i n a l 
chapter examines the corporate nature of the charismatic experience 
and corrects the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c bias in Rahner's thought. 
Notes to Introduction 
1. P, Imhof and H. Biallowons, ed., Karl Rahner in Dialogue: 
Conversations and Interviews 1965-1982. Crossroad, New 
York, 1986, (hereafter referred to as Dialogue), p.328, 
2. Ibid,. p,133. 
3. Ibid.. 
4. J. Ponter, 'First Aid i n Pastoral Care, XIV: The Charismatic 
Movement', The Expository Times. Vol. 96 (May 1985), pp.228-
233. 
5. J. Ponter, op. c i t . . p.229; cf. D. Davies, 'The Charismatic 
Ethic and the S p i r i t of Post-Industrialism', in D. Martin and 




THE CHARISMATIC EXPERIENCE 
Before looking at the charismatic nature of Rahner's theology i t is 
necessary f i r s t of a l l to define what we mean by 'charismatic'. The 
term i s intimately linked with the concept of grace and this link 
w i l l be seen to be of fundamental significance to understanding 
Rahner's charismatic theology. 
Charisma and grace 
Etymologically charisma comes from the verb charizomai which in turn 
is derived from char is, a common word in the Septuagint and New 
Testament Greek, basically meaning 'attractiveness' or 'gracefulness' 
but also able to mean 'kindness' or 'favour'. In the New Testament 
the word comes to mean favour bestowed upon men contrary to their 
desert. Basically charis denotes action and charisma denotes result 
of that action, i.e. a free or gracious g i f t . ^ Charisma occurs 17 
times i n the New Testament and a l l but one in the Pauline corpus, 
14 times i n Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians (Rom. 1:11; 5:15f.; 6:23; 
11:29; 12:6; 1 Cor. 1:7; 7:7; 12:4, 9, 28, 30f.; 2 Cor. 1:11; 1 Tim. 4:14; 
2 Tim 1:6; 1 Pet. 4:10).^ 
Since charisma i s such a d i s t i n c t i v e l y Pauline word, i t s usage 
i n Paul's theology needs to be examined, and because of the intimate 
connection between charisma and grace, the concept of grace needs to 
be looked at f i r s t . For Paul grace is the word that sums up the 
nature and structure of the salvation event, both the past event (2 
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Cor, 8; Rom, 5:15; Gal. 2:21; Eph. l:6f,) and the power of the present 
experience (Rom. 3:24; 5:2, 15, 17, 20; 1 Cor. l:4f; 15:10; 2 Cor. 6:1; 
Gal. 1:6, 15; 2:21; Eph. 2:5, &).-• Also particular ministries or 
services inspired by grace are referred to as graces and Paul's 
special grace i s his apostolic o f f i c e (Rom. 1:5; 1 Cor. 16:3, 2 Cor. 
1:15; 8:1, 8:4, 6f, 19; Eph. 4:29), 
I t i s only i n the context of charis that charisma can be 
understood. The charisma, the g i f t , 'is inseparable from the 
gracious power that bestows i t ' and that gracious power i s the 
S p i r i t of God, thus a charisma is a manifestation of the Spirit,'* 
Therefore for Paul experience of grace is experience of the S p i r i t 
and as such, as shall be shown later i n this chapter, sums up Paul's 
understanding of the Christian experience as being 'in Christ*. The 
meaning of God's salvation deed in Jesus is expressed by Paul in the 
phrase 'the g i f t of grace' (Rom, 6:23) and as we shall see the 
salvation event becomes present through the gracious g i f t s of the 
S p i r i t , the charismata. The centrality and all-embracing nature of 
the charismatic experience for Paul i s brought out in Rom. 6:23 
where charisma means ' a l l that God's unmerited generosity 
accomplishes i n and for the believer';® in Rom, 12:lff, which shows 
that 'the believer's s p i r i t u a l (and charismatic) worship involves the 
t o t a l i t y of his relationships i n this age';^ and in 2 Cor, 1:11 where 
charisma represents 'the t o t a l i t y of the conferred g i f t of 
s a l v a t i o n ' . T h e r e f o r e James Dunn in his book Jesus and the Sp i r i t 
can conclude his examination of the concept of grace as follows: 'All 
grace, including i t s particular manifestations, i s the one grace of 
God , , , the whole of l i f e i s for Paul an expression of grace: a l l 
i s of grace, and grace i s a l l ' . ^ Since Dunn's book is the most 
thorough examination of the Pauline material r e l a t i n g to the 
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charismatic experience we shall refer extensively to this work i n 
the present chapter. 
An important aspect of experience of the S p i r i t for Paul i s that 
i t i s a shared experience.^ A key concept i n his understanding of 
community i s expressed in the phrase he koinonia tou hagiou 
pneumatos (2 Cor. 13:13, Phil. 2:1) which is usually translated 'the 
fellowship of the Holy S p i r i t ' but which actually means 
'participation in the Holy Spirit'. This means that Paul understands 
the Church as a charismatic community and that therefore to be a 
Christian i s to be charismatic, since for Paul being a Christian was 
to be a member of the body of Christ, to participate in the Holy 
S p i r i t (1 Cor. 12, 2 Cor. 13:13f, Phil. 2:1).'° That participation i s 
dynamic not s t a t i c , 'an ongoing event, constantly dependent on the 
S p i r i t manifesting his manifold interacting charismata'.^ ^  Each 
member of the body has a contribution to make, however menial and 
each contribution i s a charisma (1 Cor. 12:2Iff.). A l l charismata are 
acts of service (1 Cor. 12:4 - 7) given for the common good, for the 
sanctification of the body (cf 1 Cor. 12:25f., Rom. 12:5). 
Consequently 1 Cor. 12, the f u l l e s t chapter on s p i r i t u a l g i f t s to 
individuals, leads on to the vision of the optimal Christian 
community. For Paul the growth demanded by the g i f t of grace is 
not j u s t individual but communal; 'the corporate dimension of 
religious experience i s in t e g r a l to Paul's whole understanding of the 
divine-human relationship' and therefore personal growth i s only 
possible within a communal setting.'^ 
According to Dunn, Paul does not understand charisma as 'a 
human capacity heightened, developed or transformed', rather i t i s 
always the manifestation of a supernatural power characterised by a 
'transcendent otherness'.'^ Athough Dunn considers i t important not 
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to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural i n a 
contemporary interpretation of religious phenomena, he makes i t 
clear that Paul makes such a distinction. As a result of this Dunn 
makes a clear-cut d i s t i n c t i o n between natural g i f t s and supernatural 
charismata and avoids making a link between a person and charismata. 
Charismata are seen as specific and particular endowments for 
particular occasions: 'only the actual deed or word i s the 
charisma'.^* Therefore he also maintains 'there i s no immediate 
causal connection between charismata and sanctification'.'® Although 
Dunn sees charismata as the functionings of the body of Christ 
given to build up the community, he does not develop, although 
recognizing, 'the charismatic character of the process of growth'.'® 
He wants to separate charismata from sanctification, the process of 
growth. This, however, we w i l l argue, i s an essential aspect of the 
charismatic experience as an expression of grace and we shall 
develop this in the next chapter. 
Although on the one hand Dunn talks about the all-embracing 
character of grace for Paul, on the other hand he wants to l i m i t i t 
to specific and particular manifestations, not to permanent 
ministries or offices. Although recognizing that Paul applies the 
term charis to his apostleship, Dunn argues that being an apostle is 
not a charismatic function.''^ But this sort of approach leads to 
the narrow interpretation of the experience of the Holy Sprit that 
we want to avoid and that Rahner is concerned in his theology of 
grace to avoid.'® This wider understanding i s not only brought 
about by a d i f f e r e n t theology of grace. Exegetical evidence would 
seem to suggest i t too. 
F i r s t l y , in 1 Corinthians 12 Paul talks about s p i r i t u a l g i f t s 
and, as Dunn points out, there is no dis t i n c t i o n between charismatic 
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g i f t s and other a c t i v i t i e s in verses 4-6, charismata, services and 
a c t i v i t i e s are a l l charismatic manifestations.''® Paul then speaks of 
the body as an analogy of the church which i s for Paul, as we have 
seen, a charismatic community; a l l within i t are charismatic and the 
g i f t s of the S p i r i t are 'the l i v i n g movements of Christ's body'.^^ 
But i n that case i t would seem clear that just as there are eyes, 
ears, head and feet etc. (vv.l4 - 26), so too there are apostles, 
prophets, teachers etc.; offices or functions are charismatic as much 
as individual acts. 
In this l e t t e r Paul wants to distinguish between people and 
g i f t s since the Corinthians were boasting about their g i f t s <1 Cor. 
4:7). Elsewhere Paul makes a much closer link between person and 
g i f t : ' I am hoping through your prayers to be granted 
1 charis thesomai, bestowed as a gracious g i f t ] to you' (Philm. 22; cf. 
2 Cor. 1:15).2° 
Secondly, Dunn contrasts charisma and o f f i c e in a rather 
disparaging reference to early Catholicism: 'Spirit and charisma have 
become in effect subordinate to o f f i c e , to r i t u a l , to tr a d i t i o n -
early Catholicism indeed!'.^^ However i t does not follow that just 
because charisma i s described as 'within' Timothy (1 Tiro. 4:14; I I 
Tim. 1:6) that this i s proof that 'charisma has become power of 
office', as opposed to the dynamic Pauline concept; rather i t seems 
en t i r e l y consistent with Paul's view of the S p i r i t being within 
believers (eg Rom. 8:9).=^ =^  
This i s also misinterpreting the function of o f f i c e in the 
Catholic church. Charisma i s not power of of f i c e ; the human off i c e 
i t s e l f i s not charismatic. However, i t has, as Rahner points out, a 
charismatic element which transcends the i n s t i t u t i o n a l order, giving 
the o f f i c e a charismatic character. Both the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and the 
charismatic are governed by Christ and consequently both are 
charismatically inspired: 
To that extent, therefore, ecclesiastical o f f i c e and ministry 
i s charismatic in character, i f we understand by charismatic 
what i s in contradistinction to what is purely 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l , administered by men, subject to calculation 
and expressible in laws and rules 
Dunn's argument that the apostolate i s not a charisma i s based 
on the assertion that 'Paul derived his authority as an apostle not 
from the inspiration of the present but from the decisive events of 
the past',^'* but this simply does not follow. I f the risen Christ 
appoints apostles, as Dunn would maintain, then i t is a charismatic 
function, since 'one cannot experience Christ except as Spirit'.^ ® 
According to Arnold B i t t l i n g e r apostles 'must have been conscious of 
an inner c a l l from Christ, to which the Holy S p i r i t bore unmistakable 
testimony, and the i r c a l l was recognized and endorsed by the 
church'.^*' Although Dunn i s technically correct in saying that Paul 
calls apostleship a charis not a charisma, theologically i t is an 
a r t i f i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n when seen i n the l i g h t of Paul's overall 
thought. As Donald Gelpi puts i t : 'James Dunn has attempted to 
portray the apostolate i n terms that seem to me to r e f l e c t better 
his own reticence concerning the advantages of i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r e l i g i o n than the Pauline virtues'.^^ 
Thirdly, although technically Dunn i s correct in saying that Paul 
does not c a l l marriage a charisma, the implication in 1 Cor. 7:7 i s 
that he thinks of i t so. Paul i s contrasting celibacy with marriage, 
arguing that he has adopted the celibate state in order to be able 
to f u l l y devote himself to the Gospel, whereas others have a 
di f f e r e n t charisma, which on a straightforward reading of the text 
implies marriage. To argue that the g i f t of celibacy means the 
a b i l i t y to suppress specific sexual passions each time they arise 
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would seem to be an a r t i f i c i a l reading of the text.=^ ® In other 
words charismata include permanent vocational calls and are not just 
the experience of grace 'in a particular instance and only for that 
instance'.=^ ® 
Fourthly i t i s not ju s t a case of there being d i f f e r e n t models 
of the Church which can be compared with each other: the Pauline 
charismatic community, the early Catholicism of the pastorals, 
Johannine individual pietism and the Mathean law-abiding 
brotherhood. These are not alternatives as Dunn suggests in one 
place, but as he suggests elsewhere d i f f e r e n t churches in diffe r e n t 
situations r e f l e c t something of the dominant characteristics of 
their environment.®'-'' I f they are conceived as alternatives then the 
dynamic (but, for Dunn, probably unworkable) Pauline vision of the 
charismatic community i s contrasted with the other models with their 
inherent dangers of ins t i t u t i o n a l i s m , individualism and legalism. 
Given such a choice Dunn opts ' for the Pauline vision, concluding 
that the biggest challenge for contemporary Christianity: 
. . . i s to take the Pauline exposition seriously, and to 
s t a r t not from what now i s by way of tr a d i t i o n and 
i n s t i t u t i o n , but instead to be open to that experience of 
God which f i r s t launched Christianity 
Or, as he expresses i t elsewhere, to become a one-generation church 
which organizes not for the future but concentrates on the present, 
lest the future becomes so burdened with the past that i t cannot 
make the vision of Christian community a reality.^'^ 
But t h i s i s to propose a false choice, the primary way to be 
open to the o r i g i n a l experience of God that launched Christianity i s 
by way of t r a d i t i o n and i n s t i t u t i o n . Contrary to Dunn's view that 2 
Tim. 1:14 indicates that the charisma has lost i t s dynamic character 
and i s only the power that guards the t r a d i t i o n , i t shows the 
dynamic nature of the t r a d i t i o n , enlivened by the S p i r i t , a basic 
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Paul ine though t (1 Cor. 7:10; 9:14; 11:2, 23; 15:3; P h i l . 4:9; 2 Thess. 
2:15).='® As Rahner p u t s i t : 
I t goes w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t as the Church grew, i t s 
"machinery" grew too , and the r e g u l a t i o n s f o r t h i s were 
worked ou t more f u l l y . But t h i s i s not p r o o f t h a t i n the 
e a r l y Church the wind o f the S p i r i t blew w i t h more v i g o u r 
than l a t e r . ® ' * 
T h e r e f o r e f o r Rahner the S p i r i t has a lways i n s p i r e d the Church, 
b o t h th rough o f f i c i a l a u t h o r i t y and laws and a l so th rough such 
t h i n g s as the love o f martyrdom and monast ic enthusiasm. Al though 
Dunn acknowledges the s p i r i t u a l na tu re o f the law he does not 
develop the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h a t and thus makes the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the c h a r i s m a t i c community and e a r l y C a t h o l i c i s m . The S p i r i t 
g i v e s law, t h e r e f o r e the law i s s p i r i t u a l (Rom. 7:14), ' i n the sense 
t h a t i t d e r i v e s f r o m the S p i r i t . . . and was in tended to address 
men a t the l e v e l o f the S p i r i t ' . ® ^ I n o the r words the S p i r i t i s ' the 
o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e o f the C h r i s t i a n community ' .^^ This means t h a t 
f o r Rahner, the Franciscans , f o r example, by t h e i r submission to 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l law th rough t h e i r vows, are charisma t i c s s ince the 
submiss ion t o law, i f r e a l l y done ' i n a s p i r i t o f joyous p o v e r t y ' 
b r i n g s about the s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l love t h a t i s the ha l lmark o f a 
charismar''^ Th i s n o t i o n o f s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l love d e f i n i n g a charisma 
i s c e n t r a l t o the unders t and ing o f the cha r i sma t i c na tu re o f 
Rahner's theo logy , as we s h a l l see. 
The charismatic experience as an experience of death and 
resurrection 
A l t h o u g h Dunn on the one hand r i g h t l y s t r e s ses the c e n t r a l i t y o f the 
c h a r i s m a t i c exper ience f o r Paul , on the o t h e r hand he can argue t h a t 
the re was n o t h i n g d i s t i n c t i v e l y C h r i s t i a n about cha r i sma t i c a c t i v i t y 
f o r Paul . Dunh c i t e s examples o f hea l i ngs , v i s i o n s , prophecies and 
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tongues f r o m sources contemporary to the New Testament. He 
concludes t h a t ' cha r i sma t i c exper ience as such does not b r i n g us t o 
the h e a r t o f d i s t i n c t i v e l y C h r i s t i a n exper ience f o r Paul'.®® Dunn 
can say t h a t cha r i sma t i c a c t i v i t y i s not d i s t i n c t i v e l y C h r i s t i a n f o r 
Paul on ly because he i d e n t i f i e s charismata i n t h i s con tex t w i t h 
unusua l phenomena o f the ' s igns and wonders ' type , w i t h an 
o t h e r w o r l d l y 'experience o f r e c e i v i n g a g i f t f r o m beyond'.-"'® 
A l t h o u g h elsewhere he has a much broader d e f i n i t i o n o f cha r i sma t i c 
exper ience he always works w i t h the concept o f charismata as a 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f s u p e r n a t u r a l power i n s p e c i f i c and p a r t i c u l a r 
occasions . Th i s i s why he can make no connect ion between 
charismata and s a n c t i f i c a t i o n and can envisage the experience o f 
char i smata w i t h o u t love. '*^ 
What i s d i s t i n c t i v e about C h r i s t i a n experience f o r Paul , 
acco rd ing t o Dunn, i s t h a t i t i s exper ience o f the c r u c i f i e d and 
r i s e n C h r i s t and t h a t t h e r e f o r e i t i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the s e l f -
s a c r i f i c i a l love o f God i n C h r i s t . The S p i r i t i s the S p i r i t o f Jesus 
(1 Cor. 12:3; Rom. 8 : 1 4 f f . ; 2 Cor. 3:18; Rom. 8 ;28f . ) and t h a t means 
t h a t the ' charac te r o f the C h r i s t event i s the ha l lmark o f the 
Sp i r i t ' . ' ^ ^ For Paul the ' l a s t Adam became a l i f e - g i v i n g S p i r i t ' (1 
Cor. 15:45), thus the exper ience o f the S p i r i t i s experience o f 
C h r i s t . (Though i t shou ld be po in t ed o u t t h a t Paul i s speaking 
' p r i m a r i l y i n e x i s t e n t i a l r a t h e r than o n t o l o g i c a l terms','*^ t h a t i s t o 
say he i s p r i m a r i l y concerned here w i t h how C h r i s t i s experienced by 
the b e l i e v e r , s ince C h r i s t i s more than l i f e - g i v i n g S p i r i t (eg. Rom. 
l : 3 f . ; 8:34; 1 Cor. 15:24-8) ; b u t as f a r as C h r i s t i a n experience i s 
concerned, exper ience o f the S p i r i t i s exper ience o f C h r i s t ( c f . Rom. 
8 : 9 - 1 1 ; 1 Cor. 6:17; 1 Cor. 12:4-6) . ) 
Consequently f o r Paul the C h r i s t i a n exper ience i s not on ly one 
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o f l i f e b u t a l so death (Rom. 7:24; 8:10, 13), s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s 
b rough t about th rough s u f f e r i n g w i t h C h r i s t (2 Cor. 4:7-5:5; Rom. 
8:17; 2 Cor. 1:5; Co l . 1:24; Rom. 5:2ff.).*=> Experience o f the S p i r i t 
i s exper ience o f l i f e t h rough death , the d i s t i n c t i v e C h r i s t i a n 
exper ience f o r Paul i s exper ience both o f the e x a l t e d and o f the 
c r u c i f i e d C h r i s t . Th i s exper ience o f s h a r i n g i n the s u f f e r i n g and 
death o f C h r i s t i s s t r o n g l y b rough t out i n a number o f places i n 
Paul 's e p i s t l e s . 
I n Gal . 2 :19f . Paul uses the p e r f e c t tense, not the a o r i s t , 
meaning ' I have been c r u c i f i e d w i t h C h r i s t and am i n t h a t s t a t e 
s t i l l ' ; the p e r f e c t i s a l so used i n Gal . 6:14 and Rom. 6:5.'*'^ In Rom. 
8:15-17 the g i f t o f S p i r i t i s l i n k e d w i t h s u f f e r i n g and i n P h i l . 
3 :10f Paul t a l k s about knowing C h r i s t i n the f e l l o w s h i p o f h i s 
s u f f e r i n g s and 'be ing conformed ' to h i s dea th . 
But t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what cha r i sma t i c experience i s . Thus 
H e r i b e r t MUhlen can say i n h i s book A Char ismat ic Theology t h a t 'an 
i n i t i a l acceptance o f one's own dea th ' i s ' the p r e - c o n d i t i o n f o r a l l 
c h a r i s m a t i c a c t i v i t y ' . ' ^ - ' For any C h r i s t i a n the basic and pr imary 
exper ience o f the S p i r i t i s one o f s u f f e r i n g and sur render . 
Accord ing to Muhlen 'Jesus' bas ic charism i s h i s self-surrender . . . 
and ou t o f t h i s a l l h i s char isms and t h e r e f o r e ours a lso f low' ,*® 
Again Dunn would recognize t h a t t h i s i s the case (Jesus h i m s e l f , as 
a man who l i v e d ' accord ing to the s p i r i t ' [Rom. l : 3 f ] , by h i s ac t ions 
and words and by the whole charac te r o f h i s l i f e and r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
became 'the charisma o f God') b u t does n o t develop i t , r e v e r t i n g to a 
nar row d e f i n i t i o n o f c h a r i s m a t i c a c t i v i t y t h a t means i t i s no t the 
essence o f C h r i s t i a n experience. '*^ 
Koenig i n h i s book Charismata; God's G i f t s f o r God's People 
argues t h a t i n 2 Cor. 1:8-11 charisma r e f e r s n o t t o the de l ive rance 
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b u t t o an en la rged share i n C h r i s t ' s s u f f e r i n g . Charisma i n verse 
11 i nc ludes ' the death p a r t o f h i s exper ience as w e l l as the 
r e s u r r e c t i o n / l i b e r a t i o n p a r t ' ; the e n t i r e event was a charisma. To 
know C h r i s t i s t o exper ience ' the f e l l o w s h i p o f s u f f e r i n g ' and ' the 
power o f the r e s u r r e c t i o n ' ( P h i l . 3:10).'*® The cha r i sma t i c n a t u r e o f 
the death exper ience i s a l so brought o u t i n P h i l . 1:29: 'For i t has 
been g r a n t e d (.eucharisthe - 'bestowed as a g rac ious g i f t ' ) to you 
t h a t f o r the sake o f C h r i s t you should no t o n l y be l i eve i n him bu t 
a l so s u f f e r f o r h i s sake'.'*'^ 
T h e r e f o r e cha r i sma t i c exper ience i s no t the experience o f ' s igns 
and wonders ' nor i s i t a h i g h e r and o p t i o n a l way o f C h r i s t i a n 
exper ience bu t i t i s the ve ry na tu re o f C h r i s t i a n exper ience. I t i s 
the rea lm no t o f s u p e r n a t u r a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s bu t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
the s u f f e r i n g s o f C h r i s t , b rough t about th rough dec i s ion , the 
d e c i s i o n whether o r n o t t o s u f f e r w i t h C h r i s t . Thus Dunn can say: 
For the gospe l faces man ( i n c l u d i n g the Chr i s t i an ! ) w i t h a 
choice: v i z . , he may choose how t o d i e . . . i f man chooses 
to l i v e h i s own l i f e , then he w i l l d i e h i s own death - and 
t h a t w i l l be t h a t . But i f by the power o f the S p i r i t he 
d ies C h r i s t ' s death now, then he w i l l l i v e C h r i s t ' s l i f e bo th 
here and h e r e a f t e r . ® ' ' 
T h e r e f o r e Dunn can conclude t h a t f o r Paul ' r e l i g i o u s experience 
embraces the whole o f h i s l i f e ' s ince every area o f l i f e i nvo lves 
d e c i s i o n and choice.^^ T h i s i s the h e a r t o f cha r i sma t i c experience 
and i t i s here too t h a t we a r r i v e a t the h e a r t o f Rahner's 
unders t and ing o f the C h r i s t i a n exper ience . For Rahner, i n words t h a t 
echo Dunn's above: ' I t i s t r u e t h a t we must d i e w i t h him. But then 
nobody escapes d y i n g . Why no t w i t h him . . . ?'^^ He cont inues : 
Every metaphysics o f man f i r s t becomes concrete here . And 
i t i s no longer ve ry i m p o r t a n t how t h a t metaphysics i s or 
migh t be ' i n i t s e l f . I f i t i s acqu i r ed i n Jesus, i t conta ins 
ve ry l i t t l e , and t h e r e f o r e e v e r y t h i n g , because i t i s acqui red 
i n dea th as l i f e ; no t i n speaking about dea th , but i n death , 
h i s and one's own.®® 
15 
The charismatic experience as an expression of love 
T h i s means then t h a t cha r i sma t i c a c t i v i t y i s no t t o be conceived i n 
terms o f people be ing channels o f God's grace as i f grace could pass 
th rough a person, t h a t they cou ld m a n i f e s t a charisma, bu t would 
themselves remain u n a f f e c t e d . I f cha r i sma t i c exper ience i s bound up 
w i t h the d e c i s i o n t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the s u f f e r i n g s o f C h r i s t and 
commitment t o s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l l ove , then the d i s t i n c t i o n o f t e n made 
i n c h a r i s m a t i c t h i n k i n g between g i f t s and f r u i t i s an a r t i f i c i a l 
one.^'* A l t h o u g h the New Testament does n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y descr ibe 
love as a charisma, l ove i s never the less ' the g r e a t e s t o f g i f t s ' . ^ ^ 
Le t us examine t h i s a s s e r t i o n more c l o s e l y . 
Dunn bases h i s argument t h a t charismata can be experienced 
w i t h o u t love and t h e r e f o r e independent ly o f any s a n c t i f i c a t i o n 
process on 1 Cor. 13. Since t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between love and 
charisma i s o f fundamen ta l importance t o our argument i t i s 
necessary t o have a d e t a i l e d look a t t h i s chapter and the two which 
precede and f o l l o w i t , s ince they represen t Paul 's most d e t a i l e d 
d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s i s sue . 
Dunn argues t h a t the word 'pneumatikos' i s an impor t an t word 
f o r Paul , s ince i t c l e a r l y e s t ab l i shes the C h r i s t i a n ' s dependence on 
the S p i r i t . ^ ^ So i n Rom. 1:11, charisma and pneumatikon are found 
t oge the r (see a l so 1 Cor. 2 : 1 2 f . ) . I n 1 Cor. 12:1 ; 14:1 and probably 
2:13, Dunn ma in ta ins t h a t pneumatika is used i n a synonymous sense 
w i t h charismata. D iscuss ing the equa t ion o f pneumatica w i t h 
charismata Dunn says: 
But Paul i s no t c r i t i c a l o f t h i s use o f pneumatika (as 14:1 
i n d i c a t e s ) , and even i f e lsewhere he p r e f e r s to unde r l i ne 
the g rac ious cha rac te r o f cha r i sma t i c experience, he f u l l y 
shares the C o r i n t h i a n unders tand ing o f char ismata as g i f t s 
o f the Spirit (1 Cor. 12:4) and unde r l i ne s t h i s b e l i e f on h i s 
own account ( 1 2 : 7 f f . , I D . " 
But though Paul makes a l i n k elsewhere between the two words i t 
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can be argued t h a t i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i n 1 Cor. 12-14 he 
ma in t a ins a d i s t i n c t i o n . Th i s can be shown i n th ree ways. 
F i r s t l y , Dunn h i m s e l f p o i n t s o u t t h a t pneumatikos was an 
i m p o r t a n t word i n the g n o s t i c i s m o f the t ime and t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d 
i n Paul 's usage i n 1 Cor. 2 : 1 3 f f . ; 14:37; 1 5 : 4 4 f f . ^ ° Also the 
r e f e r e n c e i n Eph. 6:12, where ta pneumatika r e f e r s t o e v i l s p i r i t s , 
h i g h l i g h t s the a m b i g u i t y o f the word .^^ Consequently charismata is 
Paul 's p r e f e r r e d choice ( c f . Rom. 1:11; 12:6; 1 Cor. 1:7) as 
'pneumatikos i s l ess ab le to p rov ide a v e h i c l e f o r the d i s t i n c t i v e 
Paul ine use than charisma\'^° 
Secondly, bo th the s i t u a t i o n i n C o r i n t h and the way Paul 
i n t r o d u c e s the s u b j e c t i n 1 Cor. 12:1 suggest t h a t pneumatika i s a 
word used by the Cor in th ians .^ ' ' 
T h i r d l y , Dunn cons iders the theory t h a t Paul was not c r i t i c a l o f 
the word pneumatica o n l y i f 1 Cor. 14:1 was the r ework ing o f an 
e d i t o r who had i n s e r t e d 1 Cor. . 13.^^ But as he p o i n t s out the 
chapter i s d i r e c t l y aimed a t the Cor in th i ans o v e r e v a l u a t i o n o f 
s p i r i t u a l g i f t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y g l o s s o l a l i a , prophecy and knowledge and 
hence an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f chapte rs 12-14 .*® However, i f the phrase 
'zeloute de ta pneumatika' (1 Cor. 14:1) i s seen as a C o r i n t h i a n 
phrase, i t can be shown t h a t Paul was c r i t i c a l o f the word w h i l s t 
r e t a i n i n g the i n t e g r a l n a t u r e o f 1 Cor. 13. Le t us examine why the 
phrase can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way. 
I n the o the r occurrences o f zelow i n 1 Cor in th i ans i t i s used i n 
an u n f a v o u r a b l e sense (1 Cor. 3:3, 13:4) and elsewhere Paul normal ly 
uses the word i n t h i s sense (2 Cor. 12:20; Rom. 13:13; Gal . 4:17; 
5:20).^""* Also i t i s n o t l i k e l y t h a t Paul would exho r t them to s t r i v e 
a f t e r the h ighe r g i f t s , hav ing j u s t exhor ted them to be content w i t h 
t h e i r place i n the body, however h i g h or low and no t a l l t o s t r i v e 
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f o r the h i g h e s t g i f t s . Th i s apparent incons i s t ency i s expla ined i f 
Paul i s e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y o r e x p l i c i t l y q u o t i n g the Cor in th i ans . Th i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s backed up by 1 Cor. 14:12: ' s ince you are eager f o r 
izelotai) m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f the S p i r i t , s t r i v e (.zeteite) to exce l i n 
b u i l d i n g up the church ' ; Paul d e l i b e r a t e l y changes the C o r i n t h i a n 
word t o h i s word."^-^ The word zeloute, which occurs i n I Cor. 12:31 
and 14:1 can e i t h e r be t r a n s l a t e d i n the i m p e r a t i v e o r i n d i c a t i v e . ^ ® 
T r a n s l a t e d i n the i n d i c a t i v e i t means: 'You are striving a f t e r the 
g r e a t e s t g i f t s ' . T h e r e f o r e 14:1 need n o t i n d i c a t e Paul 's acceptance 
o f the word b u t i s t r a n s l a t e d : 'Make t h i s k i n d o f love your g o a l ; y e t 
"you are s t r i v i n g f o r s p i r i t u a l g i f t s " , bu t I say r a t h e r tha t you 
shou ld a l l p r o p h e s y ' . ® ^ 
We have a l r eady seen t h a t pneumatikos i n 1 Cor. 12-14 would 
a l so appear to be a quote . Thus i n 12:1 Paul i s address ing a 
q u e s t i o n r a i s e d by the C o r i n t h i a n s themselves ('now concerning. . . ' ; c f . 
7 : 1 , 25; 8 : 1 ; 16:1).®® I n 1 Cor. 14 the d i s cus s ion i s almost e n t i r e l y 
about prophecy and tongues. The Cor in th i ans asked about s p i r i t u a l 
g i f t s {pneumatika) (1 Cor. 12:1). Paul r e p l i e s t h a t there are many 
g i f t s (.charismata) (1 Cor. 12:4) d e l i b e r a t e l y r e p l a c i n g the C o r i n t h i a n 
word w i t h c r i t i c a l i n t e n t i o n . ® ^ Paul 's concern i s , t h e r e f o r e , to 
e s t a b l i s h e a r l y on i n t h i s s e c t i o n : 
. . . t h a t i t i s n o t ' i n s p i r e d speech' as such t h a t i s 
evidence o f the S p i r i t . They had a l ready known t h a t 
phenomena as pagans. Rather, what counts i s the 
intelligible and Christian content o f such utterances.^ '^ 
What m a t t e r s i s n o t the s o r t o f s p i r i t u a l g i f t s (.pneumatica) they 
been expe r i enc ing b u t whether they were express ions o f g rac ious 
love and t h e r e f o r e charismata7'' Thus the sense o f 1 Cor. 12:1 i s 
most f u l l y b rough t o u t i f i t i s rendered 'Now about what you c a l l 
the " s p i r i t u a l g i f t s " ' . ' ' ^ 
But why does Paul use 'charismata' i n 1 Cor. 12:31 and 
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'pneumatica' i n 1 Cor. 14:1? T h i s can be exp la ined by the f a c t t h a t 
when Paul uses a term f o r s p i r i t u a l g i f t s immedia te ly p r i o r to 
chapter 13 he uses charismata, s ince he i s making the p o i n t t h a t 
charismata a re an express ion o f l ove . T h e r e f o r e 1 Cor. 12:31 i s 
unders tood i n an i r o n i c sense, Paul do ing something o f which he i s 
f o n d , namely t a k i n g the p o i n t o f view o f h i s correspondents bu t 
d i r e c t i n g i t i n a new way: 'You des i r e the h i g h g i f t s ( t ha t i s i n 
C o r i n t h i a n terms, the g i f t s o f h ighes t i n s p i r a t i o n , but i n Paul 's 
terms the g i f t o f s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l l ove ) ; ve ry w e l l then I w i l l show 
you t h i s h ighes t way'. The phrase kath' hyperbolen, which the 
Revised Standard Ve r s ion t r a n s l a t e s ' s t i l l more e x c e l l e n t ' i s no t 
meant i n a compara t ive sense a t a l l , t h e r e f o r e the phrase does no t 
mean t h a t Paul a f f i r m i n g s t r i v i n g a f t e r s p i r i t u a l g i f t s and a l so 
p ropos ing a b e t t e r way, r a t h e r he i s a f f i r m i n g the on ly way.^^ 
Dunn ma in t a ins t h a t Paul be l i eves t h a t ' i t i s o n l y too poss ib le 
t o exper ience charisma w i t h o u t l o v e ' b u t the verses he c i t e s (1 Cor. 
3 :1-4 ; 13:1-3) do no t show t h i s s ince n e i t h e r o f them mentions 
charisma7'^ These verses on ly suppor t t h i s hypothes i s i f there i s 
no d i s t i n c t i o n i n Paul 's mind when he i s address ing the Cor in th i ans 
between pneumatica and charismata. I n 1 Cor. 13:1-3 Paul mentions 
g l o s s a l a l i a , prophecy, knowledge, f a i t h and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , both o f 
possessions and o f one's l i f e , bu t though Paul would consider t h a t 
they cou ld be charismata, they are on ly char ismata when they are an 
express ion o f God's g r ac ious love . John Schutz b r i n g s t h i s p o i n t 
o u t , q u o t i n g Erns t KSsemann: 
For Paul ' the t e s t o f a genuine charisma l i e s not i n the 
f a c t t h a t something s u p e r n a t u r a l occurs bu t i n the use 
which i s made o f i t . No s p i r i t u a l endowment has va lue , 
r i g h t s o r p r i v i l e g e on i t s own account . I t i s v a l i d a t e d 
on ly by the s e r v i c e i t renders ' . ' ' ^ 
A r n o l d B i t t l i n g e r i n G i f t s and Graces makes the d i s t i n c t i o n 
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between love and charisma and g i v e s the example o f a man dy ing o f 
t h i r s t i n the de se r t be ing f o u n d by a rescue p a r t y . They embrace 
him s a y i n g 'Dear b r o t h e r , I don ' t be l i eve i n g i f t s j u s t love'. '"® But 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s a r t i f i c i a l , charisma and love are bound up w i t h 
each o t h e r . Not o n l y i s i t n o t poss ib l e t o have charisma w i t h o u t 
love b u t n e i t h e r i s i t poss ib l e t o have God's love w i t h o u t 
charismata, s ince they are concrete express ions o f the l o v i n g 
g r a c i o u s a c t o f C h r i s t . F rede r i ck Borsch expresses i t w e l l : 
The example o f Jesus s tands paramount. God's ch i e f ways o f 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n are th rough the s u f f e r i n g o f compassion, 
s e r v i c e and h u m i l i t y . . . I t i s these ways tha t are the 
v i t a l charisms o r f r u i t o f the S p i r i t i n C h r i s t i a n l i v i n g . ' ^ ' ' 
Love i s no t p r i m a r i l y an emotion bu t i s a concrete t h i n g , love 
i n a c t i o n , i t i s 'a c a r i n g a t t i t u d e and an o u t g o i n g a c t i o n to those 
i n need'.'^^ Thus Gordon Fee can say: 
Love i s p r i m a r y f o r h im [Paul ] because i t has a l ready been 
g i v e n concre te express ion i n the coming o f Jesus C h r i s t t o 
d i e f o r the s i n s o f the w o r l d . Love i s no t an idea f o r 
Paul , no t even a ' m o t i v a t i n g f a c t o r ' f o r behaviour . I t i s 
behaviour . To love i s t o ac t ; a n y t h i n g s h o r t o f a c t i o n i s 
no t love a t 
T h i s i s no t t o say a l l good deeds are express ions o f t h i s love s ince 
o u t w a r d l y s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l a c t i o n s can be done f o r s e l f i s h mot ives 
(1 Cor. 13:3), b u t t h a t t h i s love i s on ly r e a l i z e d by l o v i n g ac t i ons . 
T h i s f a c t i s expressed by Paul 's use o f the concept o f ' w a l k i n g ' . 
Paul uses the ve rb t o walk (peripateo) i n the sense o f the 'walk o f 
l i f e , more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the mora l s e n s e ' . ® ° Through bapt ism we 
'walk i n newness o f l i f e ' (Rom. 6:4) which i s t o 'walk by the S p i r i t ' 
(Gal. 5:16) which i s t o 'walk i n l o v e ' (Eph. 5:2) which , i n t u r n , i s a 
ve ry p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r (Rom. 14:15). For Paul those who were 
s p i r i t u a l ( the pneumatikoi i n Gal . 6:1) were not those who had 
r ece ived s u p e r n a t u r a l g i f t s o r powers bu t those who were wa lk ing 
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by the S p i r i t 'and no t g i v i n g way to s e l f - c o n c e i t , d e s t r u c t i v e and 
u n c h a r i t a b l e c r i t i c i s m o f o t h e r s o r envy' (Gal. 5 : 1 3 f f . , 26; 6:3).*^^ 
The charismatic experience as the experience of 
l i f e i n the new creation 
For Paul l i f e i n the S p i r i t i s the l i f e o f the new c r e a t i o n (2 Cor. 
5:17), the S p i r i t i s n o t an a d d i t i o n a l o r unusua l phenomenon but the 
new ex i s t ence i t s e l f , the new community. The dec i s ive event f o r 
Paul t h a t separa tes the new c r e a t i o n f r o m the o l d i s the death and 
r e s u r r e c t i o n o f C h r i s t . To en t e r i n and l i v e i n ' the f i e l d o f f o r c e 
o f the pneuma' i s to e n t e r and l i v e i n ' the f i e l d o f f o r c e o f the 
s av ing even t s , i . e . i n t o the community which l i v e s by the cross and 
r e s u r r e c t i o n ' . ® ^ But the S p i r i t i s no t j u s t the power t h a t c rea tes 
f a i t h i t i s a l so the norm by which f a i t h l i v e s , ' though a s t r i c t 
d i s t i n c t i o n need no t always be made between them'.^'^' This i s 
c l e a r l y shown i n Gal . 5:25 where the f i r s t c lause i n d i c a t e s tha t the 
S p i r i t i s the power t h a t s u s t a i n s man's l i f e and the second clause 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t 'man i s summoned consc ious ly t o acknowledge t h i s f a c t 
and t o l e t h i s conduct be w h o l l y shaped thereby ' .®-* Rudolf Bultmann 
makes t h i s p o i n t s t r o n g l y : 
' I f we l i v e by the S p i r i t , l e t us a l so walk by the S p i r i t ' 
(v . 25) - a sentence open to misunders tanding so f a r as i t 
seems to imply t h a t the re cou ld be a ' l i v i n g by the S p i r i t ' 
w i t h o u t a ' w a l k i n g by the S p i r i t ' . But the purpose o f t h i s 
f o r m u l a t i o n i s to avo id the oppos i t e misunders tanding t h a t 
the re must f i r s t be a 'wa lk ing by the S p i r i t ' which would 
then e s t a b l i s h t h i s ' l i v i n g by the S p i r i t ' . The meaning i s 
c l e a r : the f a i t h - b e s t o w e d p o s s i b i l i t y o f ' l i v i n g by the 
S p i r i t ' must be e x p l i c i t l y l a i d h o l d o f by 'wa lk ing by the 
Spir i f . '^ ' -^ 
T h e r e f o r e s ince f o r Paul the S p i r i t i s a c t u a l l y the new c r e a t i o n 
i n C h r i s t , no t an a d d i t i o n a l phenomenon and i t i s th rough personal 
d e c i s i o n t h a t man e n t e r s i n t o the exper ience o f the S p i r i t and 
con t inues t o walk i n i t . I t can be s a i d t h a t the 'sphere o f C h r i s t 
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and the sphere o f the Holy S p i r i t are . . . c o n j o i n t l y regarded as 
the sphere o f pe r sona l d e c i s i o n ' . ® * 
Rahner, however, i s concerned t o unders tand the dec i s i ve event 
o f C h r i s t i n the c o n t e x t o f a modern, e v o l u t i o n a r y , n o n - m y t h o l o g i c a l 
w o r l d v iew. He t h e r e f o r e sees the whole o f c r e a t i o n , no t j u s t the 
new, as i n C h r i s t . 
By the g r ac ious coming o f the Logos i n the f l e s h , i n the 
u n i t y o f the race , i n the one h i s t o r y o f humani ty , mankind 
as a whole has become a consecrated humani ty , i n f a c t the 
people o f God.®'' 
To exper ience the S p i r i t i s n o t t h e r e f o r e experience o f an 
a d d i t i o n a l phenomenon bu t the experience o f d e c i s i o n t o consc ious ly 
a c t u a l i z e and walk accord ing to the r e a l i t y o f be ing crea ted i n 
C h r i s t . We s h a l l look a t t h i s when we dea l w i t h Rahner's 
unde r s t and ing o f grace and the ' s u p e r n a t u r a l e x i s t e n t i a l ' . We s h a l l 
now, however, look a t the c e n t r a l i t y o f r e l i g i o u s experience f o r 
Rahner and how he unders tands the cha r i sma t i c exper ience. 
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Chapter 2 
KARL RAHNER'S CHARISMATIC THEOLOGY 
The heart of Rahner's theology i s experience, i n particular mystical 
experience of the S p i r i t . His episteraological presuppositions and 
theology of grace, which we w i l l examine l a t e r , mean everyone's 
experience i s i m p l i c i t l y mystical since God, the mysterious horizon 
of our knowledge, grounds a l l our knowing and acting. Although this 
is of crucial importance we w i l l develop an overview f i r s t , before 
going into the details of Rahner's epistemology and theology of 
grace. As a resu l t of these presuppositions Rahner is able to 
af f i r m his fundamental belief that for every person 'there i s 
something l i k e an anonymous, unthematlc, perhaps repressed, basic 
experience of being orientated to God . . . which is "mystical"'.^ He 
finds that i t is the task of a contemporary mystical theology to 
provide 'an i n i t i a t i o n Into man's personal experience of God' and to 
work out a theology of mysticism that w i l l make ex p l i c i t to people 
this unthematlc experience of God that l i e s at the heart of a l l 
experience,^ Therefore, f o r Rahner, theology i s intimately bound up 
with religious experience and a theological statement is one that 
leads into the mystery, i.e. i t i s mystagogical.^" His emphasis i s 
thus on religious experience: 'the Christian of the future w i l l 
either be a "mystic", one who has "experienced" something, or he w i l l 
cease to be anything at all'.'^ This mystological approach results 
in him having a positive approach to the contemporary charismatic 
movement; that i s , as long as i t i s not closed to ra t i o n a l i t y . ^ 
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Theology of mysticism and charismatic experience 
For Rahner charismatic experiences need to be understood in terms 
of a theology of mysticism and contemporary charismatic movements 
need such a theology i n order to evaluate their experience,^ Like 
Rahner, Edward O'Connor also makes the link between charismatic 
experience and mystical experience.'' The action of the S p i r i t is 
associated with 'the grace of quiet' of t r a d i t i o n a l Christian 
mysticism, which corresponds to the 'peace which passes 
understanding' (Phil. 4:7). This operates at a deeper level than the 
i n t e l l e c t or w i l l and results in mystics having a profound awareness 
of the unity of the i r own being, not through introspection but by 
awareness of union with God. 
He i s no longer merely the object of thought or the goal of 
desire; He i s a present person who has united Himself 
di r e c t l y and immediately to the substance, even the bodily 
substance, of the mystic,® 
Mystics have t r a d i t i o n a l l y described this in terms of touch and this 
i s often the description of contemporary charismatics, expressed for 
example i n the hymn 'He touched me'. This i s a touch that is not 
merely external or in t e r n a l but transcends them both, the touch of 
love which leads to 'an awakening of the soul and the entire being 
with a new sensitivity',^ The person i s bathed in love, an 
experience that does not require conceptual thought (nor allows 
i t s e l f to be hindered by i t , as John of the Cross points out),^° 
As we sha l l see Rahner works out his mystical theology in terms 
of his epistemology but i t i s his s p i r i t u a l i t y that l i e s at the heart 
of his epistemological and theological considerations.'' ^  That i s 
why we are not s t a r t i n g with his philosophical thought, crucial as 
i t i s to understanding Rahner, He has always had an interest in 
religious experience and i t i s significant that before he wrote his 
two philosophical works, S p i r i t i n the World and Hearers of the Word 
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i n 1939 and 1941 respectively, he had already w r i t t e n a number of 
a r t i c l e s concerned with religious experience, in particular the 
mysticism of Orlgen, Bonaventure and Ignatius of Loyola.^ ^  However, 
i t i s Important to note that S p i r i t i n the World does not signify a 
break i n this interest i n religious experience but i s an attempt to 
give Jesuit s p i r i t u a l i t y a deeper basis. Consequently Rahner could 
say: 
The s p i r i t u a l i t y of Ignatius himself which we share in 
through the practice of prayer and a religious formation 
has become more significant for me than a l l the learned 
philosophy inside and outside the order.'^ 
Rahner was also interested in the mystical side of Thomas 
Aquinas: 'Thomas is the mystic who adores the mystery which i s 
beyond a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of expression',''^ and he appreciated the 
mystical theology of John of the Cross and Theresa of Avila,'^ and 
was influenced by Carl Albrecht's work on mysticism.'^ The Spanish 
mystics are an indispensable guide for Rahner in his formulation of 
a mystical theology for today. Finally, for Rahner, as for Origen, 
a l l knowledge of God i s mystical.' 
But although the writings of these mystical theologians were of 
great influence on him, the greatest influence was Rahner's own 
experience of the Ignatlan Exercises and his experience of the 
S p i r i t through them. I t was in his own s p i r i t u a l experience that 
his theology was formulated. I t i s Rahner's mystical experience of 
God, brought about through the Exercises, that i s at the heart of 
his thought. Ignatius' experience of God has become Rahner's: 'All 
I say i s I knew God, nameless and unfathomable, s i l e n t and yet near, 
bestowing himself upon me i n his T r i n i t y , I knew God beyond a l l 
concrete imaginings'.'® That is why Rahner is so suitable as a 
theologian for studying religious experience. The same is true of 
him as he says of Aquinas: 'Thomas' theology i s his s p i r i t u a l l i f e 
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and his s p i r i t u a l l i f e i s his theology'.'^ 
Aquinas, with whom Rahner constantly engages, was not 
specif i c a l l y concerned with mysticism. However he recognized the 
importance of mysticism and saw i t as the fulfil m e n t of knowledge 
of God and at the end of his l i f e had a mystical experience which 
made him regard his work as straw. He greatly respected the 
writings of the f i f t h - c e n t u r y mystic Pseudo-Dionysius, believing 
them to be close to St Paul and thus having a kind of apostolic 
authority. Dionysius described a contemplation which went beyond 
the senses and the i n t e l l e c t and passed into the 'unknowing' towards 
the 'Ray of Divine Darkness'.^*^ The darkness i s not a darkness of 
despair and nothingness but a 'darkness beyond light'.^^ Dionysius 
influenced the whole western t r a d i t i o n i n the Middle Ages, including 
the Scholastics; and the image of darkness i s further developed by 
John of the Cross. A comparison of John of the Cross and Rahner 
makes apparent the strong mystical element in Rahner's theology 
Rahner's epistemology and understanding of grace lead him to 
emphasize the experience of God that i s located i n the everyday 
encounters in the world rather than specifically religious 
a c t i v i t i e s , John stresses the experience of God in contemplation 
which occurs to Christians who have committed themselves i n prayer 
and asceticism and passed beyond the beginner's stage to become 
proficient. God i s encountered also i n human relationships but for 
John this i s dependent in and subsequent to the contemplative 
experience, John's mystical experience is brought about by 
supernatural means whereas for Rahner mysticism occurs 'within the 
framework of normal grace'.^^' Mystical experience is not of a 
di f f e r e n t order from the ordinary l i f e of grace but rather an 
intense experience of a universal experience of God.^ "* Mysticism i s 
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not an intermediate stage between f a i t h and the experience of grace 
on the one hand and the b e a t i f i c vision and glory on the other hand. 
Mysticism i s not theologically d i f f e r e n t but only psychologically 
d i f f e r e n t ; i t i s d i f f e r e n t within the natural sphere only and as such 
i t i s able to be learned. Rahner considers every experience of God 
mystical, what he would c a l l 'natural mysticism', but does consider 
that the word 'mysticism' i s best kept for the psychologically 
unusual manifestations. 
Whereas John of the Cross envisaged a new supernatural mode in 
the mystical contemplation of God, for Rahner mysticism takes place 
within ordinary experience. Although mystical experience (in the 
more specific sense) i s qua l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t , the difference i s 
one of the natural order of psychology or parapsychology, 'phenomena 
that are unusual but natural in themselves are elevated by grace 
and put to supernatural use, just as ordinary ones are.'^^ 
Edwards combines the Insights of both authors to obtain their 
mutual defining characteristics of experience of God. Experience of 
God i s : (1) of radical transcendence, (2) general and in d i s t i n c t , (3) 
non-conceptual and unthematic, (4) obscure, dark and mysterious, (5) 
mediated immediacy, (6) subtle and delicate and thus not always 
noticed, (7) indefinable and Ineffable, (8) of loving knowledge, (9) 
interpersonal, (10) passive and receptive, (11) with effects, e.g. 
peace, joy, t r a n q u i l i t y , and (12) preparation for glory but Infe r i o r 
to it.^^e-
Thus i t can be seen how deeply mystical thought and experience 
has influenced Rahner. His theology i s 'mystagogy', f a c i l i t a t i n g an 
individual's r e f l e c t i n g upon his own 'transcendental' experience of 
God that occurs within the whole of his e x i s t e n t i a l human 
experience, not j u s t one part of his l i f e . * ' " We sh a l l look much 
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more f u l l y at this notion of transcendental experience, but a brief 
explanation i s called for here. For Rahner we can only know 
something because we place i t in a wider horizon, which, as i t were, 
gives us co-ordinates to define things by. But that horizon i s not 
i t s e l f the object of knowledge, i t i s beyond us, transcendent and 
i n f i n i t e ; for Rahner this horizon i s God, 
His pastoral concern means that the s t a r t i n g point for his 
theology must be the place where the contemporary person finds 
himself today, the place where ' l i f e confronts the concrete 
individual i n his own personal and unique situation'.^ ® The 
influence of mysticism on Rahner means that he stresses the 
experience of mystery and begins with the individual's experience of 
divine mystery, the person standing before the mystery. I t is not 
simply an anthropological approach but a theological anthropology in 
which the two sides, God and man, are integrally bound up with each 
other. More precisely, since the experience of mystery i s the basis 
of his theology, i t i s a mystical theological anthropology. In 
Harvey Egan's words, for Rahner 'the human person i s basically 
mystic-in-the-world';^® the experience of mystery pervades the whole 
of l i f e , 
Sanctiflcation and charismatic experience 
Mystical experience i s therefore the experience of grace and, as we 
have seen, the experience of grace i s the d e f i n i t i v e factor in 
charismatic experience. We have also seen that charismatic 
experience and sa n c t i f i c a t i o n are bound up with each other. 
Sanctification is growth in grace and Rahner develops his 
understanding of growth in grace with reference to mystical 
theology. Mystical theology has always seen development in terms of 
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stages: either i t has been the purgative, illuminative and unitive 
way which has seen mystical progress i n terms of an ever-increasing 
gnosis; or i t has been the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of incipientes, 
proficientes and perfecti (beginners, those who have progressed, the 
perfect),®"^  But although there must be progress and growth in the 
Christian l i f e , Rahner views these t r a d i t i o n a l attempts to define i t 
as too gnostical in the case of the former and too formal and too 
a r t i f i c a l i n the case of the l a t t e r 
Another way of understanding Christian growth, this time in 
dogmatic theology, has been the doctrine of the inevitable increase 
in sanctifying grace through good works done in the state of grace 
and reception of the sacraments. But this sort of understanding i s 
based on 'a quantitative, impersonal conception of grace'.®^  I t i s 
exactly this s t a t i c conception of grace as 'a thing', as something to 
be received, that Rahner wants to avoid. His concern throughout his 
theology i s to make grace an integral part of human experience not 
an external superstructure and he considers that the tr a d i t i o n a l 
ways of explaining growth in grace have fa i l e d to do that. 
Rahner reinterprets the t r a d i t i o n a l understanding of growth in 
grace to show how this growth i s i n fact 'the law of the exi s t e n t i a l 
deepening of acts', which i s i n fact what t r a d i t i o n knows as the 
mystical factor i n religion.^^' Rahner i s concerned to make growth 
in grace, the process of sanctification, not only an external moral 
a f f a i r but one that affects a person ontologically, in the core of 
his being, not ju s t his actions. He therefore distinguishes between 
two d i f f e r e n t dimensions of intensity involved in human action: 
One of these i s the measure of the greater or lesser 
personal depth of an act, while the other measures the 
intensity and density of the act on a particular personal 
level.^•'^ 
So, for example, a moral act i s always good i n terms of the second 
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measure, whatever the motives, but in terms of the f i r s t measure 
the act may not involve the person to any great extent in the depth 
of his s p i r i t u a l and personal being and so be of l i t t l e value in 
terms of growth i n grace. Growth In grace i s Integrally tied up 
with 'a person's capacity to commit himself exlstentlally', i,e, 
measured by the law of the e x i s t e n t i a l deepening of acts,='^ 
This i s the key to Rahner's understanding of the process of 
sanctification and i t is also, since the two are bound up with each 
other, the key to his understanding of charismatic experience. We 
have seen the Importance of Ignatius for Rahner and i t is to him 
and his method of discerning God's w i l l that we must now turn our 
attention as we look at how Rahner understands the charismatic 
experience in terms of the e x i s t e n t i a l deepening of acts. 
Existential commitnient and charismatic experience 
Rahner's main treatment of Ignatius' method of discerning God's w i l l 
i s i n the essay 'The Logic of Concrete Individual Knowledge in 
Ignatius Loyola',-^ ® Ignatius envisaged three ways of discerning 
God's wlll.='^ The f i r s t i s a clear and e x p l i c i t c a l l from God, such 
as Paul's Damascus road experience. The second i s through the 
movement of s p i r i t s and the discernment of these s p i r i t s through 
the experience of consolations and desolations, what Ignatius calls 
the process of making an election. The t h i r d i s through rational 
choice, a reasoned, i n t e l l e c t u a l assessment of a l l the factors 
involved. Now, as Rahner points out, the last way i s to be 
considered the exception for a Christian, to be used only as a last 
resort i f the other two are not present. In other words Ignatius 
'assumes that a man has to reckon, as a practical p o s s i b i l i t y of 
experience, that God may communicate his w i l l to him'.^ '® However, 
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Ignatius' world view i s the t r a d i t i o n a l kind that Rahner wants to 
leave behind. I t views thoughts as either coming from within, from 
one's own free judgment, or else from without, from the good or e v i l 
spirit.^-'' This i s the world view that Rahner wishes to reinterpret 
since i t f a i l s to take into account a l l the psychological, 
environmental, genetlcal, social factors, etc., that influence a 
person Rahner's premise is that God's action is through 
secondary causes, that God does not intervene within the order of 
causality but upholds the whole chain of causality,'*' Experience of 
the S p i r i t i n grace during the election process must enter as 'a 
formative power into a genuine relation to the whole of his l i f e ' , 
not as a 'meteorite'.'*^ 
The basic principle underlying Ignatius' understanding of 
election i s that 'a moral decision in i t s i n d i v i d u a l i t y is not merely 
an instance of general normative principles' Rather each 
individual, i n his unique concrete h i s t o r i c a l circumstances makes an 
o r i g i n a l and unique contribution to the moral decision making 
process. Consequently a proper understanding of the Exercises i s 
only possible i f i t i s recognized that 'the universal alone does not 
determine man, that within i t there i s and must be the unique, the 
unrepeatable that belongs to history, what i s individual and 
inexpressible'.'^* 
The mode of knowledge in the f i r s t and second ways of making 
the election are not of an 'otherworldly kind'; a l l three ways are of 
the same nature.*^ But given this there i s nevertheless a 
d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t kind of knowledge in the f i r s t and second ways 
which are progressively higher and more concentrated types of the 
third.''® 
Rahner does not deal in d e t a i l with the f i r s t or t h i r d method of 
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making an election but with the second, the experience of 
consolations and desolations. For Ignatius the discerning of God's 
w i l l this way, i.e. discernment of s p i r i t s , i s not simply a matter of 
judging the consolations and desolations by their f r u i t s but by 
discerning 'the i n t r i n s i c differences between the impulses 
themselves', i.e. not by f r u i t s but by roots.'*'^ For Ignatius this 
discernment comes about through the experience of 'consolation 
without cause', i.e. feelings of peace, t r a n q u i l l i t y and quiet that 
come about not through a particular cause but through a non-
conceptual experience of God, through u t t e r receptivity to God, 
'There i s no longer "any object" but the drawing of the whole 
person, with the very ground of his being . . . into the i n f i n i t y of 
God'.'^ ^ 
Consolations, i n themselves, are not c r i t e r i a but their divine 
o r i g i n , the fact that they are consolations without cause.'*® This i s 
done by an 'experimental test' to imagine oneself making a 
particular choice and then seeing i f that decision leaves the 
experience of pure openness to God intact,®'^  Rahner, however, 
interprets the discernment of s p i r i t s i n terms of exi s t e n t i a l 
commitment, i.e. 'the free act of a human being in which he has 
ultimate control over himself before God'.~'^  For Rahner the 
discernment of s p i r i t s in the Exercises is interpreted in terms of 
the 'unity of s p i r i t u a l experience and e x i s t e n t i a l decision',^^ The 
choice i s made between an alternative of rationally and morally good 
choices according to the 'fundamental feeling he has about 
himself'.^^ This i s not an 'otherworldly' experience but, since 
freedom and love are involved, i t concerns 'a concrete person in his 
innermost centre, as unique, responsible and free.®^ There is no 
special revelation at work but an assessment of congruence with our 
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deepest sense of God. This determines whether or not i t i s the w i l l 
of God for him. When a person comes to a decision not merely on 
the basis of r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n and moral principles but also in 
this way of understanding the Exercises, then for Rahner, he has 
acted not only r a t i o n a l l y and morally but also charismatically.^^ 
Thus Rahner can say of the Exercises: 'Ignatius of Loyola 
constructed a logic of the ex i s t e n t i a l recognition of God's 
charismatic Impulses, but i t has not yet been properly 
assimilated'.'^ ® 
However, i t needs to be pointed out that there is plenty of 
room for self-delusion i n this method unless i t i s realized that for 
Ignatius i t i s essential that the decision i s made in humble prayer 
in the context of a progressive i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with, in Paul's phrase, 
'the mind of Christ' (1 Cor.2,16; cf, Phil,2.5). The person must be, 
in Ignatius' terms, 'indifferent'.®'^  That i s to say he must recognize 
that i n a decision between two choices God may be leading in either 
direction and the less a t t r a c t i v e , the way that involves personal 
suffering, may well be the one He is actually leading in. In other 
words to have the mind of Christ is to take up the cross, the 
charismatic Impulses lead i n the way of the cross. Only I f this i s 
prayerfully recognized w i l l the danger of self-delusion be reduced. 
Ethical decisions and charismatic experience 
Rahner develops this process of charismatic decision i n terms of 
ethics i n his essay, 'On the Question of a Formal Existential 
Ethics'.®® In th i s essay Rahner says that a man's acts are of not 
merely spatio-temporal significance, as is the case with material 
things, but, since he i s destined to an eternal l i f e , have an eternal 
significance; not j u s t morally but ontologically, there i s something 
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'positively individual' i n man's personal acts.®® The decision-making 
process of formal e x i s t e n t i a l ethics d i f f e r s from si t u a t i o n ethics i n 
that i t does not deny that universal norms can be applied to 
concrete individual cases. But at the same time i t i s not just a 
matter of perception and application of a universal norm. In formal 
e x i s t e n t i a l ethics universal norms are applicable but the decision 
based on them i s not simply an application of the universal norm by 
the conscience. Rather; 
, , . there must be some function of conscience which does 
not merely apply the universal norms to each of my 
particular situations but which moreover grasps also what 
has not yet been made absolutely clear by the situation and 
the universal norms, and which i s precisely and as such 
what has to be done by me individually.^^ 
For Rahner this i s how the Exercises are to be understood.^' The 
value of the s p i r i t u a l theology of Ignatius for Rahner is Ignatius' 
awareness that the w i l l of God for each person is intimately 
connected with his own unique ind i v i d u a l i t y , he must choose what i s 
connatural to himself. In the l i g h t of the above this can be 
understood as a charismatic ethic. 
The charismatic nature of Rahner's ethics i s more f u l l y brought 
out i n the essay: 'The Commandment of Love i n Relation to the Other 
Commandments',^'^ The commandment of love, which sums up a l l the 
commandments, i s not a commandment to do something or other but to 
'do oneself, to realize one's existence, to become personal. For 
Rahner this i s the point where the Christian doctrine of law merges 
with the Christian doctrine of grace, where the teaching of the 
Synoptics on the love demanded of man i s combined with the Pauline 
teaching on morality and sanctity i n the context of the grace given 
to man. What i s demanded of us has in fact already been given to 
us: 
His [Paul's] idea of morality as compared with the morality 
of the Pharisees i s the pneumatic morality of the pure 
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reception of what i s demanded of us, since i t Is the 
morality of boundless love as an answer to that absolute 
and irrevocable love in which God's Innermost Pneuma gives 
himself gratuitously to us."^ '-^  
I t i s not s i t u a t i o n ethics or 'individual ethics' but 'pneumatic 
morality', charismatic ethics. This can be more clearly understood 
in a more precise theory of ethics, that of Lawrence Kohlberg.®'' 
Kohlberg o r i g i n a l l y distinguished six stages in human moral 
development; he subsequently added a seventh. They are as follows: 
1, Punishment and Obedience Orientation: moral behaviour measured in 
terms of good or bad consequences to myself; 2. Instrumental, 
Relativist Orientation: needs of others taken into account insofar as 
they af f e c t consequences to myself; 3. Interpersonal Sharing 
Orientation; increased social awareness, moral behaviour motivated by 
social approval; 4, Law and Order Orientation: external law becomes 
basis for behaviour; 5. Social Contract Orientation: the conscience 
realizes that sometimes the law Is inadequate; 6. Universal Moral 
Principles: acknowledges inadequacy of u t i l i t a r i a n and l e g a l i s t i c 
solutions; and 7. Morality of Sanctity or of Supererogation: ready to 
suffer persecution. 
Kohlberg's research indicated that most adults (or at least most 
Americans), did not pass beyond stage four, Joseph Fletcher's book 
Situation Ethics was an attempt to get beyond this stage four 
morality.®^ ' Fletcher cites John Dewey as an influence, but Donald 
Gelpi argues that this i s misleading because Dewey's morality i s a 
stage f i v e morality committed to rational discourse, that is to say 
i t i s a morality committed to shared s c i e n t i f i c enquiry as a means 
for determining moral principles. Fletcher's i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
s i t u a t i o n a l relativism does not match up to Dewey's reasoned, 
collective ethical morality. 'Fletcher's situatlonism i s a l e g a l i s t i c 
ethic in tr a n s i t i o n to a social contract orientation, but i t has not 
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yet arrived'.*^*^ Although, for Gelpi, Dewey's strength over Fletcher 
is his commitment to shared enquiry i n a community, nevertheless his 
ethics are thoroughly rel a t i v i s e d . 
A charismatic morality i s at stage seven though i t transcends 
natural morality i n that i t i s an ethics of f a i t h . Decisions are 
made not only r a t i o n a l l y but prayerfully in openness to the dynamic 
action of the S p i r i t . Rahner, as we have seen, develops this aspect 
of charismatic ethics. He does not however s u f f i c i e n t l y develop the 
communal nature of morality. He stresses the aspect of transcending 
natural morality, ethical decisions are not based purely on rational 
or moral principles, but his emphasis i s ind i v i d u a l i s t i c . The only 
community for t r u l y understanding the charismatic nature of 
Christian ethics is the charismatic community governed by the moral 
absoluteness and moral ultimacy that Christ proclaimed and 
continually inspired by the S p i r i t , We shall develop this further 
later. 
Self-realization and the charismatic experience 
The charismatic nature of ethical decisions i s not something that i s 
confined to a particular realm of human existence. Choice and 
decision are involved i n every aspect of l i f e . In fact for Rahner 
they are the essence of being human, Rahner i s aware that human 
beings are the product of a whole proceeding history; a complex 
network of biological, psychological and hereditary factors affect 
them and they are immersed in a social, p o l i t i c a l and cu l t u r a l 
infrastructure. But at the same time human beings are not merely 
the sum of these influences; there i s an irreducible dimension to 
human beings. Humans are only f u l l y understood on the basis of 
their own spontaneity and i n t e r i o r freedom which results in unique 
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personal decisions. This i s not explainable by the human sciences 
which i n their e f f o r t to formalize everything about a human being 
can miss the essence of a person 'who i s always unique and bestowed 
on himself'.'^•^ Rahner sums up these two dimensions of human 
existence i n the following passage: 
There i s no 'inwardness' which does not also stand open, as 
i t were, to what i s without. The ultimate, most personal 
freedom, which i s to be found where man i s inevitably 
himself, without any substitute or any excuse, at the heart 
of his being (or however we like to express i t ) - the place, 
that i s to say, where he is v i r t u a l l y the absolute and 
irreplaceable subject - i s where he s t i l l has something to 
do with Christ, and with a l l other men and women too. For 
there are no spheres which can be cleanly separated from 
one another i n an ex i s t e n t i a l cleavage.*^ ® 
A person i s not explained by either the reducible elements or the 
irreducible elements, the essence of a person i s both; he is 'a 
s p i r i t fleshed out in society and a particular set of relationships 
with the world'.^^ 
As a consequence of this man experiences himself as 'a task', 
only achieving himself through his involvement with the world; and 
i t i s only i n the taking on of this task that he actively discovers 
the r e a l i t y of God.'^ "^  A true knowledge of God in which the r e a l i t y 
of God i s t r u l y experienced i s the result of 'an act which can only 
be posited by man as a whole'7'^ Different 'catchwords' sum up this 
t o t a l commitment or engagement with the world. For Paul i t is 
'faith', John 'love', the synoptics 'conversion'; Rahner suggests 'love 
of neighbour' might be most appropriate for the contemporary 
situation,''^ James Bacik paraphrases Rahner's description of this 
self-achievement: 
Through our individual decisions we make ourselves to be 
what we w i l l be forever. Our self i s not like a stage on 
which our individual actions play out their b i t parts, only 
to depart, leaving the stage unchanged. Rather, the self 
resembles a storehouse i n which i s gathered the true and 
abiding significance of a l l our human activity.''® 
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For Rahner any of the three theological virtues may lead to the 
realization of the task of man's existence; 'Faith, hope and love 
constitute that which i s d e f i n i t i v e and f i n a l ' . ^ * 
Love i s not a s t a t i c essence but the expression of the moral 
and s p i r i t u a l personality of a person which has i t s own particular 
history. By love 'man embarks on the adventure of his own 
reality'.^-" Love i s not something that is simply present or merely 
the f u l f i l l i n g of the commandments. I t i s the constant self-giving 
that i s never complete: 
Love today i s , therefore, what i t should be today only i f i t 
acknowledges today that i t is something of which more w i l l 
be demanded tomorrow. I t i s true love even for today only 
to the extent i n which i t reaches out to become more than 
i t i s today, only i f i t i s really on the way and forgets 
what i t i s now, reaching out for what l i e s ahead of i t (cf. 
Phlp.3.13).^ « 
Man is not able to comprehend and evaluate from the beginning of 
this adventure or journey what i s actually demanded of him; he i s 
deraanded.^^ I t is this dimension of love that is at the heart of 
Christian ethics but one that Rahner considers i s too often 
overlooked. I t means i t i s impossible to say what i s actually 
demanded by Christian ethics. This i s , in Dunn's phrase, 'the 
charismatic dimension of Paul's ethics' which goes beyond generalized 
ethical principles.'^ ® 
This t o t a l self-commitment can also be described in terms of 
f a i t h . Through f a i t h a person can fin d God 'in the world' and yet 
'he discovers God only i f - radically - he walks I t s ways r i g h t to 
the end'.'^ ^ What Rahner means by this can easily be misinterpreted 
unless i t i s understood i n the context of the pervasive influence on 
him, Ignatlan s p i r i t u a l i t y . This has two central tenets: f i r s t l y i t 
i s a world affirming s p i r i t u a l i t y based on the concept of 'finding 
God i n a l l things', of 'joy in the world'; secondly i t i s a piety of 
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the cross.s"^ When this i s combined with Rahner's understanding of 
grace and creation i n Christ i t means that radically walking the way 
of the world to the end i s actually walking the way of the cross. 
I t i s the way of se l f - g i v i n g which i s the way of f a i t h which i s 
actually the way of death. This becomes clearer in the l i g h t of 
Ignatian piety. 
This piety i s a monastic piety, not in the l i t e r a l sense of an 
external arrangement of community l i f e , but i n the sense of the 
monk as one 'who has "put on the pattern of Christ" through 
asceticism'.'^"" A true asceticism i s not the moral asceticism of the 
'average' or 'bourgeois-Christian' which consists of the suppression 
of sensual and s e l f i s h desires, of se l f - c o n t r o l and the renunciation 
of a l l that i s morally unpermissible but which i s not a true s e l f -
sacrifice.*^'^- Nor i s i t mystical asceticism, a technique adopted for 
mystical experience which can become a means to attempt to force 
God.^ '-' Rather, Christian asceticism i s when a man undergoes 
'personal free grasping-of-his-own-accord of his necessary being-
unto-death' and thereby puts himself at the disposition of God.®" 
Although this i s also a Heideggerean theme the primary influence on 
Rahner here i s i n fact Ignatius. As Thomas Merton points out, 
Heidegger's thought 'can remind us that the climate in which 
monastic prayer flourished i s not altogether absent from our modern 
world'.-^ '® 
Thus the same act can be called both 'faith' and 'death', where 
death i s not understood as the event which terminates man's l i f e but 
as the si t u a t i o n which rules his life;®® Death i s 'the supreme and 
most radical act of faith'.®'' Death is not ju s t passively suffering 
the biological termination of l i f e but also 'an active consummation 
from within brought about by the person himself'.®® Death i s 
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something that transpires throughout the whole of man's l i f e ; l i f e 
i s a 'living death'.'^-^ Death is 'the ever-present, secret essence of 
a l l l i f e i t s e l f not something simply at the end.-'" This l i v i n g 
death can either be a renunciation, an act of f a i t h and t r u s t , or an 
act of desperate clinging on to that which we must inevitably lose, 
man's running away from, in Heidegger's terms, 'the ontological 
structure of his being'.®'' 
The question about death i s the question about God. In death 
man i s most obviously confronted with what i s beyond his control 
and comprehension. I t i s either 'the void of absolute absurdity or 
the i n f i n i t u d e of the mystery of love'.®^  God i s understood as hope 
in the face of death,^^ I f death is accepted as a dying with Christ 
i t becomes the highest act of believing, hoping or loving, a 
venturing t r u s t into the unknown. Christian asceticism i s thus also 
understood as 'the anticipating grasp of Christian death understood 
as the most radical act of faith,^'* Or as the Didache expresses i t , 
'a letting-the-world-go-by' so that grace may come.^^ Thus Rahner 
can describe his own personal f a i t h as 'the act of l e t t i n g myself go 
into the inconceivable mystery' and say with Ignatius that 'Jesus i s 
t r u l y found and God found i n him only when you have died with 
him'.®*^  This, as we have seen, i s the essence of the charismatic 
experience. 
As a consequence Christian asceticism, the Ignatian piety of the 
cross brings about the Ignatian acceptance of the world: 
, . . this emptying of self w i l l not be accomplished by 
practising pure inwardness, but by the real a c t i v i t y which 
is called humility, service, love of our neighbour, the cross 
and death. One must descend into h e l l together with Christ, 
lose one's soul, not d i r e c t l y to the God who is above a l l 
names but in the service of one's brethren.^'' 
The same ideas can be expressed i n terms of the v i r t u e of hope; 
The person who, in a hope which no longer seeks to reassure 
i t s e l f , relinquishes himself in the depths of the mystery of 
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existence, i n which death and l i f e can no longer be 
distinguished because they can only be grasped together, 
actually believes in the Crucified and Risen one, even i f he 
is not aware of i t (in conceptual terms).^ ® 
Because of Rahner's theology of grace, hope as surrender to the 
mystery i s an entering i n to the death and resurrection of Christ.^ ® 
We 'give ourselves as a response to God's own giving of Himself to 
ygt i o o Hope i s surrender to the disposing hand of God, as Christ 
did.'"='^  Hope i s the 'l e t t i n g of one's self go into the mystery of 
God and when we surrender ourselves i n hope 'there alone do we 
t r u l y understand what, or s t i l l better who God is'.^°^ 
Closely related to the concept of hope i s the concept of 
absolute future. Man's transcendence includes a reaching into the 
f u t u r e . ^ M a n ' s l i f e i s not a s t a t i c existence but a becoming. 
There are no universally applicable programmes of actions; 
Christianity i s not an ideology. Rather, every Christian must be 
responsible f or his own decisions and actions made in f a i t h and 
tr u s t i n g acceptance of grace.'"^'^ Christianity is the religion of the 
absolute future i n God; i n fact absolute future is another name for 
God.'"-'« 
We say that Christianity is the re l i g i o n of the absolute 
future to the extent in the f i r s t place that God is not 
only 'above us' as the ground and horizon of history, but 
'in front of us' as our own future, our destination, 
sustaining history as i t s future . . . as i t s innermost 
principle and ultimate future, who sustains and drives 
history as his genuinely most ultimate concern, not only 
distinguishing himself from i t as i t s creator.' 
The characteristic v i r t u e of Christianity as a religion of the 
future i s hope."-"''^  Anne Carr describes Rahner's later thought in 
terms of an 'ontology of hope' involving, as i t does, a reappraisal 
of the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t position of S p i r i t where, as we shall see i n 
the next chapter, the primary structure of human being was 
knowing."^ '® But i t could be also described as an ontology of love 
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or of f a i t h or even of death since i t i s in fact an ontology of 
human becoming interpreted i n a radically christological sense, 
since, as we sha l l see la t e r , for Rahner a l l anthropology i s 
Christology and vice versa. 
But this also means that this can also be interpreted in terms 
of experience of the S p i r i t since experience of the S p i r i t is 
participation i n the victorious death of Christ, 'the chalice of the 
Holy S p i r i t i s identical with the chalice of Christ',''°® Experience 
of the S p i r i t i s not an experience of a particular action of God 
'from without'; to regard i t in this way i s , for Rahner, to adopt a 
mythological interpretation of the relationship of God to the world. 
Rather i t i s 'experience of the radical and permanent nature of 
human transcendence*.''' This transcendental experience of the 
S p i r i t i s brought about when man freely responds and surrenders 
himself i n f a i t h , hope and love to God; an experience of exi s t e n t i a l 
commitment involving a person i n the t o t a l i t y of his experience:^ ^' 
The re a l experience of transcendence in the Holy S p i r i t 
accepted i n freedom is primarily and ultimately not a 
matter of theoretical reason, but something that involves 
the whole person in the concrete history of his l i f e and 
freedom. In the las t resort then i t occurs at the point 
where i t i s impossible to stop at any individual r e a l i t y of 
l i f e as i f i t were f i n a l and absolute, where a f i n a l , 
autonomous self-defence i s abandoned i n free and liberated 
hope unsecured by anything else: in a word, at the point 
where dying i s a passing into the incomprehensibility of 
God.'' 
In the above passage Rahner emphasizes the concrete nature of 
this experience, involving the whole person i n his relationships in 
the world; i t i s not some otherworldly experience in a supernatural 
or transcendent realm. Rahner gives various l i s t s of concrete 
experiences which bring about this experience of the S p i r i t , 
experiences such as unconditional forgiveness, f a i t h f u l obedience to 
conscience and s a c r i f i c i a l giving summed up as 'where the one and 
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entire hope i s given beyond a l l individual hopes' and 'where we 
rehearse our own deaths in everyday life'."== But the l i s t s are 
only a r b i t r a r i l y selected examples since there are no blueprints for 
experience of the S p i r i t , no 'unadulterated operations of the Holy 
Spirit'.''-* They are only experiences of the s p i r i t as long as 'we 
experience them i n the r i g h t way', that i s to say we have t r u l y 
learnt to surrender ourselves, to drink the chalice of Christ, and 
this chalice 'is drunk only by those who have slowly learned in 
l i t t l e ways to taste the fullness in emptiness, the ascent in the 
f a l l , l i f e in death, the finding in renunciation'." 
This means that for Rahner, according to the Pauline epistles, 
charismata may be of an extraordinary or spectacular nature or 
everyday capabilities and responsibilities'. 
We may say that a l l a b i l i t i e s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s of Christian 
action, inasmuch as i t i s ultimately empowered, supported 
and ensouled by the Holy S p i r i t of God, are charismata or 
g i f t s of the Spirit.'"^' 
This is not to say that whatever we do i s charismatic because of 
the universal presence of grace. The individual's a b i l i t i e s and 
po s s i b i l i t i e s only become charismatic when they are empowered and 
supported by the Holy S p i r i t and that occurs when a person chooses 
and accepts one p o s s i b i l i t y rather then another not merely on the 
basis of ratio n a l or moral principles but on the basis of Rahner's 
understanding of the Ignatian Exercises and that choice involves the 
way of the cross. 'Then he acts not only rat i o n a l l y and morally 
but charismatically'.""^ 
Therefore charismata are not 'gi f t s ' i n the objectified sense or 
the direct and unmediated a c t i v i t y of God; rather they are, in 
Geoffrey Lampe's phrase 'actions of God and man in personal 
union'."® As John Koenig points out, the New Testament does not 
id e n t i f y particular experiences that must accompany charismata; for 
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Paul each person has his own special 'charisma of God' <1 Cor. 7:7; 
cf. Rom. 6:23: 11:29): 
No g i f t q u a l i f i e s as a charisma unless the recipient sees 
behind i t the gracious hand of God, for with the charisma 
one receives not simply a package, an objectified thing, but 
a new relationship with the Giver. One discovers afresh 
how one i s dependent upon, in conversation with, answerable 
to, God, One learns in a richer way what i t means to be a 
child of God.^  
I t i s this new relationship with God that makes an experience a 
charismatic experience. When conceived lik e this there i s an 
Inevitable l i n k between charismata and sanctification. Therefore 
Rahner argues that Paul does not distinguish between grace that 
sanctifies the recipient and grace for the benefit of others which 
does not however, sanctify the recipient. He only envisages the 
case where charismata both sanctify the recipient and church 
simultaneously. 
For how else could one t r u l y sanctify oneself except by 
being unselfish to others in the one Body of Christ by the 
power of the Spirit? And how could one f a i l to be 
sanctified i f one f a i t h f u l l y takes up and f u l f i l s one's real 
and true function i n the Body of Christ?' 
Dunn can only argue that 'there i s no immediate causal 
connection between charisma and sanctification' because he has an 
objectified exteriorized concept of charismata.^ Dunn cites 
B i t t l i n g e r to back this up. According to him charismata 'are 
received as presents from God , . . who places his g i f t s into our 
unholy hands and takes the risk of our misusing them'. 
But for Rahner grace i s not a thing, something that i s separate 
from other things and somehow related to the world. I t is not 
something, even metaphorically speaking, that could be placed in our 
hands to be used or misused. We do not possess grace as i f i t were 
a thing, rather we are possessed by grace. I t i s not a thing but a 
mode of becoming and being a person. We can only fi n d i t , or rather 
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be found by i t when we surrender ourselves 'in generous outgoing 
love'.'=® 
Therefore, when talking about p r i e s t l y existence (though the 
same i s true throughout a l l Christian existence) Rahner questions 
the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between grace for one's own 
sanctification {gratia gratum faciens) and grace for the 
sanctification of others (gratia gratis data). The preaching of the 
Gospel demands not jus t a commitment i n terms of time and work etc. 
but a personal e x i s t e n t i a l commitment; i t demands the whole person. 
Thus the charism of the S p i r i t needed to inspire preaching i s also a 
charism sanctifying the preacher as well. Consequently the power of 
the preaching of the Gospel i s dependent on the 'fact that the grace 
which i s preached i s a r e a l i t y i n the preacher himself'.'^'' The 
preaching may s t i l l be conceptually 'right' i n i t s content but i t 
would not be 'true' since what distinguishes a true proposition from 
merely a r i g h t one i s that the former has been f u l f i l l e d in action. 
Ultimately there are no 'propositions i n themselves' since they are 
'always in their concrete presence an act of man'.'^ ^ 
The contemporary charismatic movement and 
charismatic experience 
How then does Rahner understand the unusual experiences referred to 
as g i f t s of the S p i r i t i n the contemporary charismatic movement? 
On a personal level he i s w r i t i n g for people l i k e himself who 'for 
very d i f f e r e n t reasons cannot take any personal part in these 
charismatic movements and practices' but nevertheless can experience 
the S p i r i t i n the ordinary things of l i f e , digging i t out 'from under 
the rubbish of everyday e x p e r i e n c e ' . ' B u t this does not mean that 
experiences of a more spectacular or unusual nature are ruled out 
- 50 -
from the s t a r t . However they are not necessarily experiences of 
grace,''^'^ I t i s not a question of recognizing them as either 
'unadulterated operations of the Holy S p i r i t ' or discounting them 
completely. We cannot interpret particular psychic events 
'unashamedly as charismatic interventions of the Holy S p i r i t "from 
without'" p a r t l y because we need to recognize that both the 
categorical content and the impulses that give rise to them are 
conditioned by social, h i s t o r i c a l , psychological, and other factors 
and also because a l l these phenomena have parallels outside 
Christianity.'^® The phenomenon of religious enthusiasm needs to be 
assessed by such disciplines as psychology, depth psychology and 
para-psychology.''But they can nevertheless s t i l l be vehicles of 
experience of the S p i r i t , not by vi r t u e of their particular 
categorical content but by vi r t u e of the fact that a l l s p i r i t u a l 
experience needs a 'complementary h i s t o r i c a l expression';^®° there 
are no 'purely divine experiences of grace; there are only 
"incarnate" s p i r i t u a l experiences'.^®^ Our discussion on pneumatica 
and charismata in the previous chapter makes the same point from an 
exegetical point of view. 
In the l i g h t of the above Rahner can say: 
Someone in a moment of religious enthusiasm may have a 
'conversion experience' whose content la t e r proves highly 
questionable and dated, nevertheless i t may have been a 
genuine experience of conversion in the sense that through 
a very dubious categorical medium a person can achieve a 
radically free self-determination and an unconditional 
acceptance of the sovereignty of God,'^^ 
Such experiences may be libe r a t i n g and transforming, opening up 
new horizons on l i f e and as a consequence 'are quite f i t ( i f you 
wish) to be called "baptism i n the Spirit",'^ 
Rahner, therefore, i s sympathetic towards the charismatic 
movement in that his own experience of the Ignatian Exercises and 
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his interest i n mystical experience mean that he stresses the 
importance of experience of the S p i r i t . However he i s c r i t i c a l of 
interpretations of such experiences that conceive of them in 
interventionist terms and we have indicated that he avoids an 
interventionist concept of experience of the S p i r i t through his 
epistemology. He i s also c r i t i c a l of objectified concepts of grace 
that are external to a person's e x i s t e n t i a l situation. In order to 
understand the nature of these criticisms and Rahner's attempt to 
avoid them we must now examine Rahner's epistemology and 
philosophical influences. 
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Chapter 3 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
Rahner's thought needs to be understood in the context of the 
philosophical and theological sources that underlie i t . Although 
Rahner rarely e x p l i c i t l y refers to sources apart from Aquinas, he 
has assimilated them into his theology and they need to be examined 
before we examine his own thought in more de t a i l . Rahner is a 
Catholic theologian, standing in the line of transcendental Thomism 
developed by Joseph Mar6chal, who developed Aquinas' thought in the 
l i g h t of Kant's c r i t i q u e of knowledge. But Rahner is also in 
dialogue with modern German thought, particularly Kant and 
Heidegger. I t i s Kant's influence that i s the basis for Rahner's 
transcendental approach and i t is to him we must f i r s t turn. 
Kant's influence - the question about God 
Kant's objective in the Critique of Pure Reason was to j u s t i f y the 
ob j e c t i v i t y of mathematical and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge in the face of 
Hume's empiricism, which Kant considered i n s u f f i c i e n t to explain the 
success of Newtonian physics. His basic question was how is i t 
possible that i n our i n t e l l e c t we know more than we perceive with 
our senses? Kant attempts to answer this by his 'Copernican 
revolution', the theory that objects, so far as we know them, confirm 
to the mind, rather than the other way round, and that the 'what' of 
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the object conforms with the 'how' of judgment.^ The structure of 
human s e n s i b i l i t y and mind i s constant, and objects w i l l always 
appear to us in certain ways, conforming to the a priori conditions 
of the understanding. We are thus able to make universal s c i e n t i f i c 
judgments which hold good both for actual and for possible 
experience. Newtonian science i s therefore j u s t i f i e d in spite of the 
empiricist cri t i q u e . 
Kant's approach i s a transcendental one, transcendental referring 
to the a priori elements of knowledge, concerned not with objects 
but with the mode of our knowledge of objects.^ In the event of 
human knowledge s e n s i b i l i t y provides the data and the understanding 
enables the appearances to be thought through concepts. The 
categories are the a priori conditions of objects being thought 
whereas the forms are the a priori conditions of objects being 
i n t u i t e d . 
Without s e n s i b i l i t y no object would be given to us, without 
understanding no object would be thought. . . . The under-
standing can i n t u i t nothing, the senses can think nothing. 
Only through their union can knowledge arise. . . . Thoughts 
without content are empty, i n t u i t i o n s without concepts are 
blind .^^ 
Objects are thought by means of the categories but without a 
knowing subject they would not be thinkable. This is achieved by 
the ' I think' of the knowing subject (the 'unity of apperception') 
whereby the manifold of representations are united into one 
consciousness.'* There i s no a priori consciousness of this e^o; i t 
i s within the consciousness of what i s cognitively experienced.^ In 
other words, self-awareness i s given in knowledge of the world. The 
basic point of Kant's cr i t i q u e i s , therefore, that knowledge i s 
- 61 -
limited to experience but i t i s not entirely derived from experience; 
empirical knowledge i s the ' f e r t i l e lowland of experience'.^' I t i s 
only through experience that any objective r e a l i t y i s given to the a 
priori modes of knowledge.'-^ Thus a l l our knowledge i s limited to 
phenomenal r e a l i t y . The t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , the noumenon, i s not an 
object of our sensible i n t u i t i o n and thus we have no knowledge of 
i t . The concept i s only necessary in a l i m i t i n g or 'regulative' 
sense to prevent knowledge overstepping i t s boundaries and thinking 
i t has knowledge of things in themselves. 
I t i s on this epistemological basis that Kant c r i t i c i s e s the 
three premises of t r a d i t i o n a l psychology, cosmology and theology, the 
concepts of the substantial soul, the world as a t o t a l i t y of 
causally related phenomena and God as the supreme condition of a l l 
that i s possible. Reason does not need the existence of God, but 
only the Idea of i t as the regulative function of the concept of 
t o t a l i t y . The t o t a l i t y i s not that of absolute existence but only 
the expression of a d e f i n i t e epistemological postulate; we cannot 
hypostatise the Idea of the t o t a l i t y of r e a l i t y as a thing that 
contains a l l empirical reality.® I t i s important to note that in 
The Critique of Pure Reason Kant is not denying the existence of 
God or, for that matter, his non-existence but i s rather c r i t i c i z i n g 
the means by which he could be known. 
In S p i r i t i n the World Rahner adopts the Kantian method of 
transcendental r e f l e c t i o n on the conditions for the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
knowledge. Rahner i s asking the same basic question as Kant did: 
how i s metaphysics possible i f a l l human knowledge i s necessarily 
referred to a sensible i n t u i t i o n ? Rahner also accepts Kant's basic 
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premise that theology must be based on t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics, i.e. 
on knowledge of the absolute. But whereas Kant reached a negative 
conclusion with regard to such knowledge, and allows the positing of 
God only i n the realm of practical reason, Rahner, whilst 
acknowledging that a l l knowledge has an empirical element, argues 
that i t can at the same time transcend the realm of sense 
experience and provide knowledge of absolute being i t s e l f . ^ 
This i s not a knowledge based on an innate idea or an immediate 
i n t u i t i o n of a metaphysical object. The absolute cannot be known as 
an object nor can the human mind form an adequate conception of 
God. Rather, there i s a transcendental knowledge of God not as 
object but as the grounding of a l l human knowledge and r e a l i t y . God 
is known in the pre-apprehension (.VorgrifD of being that underlies 
a l l knowledge, not in the 'grasp' <Grif/),"=' i n which the existence of 
absolute being i s simultaneously affirmed with knowledge of the 
world. 
Rahner i s able to answer Kant's question because he begins from 
a fundamentally d i f f e r e n t s t a r t i n g place, the human question 
concerning being. This i s the 'point of departure' for the 
metaphysical question.^ ^  Man questions, and man questions by 
necessity; he cannot escape this. He can turn away from individual 
questions but he cannot avoid the question about being in i t s 
t o t a l i t y since 'man exists as the question about b e i n g ' . T h i s i s 
the 'transcendental question', the question man asks about himself, 
not just something which i s being asked about. The question one 
asks, or rather the question one i s , indicates a knowledge of being 
- 63 -
in the one who questions. This s t a r t i n g point results from Rahner's 
assimilation of Hegel's and especially Heidegger's criticisms of Kant. 
Heidegger's influence - man i s the question about God 
I t was Heidegger's rethinking of ontology, the question of Being, 
that l a i d the basis f o r Rahner's thought. Heidegger broke away from 
the t r a d i t i o n a l understanding of ontology which was based on the 
category of substance. For Heidegger being i s not some substance 
or e n t i t y , but transcends the ordinary categories of thought;^ as 
such i t cannot be defined but i t must s t i l l be investigated. Since 
i t i s not some substance or e n t i t y i t does not exist on i t s own but 
is always the being of an en t i t y . At the same time, there i s an 
'ontological difference' between being and beings, there is no 
ide a l i s t equation of being with beings.'''* The s t a r t i n g point for 
the investigation of being i s not Just any en t i t y in which being 
subsists (is 'presence-at-hand') but man the questioner himself, 
since he i s not jus t an e n t i t y among other e n t i t i e s but he whose 
being i s an issue f or him. 'Understanding of Being is itself a 
definite characteristic of Dasein's Being - Dasein is ontically 
d i s t i n c t i v e i n that i t i s o n t o l o g i c a l ' . ^ M a n cannot avoid making 
decisions about the way he lives either e x p l i c i t l y or implicitly.'^' 
Man (albeit to a limited extent) i s responsible and free and 
determines his own existence, his 'Dasein' ('being there'); he cannot 
avoid asking the e x i s t e n t i a l question. In this way Dasein exists 
(stands out) from a l l other e n t i t i e s . 
Rahner approaches the problem of metaphysics from the same 
anthropological s t a r t i n g point as Heidegger, that of man as the 
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unique questioner of being.''^ Just as for Heidegger an ontology 
must s t a r t from an e x i s t e n t i a l analytic of Dasein so too for Rahner 
the metaphysical question and the question of man form an abiding 
u n i t y . T h i s question cannot be avoided either e x p l i c i t l y or 
i m p l i c i t l y ; to attempt to avoid the question is to answer i t already 
and thus to be involved with metaphysics.^^ 
Heidegger's 'exlstentieW question i s how Dasein asks about and 
understands his own existence, his ontical a f f a i r s ; and the 
ex i s t e n t i a l question i s a theoretical question about the ontological 
structures of existence. The ex i s t e n t i a l question about being (the 
'existential analytic') takes i t s s t a r t i n g point from the existentiell 
question i.e. the ontological i s answered through the ontic^^*^ The 
a b i l i t y to ask the question presupposes an anticipatory knowledge of 
being, 'Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by 
what i s sought'.^'' And so there is a circular structure to the 
investigation which implies both the hiddenness and disclosedness 
(luminosity) of being.=^^' 
Just as for Heidegger the ontological i s answered through the 
ontic so too for Rahner statements about God move from the ontic 
level to the ontological when they are related to the knowing 
s u b j e c t . J u s t as for Heidegger being remains essentially hidden 
from Dasein, though i s manifest in e n t i t i e s and particularly in man, 
so for Rahner being i s an analogous r e a l i t y i n beings and is only 
f u l l y realized i n being i t s e l f , 'pure Being', (a point that Aquinas 
had already made).=^ '* Rahner adopts Heidegger's circular argument 
for knowledge of being; being i s both hidden and disclosed. The 
fact that man raises the question of being implies he does not know 
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about being but i t also implies he must have some understanding of 
the concept. As for Heidegger there i s a circular nature to the 
questioning by which the question as a seeking must in some way be 
guided by what i s sought, therefore for Rahner: 
The question about being s i g n i f i e s human transcendence 
towards being, since the metaphysical implies an existing 
knowledge of being, being and knowing are related in an 
or i g i n a l unity, there i s already an i m p l i c i t knowledge of 
being .^ ^ 
There i s a threefold nature to Heidegger's ex i s t e n t i a l analytic 
of Dasein's being-in-the-world, summed up by Heidegger as 'care'. 
F i r s t l y Dasein i s 'ahead of i t s e l f constituted by po s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Dasein achieves i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s through projecting them upon the 
en t i t i e s in the world and in this way incorporates them into i t s 
'significant' world and thereby 'understands' them. Secondly Dasein 
i s already i n the world; i t i s not just constituted by pos s i b i l i t i e s 
but i s influenced by i t s f a c t i c i t y . The sit u a t i o n i n which i t finds 
i t s e l f impinges on Dasein; i t has to take over what i s already given 
in i t s particular 'mineness'. Heidegger uses the term 'thrownness' 
to describe this concept of being 'delivered over' to factors beyond 
one's own c o n t r o l . T h i r d l y Dasein can f a i l to achieve i t s 
po s s i b i l i t i e s of authentic existence and ' f a l l ' into inauthentic 
existence, being absorbed into the world. Dasein then becomes 
subject to others and rather than taking i t s own decisions, they are 
taken by the anonymous 'they'.^'' 
This threefold structure to Dasein's existence cannot be based 
on any substantive notion of being but i s a dynamic concept. To the 
three dimensions of care correspond the three dimensions of time; 
the notion of temporality replaces the t r a d i t i o n a l model of the 
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substantial soul.^® Temporality i s the or i g i n a l being of man but to 
say that man is temporality does not mean to say that he exists as 
an object i n time. An object has an external relationship to time, 
moving through time from one "now* to another, Dasein, however, i s 
not simply confined to the now. As projecting he i s already in the 
future and as thrown he has already been; Dasein i s not just i n time 
but i s constituted by the past, present and future. He has 'the 
unity of a future which makes present in the process of having 
been'.^ ® Man i s thus not simply temporal but also h i s t o r i c a l , not in 
the sense of past time but in the sense of being derived from the 
past and continuing i n the future. 
According to Heidegger, Kant failed to develop an ontology of 
Dasein in terms of temporality. His f a i l u r e was his u n c r i t i c a l 
acceptance of Descartes' basic position, although i n many respects he 
went far beyond him. Descartes had begun the Copernican revolution 
in thought with his 'cogito sum' but had fa i l e d to develop an 
understanding of the 'sum', i.e. provide an ontology of Being.-=° 
Kant's premise that 'Being i s not a real predicate' side-steps the 
issue and thus Being is understood as 'Being-present-at-hand' - i.e. 
as an e n t i t y come, across.®'' Kant's ' I think' as the form of 
apperception i s not meant to be something represented but the 
formal structure of representation, that which 'binds together'. 
However this i s nothing less than a 'logical subject' and although he 
does not reduce the 'I' to an ontical substance he has not avoided 
using i t i n a wrong ontological sense.®^ Kant considers the ' I 
think' as an ' I think something'. The representations 'accompany' the 
'I' and i t i s nothing without them. However the concept of 
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accompanying i s not made e x p l i c i t and i s based on the subject as 
being constantly present-at-hand over and against the 
representations. However for Heidegger, "!' is neither substance nor 
subject but the authentic potentiality-for-being.^'^' 
In Kant the d i s t i n c t i o n between ontological knowledge and ontic 
knowledge i s expressed i n terms of noumena and phenomena; we only 
have knowledge of .the phenomenon not of the noumenon. The 
noumenon i s an object, but one of which we can have no knowledge 
since i t i s not an object of s e n s i b i l i t y and only performs a 
regulative function. Heidegger interprets the transcendental object 
in terms of the Vorgriff, as a 'something' of which we know nothing; 
i t i s a Nothing.®* I t i s the horizon within which things are made 
thematic and within which t r u t h i s possessed. The horizon i t s e l f i s 
not however possessed. 
There are both s i m i l a r i t i e s and major differences between 
Heidegger's and Rahner's understanding of man, between Heidegger's 
being-in-the-world and Rahner's s p i r i t - i n - w o r l d . Heidegger's 
existential-ontological analysis of Dasein is in terms of the 
threefold structure of care, i n other words in the context of the 
whole of experience; Rahner's analysis i n S p i r i t in the World is 
primarily (though not exclusively) confined to the realm of 
knowledge and i s understood i n terms of knowing and se l f -
presence However, Heidegger's understanding of Dasein in terms 
of temporality has strong echoes i n both S p i r i t i n the World and 
Hearers of the Word. The human knower i s already and always in the 
world and his knowledge is grounded i n the world. The pos s i b i l i t y 
of metaphysics i s based on this worldliness, in the context and 
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knowledge of worldly r e a l i t y , or in Thomistic terms 'conversion to 
the phantasm'. Human s p i r i t i s s p i r i t i n rela t i o n to the spatio-
temporal world and human transcendence i s realized in the context of 
history of mankind.®* Consequently Rahner's difference from both 
Kant and Hegel l i e s i n his Heideggerian s t a r t i n g point - human 
questioning i n i t s radical historicity.®"'' 
There is a basic difference between Rahner's and Heidegger's 
thought. Heidegger interpreted Dasein in terms of temporality and 
thus i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y limited and f i n i t e , orientated towards death. 
At the same time Dasein is transcendentally orientated towards 
nothingness against which beings are able to stand out. Although 
Rahner acknowledges both that some commentators maintain that 
Heidegger's fi n i t u d e only refers to Dasein and does not prejudice a 
discussion about pure Being and that Heidegger himself states that 
the question of God i s s t i l l open, he i s not convinced. For Rahner, 
since Heidegger has answered the metaphysical question in terms of 
pure nothingness, the question of God i s ruled out from the start.®® 
However, he sees i n Heidegger's thought when purged of i t s atheistic 
implications, profound implications for religious belief in terms of 
an e x i s t e n t i a l analysis of man which resists 'the mad and secret 
Hegelian dream of equality with God' and directs man into the world 
and history i n order to seek a h i s t o r i c a l revelation.®® I t i s in 
these terms that Rahner uses Heidegger's thought i n Hearers of the 
Word. Rahner, however, drawing on Thomistic thought, sees pure 
being as absolute, i n f i n i t e and unconditioned, known in unobjective, 
unthematic consciousness i n the pre-apprehension (.VorgrifD which 
underlies a l l knowing. 
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The influence of Aquinas and transcendental Thomlsm -
the question i s answered 
In Rahner's interpretation of Aquinas the influence of Heidegger's 
method i s apparent. Heidegger understood history i n terms of human 
participation; we can only study history because as h i s t o r i c a l 
existents we already participate in it.'*'^' History i s not primarily 
to do with the past but to do with man and the po s s i b i l i t i e s of his 
existence as coming from the past and orientated towards the 
future. I t must therefore be studied primarily in exi s t e n t i a l rather 
than s c i e n t i f i c terms, though the terms of investigation are no less 
rigorous or factual.'*' History i s not a study of events that 
happened ju s t once and for a l l but i s repeated (or better, re-
fetched or retrieved i n an active sense) to reveal the authentic 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of Dasein for the present.'*^ Thus Heidegger attempts 
a r e t r i e v a l of Kant not simply in terms of 'historical philology' but 
in a attempt 'to set in motion a thoughtful dialogue between 
thinkers'.'*'^ Likewise Rahner does not undertake merely to assemble 
and summarise the statements of Aquinas but 'to reconstruct the 
or i g i n a l line of reasoning' i n a creative and personal way.'*'* 
Both for Aquinas and for Kant t r u t h l i e s in the agreement 
between thought and object.-*-^ In Aquinas this takes place in 
judgment, not merely as a synthesis between two concepts to form a 
concrete idea; i t must also be related to the r e a l i t y i t s e l f . The 
r e a l i t y must exist in i t s own r i g h t , not merely on the psychic level. 
Rahner makes a li n k between Thomas and Kant i n that for both 
thinkers the act of judgment and the concept both contain two 
elements, s e n s i b i l i t y and thought.*^' Thus Kant's statement that 
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'Thoughts without content are empty, perceptions with conceptions 
are blind' i s an expansion of Aquinas' doctrine of conversion to the 
phantasm. 
In his interpretation of Aquinas Rahner i s heavily influenced by 
Mar6chal, who, against the trend of neo-Thomism with i t s emphasis on 
the a posteriori dimension i n Thomas' epistemology, develops the 
less obvious a priori element.*^ Mar6chal was the f i r s t to see the 
connections between Kant and the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge. 
He uses Kant's transcendental method within the context of Aquinas' 
thought to overcome the di f f i c i e n c i e s i n Kant's thought. Kant had 
attempted to resolve the contradiction between empiricism and 
ontological rationalism, but he limited knowledge to the empirical 
realm alone. For Mar6chal however, the human mind i s both an 
empirical faculty and a p o s s i b i l i t y for the absolute.48 Knowledge 
is not primarily based in a construction from the parts derived from 
empirical senses but in the absolute affirmation of being, which i s 
objective and related to what i s real; the metaphysical can only be 
reached i f i t i s already combined i n what i s given. 
Mar6chal, approaching from the standpoint of Thomistic 
metaphysics, makes two criticisms of Kant. F i r s t l y the human 
i n t e l l e c t i s both an empirical faculty and a po s s i b i l i t y for the 
absolute. He agrees with Kant that each judgment expresses the 
synthesis of what i s sensibly given but he also wants to assert 
that i t i s not merely categorical, limited to conditions related to 
space and time. I t also refers the categorical synthesis i t 
produces to being i n general. For Kant absolute unity was merely a 
regulative idea, for Marechal i t is a constitutive function. 
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Categorical synthesis can only be conceived in relation to t o t a l 
synthesis. 'Pure being - or the absolute - i s thus comprehended in 
every judgment as universal unity and posited as absolute end'.'*'^  
Secondly Kant has too s t a t i c a conception of the functions of 
knowledge.'*'^' For Marechal knowledge i s not jus t a psychological 
event passively undergone by the knower but a dynamic a c t i v i t y . 
When I know something I am aware that I am doing something. In 
other words the act of knowing i s i t s e l f already a kind of r e a l i t y , 
knowing i s a kind of being. Although Kant used dynamic language he 
fa i l e d to develop i t and preserved a r i g i d diversion between 
sensible (a posteriori) i n t u i t i o n and creative (a priori) i n t u i t i o n . 
He never went beyond a s t a t i c conception of human intelligence and 
i n his analysis of human knowing he considered only the content and 
not the a c t i v i t y through which this content i s held. Thus Mar6chal 
emphasises both the dynamism of human i n t e l l e c t and the act of 
affirmation. 
Whereas Aquinas developed a metaphysical critique of knowledge 
Mar6chal develops a transcendental critique, s t a r t i n g from Kant but 
going beyond him. Mar6chal regards knowledge as the act of a 
knowing subject, involving the immanent unity of knower and known, 
and then looks for the preconditions which must necessarily be given 
prior to the act. Following Aquinas, Mar^chal describes the human 
knower as the point of intersection between a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge. The understanding contains an active 
component (agent i n t e l l e c t ) which i s an a priori determination which 
unifies and orders empirical knowledge in terms of a l l that is 
knowable, not Just i n space and time but the t o t a l i t y of being. 
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This dynamic orientation of knowledge towards the t o t a l i t y of being 
is termed 'anticipation'.^'' This involves what Marechal calls 'une 
sort d'anticipation metaempirique', in which human reason transcends 
the limited beings of i t s conceptual knowledge.^^ 
This anticipation of absolute being is the basis of an 
analogical understanding of knowledge. However i t i s judgment that 
leads to knowledge rather than just mere appearance. Judgment 
takes place by affirmation, the dynamic spontaneous s t r i v i n g which 
affirms the object as over and against the subject i n relation to 
the t o t a l i t y of being, the goal of this affirmation. Marechal uses 
Aquinas to show that the goal of this s t r i v i n g i s not merely a 
'subjective postulated ideal' as Kant maintained but 'an objective 
necessary absolute r e a l i t y ' . ^ ^ Marechal shows how in Aquinas man's 
i n t e l l e c t i s 'quodammodo omnia' since in his pre-apprehension he 
embraces the t o t a l i t y of being and that this i s the basis for 
abstraction. This s t r i v i n g can only be orientated to an ultimate 
and absolute goal, i n f i n i t e being, which i n Thomistic metaphysics i s 
God himself. This goal, although supernatural, must i t s e l f be 
possible, otherwise the natural orientation of our i n t e l l e c t u a l 
nature would become a logical contradiction - the s t r i v i n g after 
nothing '.-•s'^ 
Rahner i s heavily influenced by Mar^chal's interpretation of 
Aquinas. Rahner's S p i r i t i n the World is an interpretation of 
Thomist epistemology and metaphysics as developed by Mar6chal in 
the l i g h t of German thought from Kant to Heidegger by way of Hegel 
i n order to go beyond Kant's agnosticism to show that being i t s e l f 
i s i m p l i c i t l y reached in the act of knowing.^^ I t i s important to 
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understand Rahner's treatment of Aquinas with this in mind for 
although he refers to many of Aquinas' phrases he is not 
understanding them in terms of the t r a d i t i o n a l Aristotelian 
understanding of the cosmos and external r e a l i t y . On the whole 
Aquinas' approach i s o b j e c t i v i s t i c and cosmocentric but there are 
hints at a more anthropocentric approach and these are developed by 
Rahner, following Mar6chal. Rahner i s arguing against the 
t r a d i t i o n a l approach to metaphysical knowledge that either assumes a 
direct i n t u i t i o n of God or an inference of God from observations of 
the external world and in this he agrees with Kant that a l l 
knowledge must begin with and be mediated by sense experience. 
Rahner develops Marechal's idea of the unity of knower and 
known into his own concept of the primordial unity of being and 
knowing, being as self-presence.^^ He combines Mar6chal's notion of 
the i m p l i c i t affirmation of being i n judgment with his interpretation 
of Heidegger's Vorgriff which is i m p l i c i t l y and simultaneously 
affirmed i n knowledge .^"^  Rahner makes f u l l use of Marechal's 
understanding of the affirmation of being i m p l i c i t in judgment in 
his own understanding of abstraction.®® He also makes use of 
Marechal's understanding of the dynamism of judgment, human s p i r i t 
as 'desire', 'a dynamic orientation' towards absolute being.^'^ There 
is however a si g n i f i c a n t difference in s t a r t i n g point. For Marechal 
the affirmation of being i s made possible as a result of his 
transcendental analysis of human knowing. Rahner, on the other 
hand, begins both S p i r i t i n the World and Hearers of the Word with a 
description of the unity of knowing and being. Marechal, s t a r t i n g 
from Kant's theory of judgment, shows that the affirmation of being 
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i s i m p l i c i t i n that judgment; Rahner, following Heidegger, begins 
from the a priori knowledge of being i m p l i c i t in human questioning, 
i m p l i c i t because the mind cannot question that which i s t o t a l l y 
u n k n o w a b l e T h e r e f o r e Francis Fiorenza can say; 
Rahner does not attempt, as does Marechal, to establish the 
metaphysical significance of the judgment primarily as a 
re s u i t of a transcendental reduction or deduction, but 
applies Heidegger's insights concerning the circular 
structure of human knowledge.®^ 
Man questions necessarily and since something which is completely 
unknowable cannot be questioned man as being-in-the-world affirms 
the questionability of being in i t s t o t a l i t y . I t is in this way that 
being (as questionability) i s able to be known. 'Always and of 
necessity man posits i n his existence the "whence" for an answer, 
hence i m p l i c i t l y the answer to the question of being i t s e l f ' . ^ ^ 
The unity of being and knowing, or rather the assertion that 
the concept of being cannot be separated from the concept of the 
knowability of being, i s a central concept in Rahner's theology. 
Rahner develops Aquinas' understanding of knowledge to show that 
knowing i s not a 'coming upon' something but that knowing is the 
being-present-to-self of being.®® Being i s o r i g i n a l l y self-presence, 
or luminosity i n Heidegger's language, a 'knowledge of the act of 
being which the knower himself is', i.e. being is 'present to i t s e l f 
in knowing.'^"- The questioner must both be united with being and 
yet not united; in that he i s able to ask he is united, and in that 
he needs to ask he i s not united. Thus, for Rahner, even i n Aquinas 
being i s not a s t a t i c substance or concept, understood in purely 
ontic terms but i s ontological, or as Rahner puts . i t , r e l ating 
Aquinas' thought to Heidegger's; Aquinas has an ontological 
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understanding of metaphysics 'which i s quite current today'.^'^ 
Rahner's thought has been c r i t i c i s e d at this point for being too 
i d e a l i s t i c in i t s implications. Cornelius Ernst has described the 
assertion of the unity of being and knowing as 'wholly unacceptable' 
since i t means that 'every e n t i t y (every material entity too) is a 
more or less deficient angel'.®^ Fiorenza, commenting on Ernst's 
c r i t i c i s m , points to the need to set Rahner's thought in context at 
this point. Kant's separation of thinking and being had led to his 
dismissal of ra t i o n a l theology. I f a theologian accepts this 
d i s t i n c t i o n between thinking and being then he must either accept 
Kant's conclusions and a l l that acceptance entails or show the 
conclusions do not follow from the premises, which i s , as Fiorenza 
suggests, a d i f f i c u l t task. Rahner therefore, following Marechal in 
his attempt to confront the problem posed by Kant, questions Kant's 
premises in order to avoid his negative conclusions regarding 
theology. Fiorenza continues: 
Therefore, before we as Anglo-Saxons l i v i n g i n a dif f e r e n t 
philosophical t r a d i t i o n label Rahner's position as id e a l i s t i c 
or c r i t i c i z e his understanding of the co n v e r t i b i l i t y of 
being and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , we should take into account the 
Kantian problematic with a l l i t s implications and 
consequences 
Human beings are affirmed not in an ide a l i s t sense as an 
absolute i d e n t i t y of being and knowing, which i s God, or as a 
Hegelian absolute consciousness, but as f i n i t e self-presence, s p i r i t 
i n the world. Rahner i s anxious to avoid being i d e n t i f i e d with 
Hegel's idealism, though his emphasis on the dia l e c t i c a l unity of 
human being and knowing incorporates the Hegelian view of the 
process character of being.^'^' But as Rahner points out one does 
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not have to be a Hegelian in order to incorporate his insights.®^ 
For Rahner the whole of S p i r i t in the World can be summarised 
by Aquinas's phrase 'conversion to the phantasm'7° Human knowledge 
of self and of the Absolute comes only through sense experience. I t 
is on the doctrine of conversion that Rahner e x p l i c i t l y bases his 
conviction of the unity of being and knowing. For Aquinas there i s 
only one knowing, 'a k n o w i n g - b e i n g - w i t h - t h e - w o r I d M a n in his 
sense-knowledge becomes one with the material object, 'the knower 
i t s e l f i s the being of the other'.^^ Matter is the 'other' of being 
through which being can only become 'present to i t s e l f in a 
subject's knowledge of i t , i.e. being i s on both sides of the 
subject-object s p l i t and grounds them both.''^ '' Thus the problem of 
metaphysics i s not how to bridge the gap between knower and known 
but how to distance the two, to create a gap.^* 
The a b i l i t y to liberate the subject from s e n s i b i l i t y is the 
power of the i n t e l l e c t (agent i n t e l l e c t ) through abstraction. Like 
conversion the agent i n t e l l e c t i s a central concept i n Rahner's 
understanding of Aquinas and enables him to assimilate Kant's a 
priori forms of s e n s i b i l i t y and understanding and also Heidegger's 
concept of the revealedness and hiddenness of being. I t is in 
abstraction that self-presence i s seen as presence to another. This 
i s contained i n Aquinas' understanding of the agent (active) 
i n t e l l e c t and the possible i n t e l l e c t . The agent i n t e l l e c t is the 
spontaneous openness of the human s p i r i t for the absolute, absolute 
esse in Aquinas' terms, whilst the possible i n t e l l e c t s i g n i f i e s the 
receptive capacity of the knower for a l l empirical objects. The 
agent i n t e l l e c t i s the a priori drive towards the absolute, the l i g h t 
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by which what i s received from s e n s i b i l i t y by the possible i n t e l l e c t 
is illuminated. The I n t e l l e c t actively produces an abstract concept 
enabling 'human knowledge to place the other, which i s given i n 
se n s i b i l i t y , away from i t s e l f and in question, to Judge i t , to 
objectify i t and thereby make the knower a subject for the f i r s t 
time'.^^^ 
Rahner understands Aquinas' concept of the agent i n t e l l e c t i n 
terms of the Vorgriff. The i n t e l l e c t can only take possession of an 
an object, recognize i t as limited i f i t passes beyond i t . The 
problem i s how can human knowledge establish i t s own l i m i t s when a 
knowledge of l i m i t implies knowledge beyond that limit? The 
i n t e l l e c t can only know the form as limited i f i t has a 'pre-
apprehension' (Vorgrlff), a pre-grasp of the i n f i n i t e horizon of 
being, an a priori power given with human nature.'^^^ This is not 
knowledge of an object but the im p l i c i t unreflexive consciousness 
that makes objective knowledge possible. Man knows of i n f i n i t y only 
insofar as he experiences himself surpassing a l l his knowledge in 
the pre-apprehension and as open to being i n I t s t o t a l i t y . Being i s 
not objectified; i t is not a s t a t i c essence but 'oscillating as i t 
were, between nothing and infinity'.'"^ I t is only when man turns to 
the world that being can be shown to be present and necessary in 
a l l knowing. The horizon needs a world to make i t a horizon. In 
this way man has an unobjective unthematic consciousness of God.^® 
The Vorgriff i s a central concept i n S p i r i t in the World. I t 
answers the question of how the human person can be s p i r i t , can 
reach beyond the world to metaphysical knowledge whilst at the same 
time remaining bound to the world. But what is i t s 'whither', the 
- 78 -
object of the Vorgriff? For Rahner there are three possible 
answers.^^ F i r s t l y , the answer of the perennial philosophy from 
Plato to Hegel i s that the object i s absolute being, God. Secondly, 
the answer of Kant i s that the object the f i n i t e horizon of sense 
i n t u i t i o n . Thirdly, in Rahner's understanding of Heidegger, the 
answer i s nothing. 
Rahner deals with Heidegger's answer f i r s t . On a superficial 
level i t would seem that since human knowledge is related to 
existents, so the Vorgriff should relate to some r e a l i t y and also, at 
a deeper level of argument, i t is only an orientation towards 
infiniteness that makes finiteness possible (negates).®'^  I t is not 
'nought that noughtens', as for Heidegger, but i t i s only in the 
i n f i n i t e that the f i n i t e can be known. Nothingness is not a horizon. 
For Rahner, this also invalidates Kant's argument. In this way 
Rahner argues that the object of the Vorgriff must be absolute 
being, God. In equating absolute being with God Rahner i s not 
attempting an a priori proof; rather such a move i s only possible i n 
the l i g h t of an h i s t o r i c a l revelation, a point he w i l l develop in 
Hearers of the Word. 
Rahner's transcendental Thomism is central to his theology. I t 
provides an appropriate s t a r t i n g point for answering Kant's negative 
conclusions about the p o s s i b i l i t y of metaphysics whilst accepting 
his basic premise. I t i s also a good s t a r t i n g point for 
incorporating Heidegger's ontology of worldliness and temporality. 
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Rahner's understanding of experience of God 
In the second chapter we looked at the relationship between Rahner's 
and John of the Cross's understanding of experience of God. We are 
now in a position to examine that in more de t a i l . John of the Cross 
had a Thomistic understanding of knowledge; a l l natural knowledge is 
limited by sense experience and we know through the process of 
sensation, abstraction and conversion to the phantasm. This, 
however, i s not appropriate for knowledge of God since this 
knowledge i s of a d i f f e r e n t kind, a supernatural knowledge brought 
about by God acting upon the passive i n t e l l e c t . Rahner, as we have 
seen, s t a r t s from the unity of being and knowing; knowledge is not 
merely a coming across something but also self-knowledge. Whereas 
John envisaged a supernatural action on the passive i n t e l l e c t , for 
Rahner our non-conceptual knowledge of God is part of the structure 
of human knowing, given in and as a condition of the process of 
abstraction by the agent i n t e l l e c t , as the a priori horizon and basis 
of a l l our knowledge. Rahner's epistemology means that he can 
incorporate the mystics' affirmation of a direct experience of the 
S p i r i t without i t being seen i n terms of supernatural intervention. 
This is possible because of God's supernatural elevation of human 
existence. God 'is always given simply as the ultimate basis of 
experience',^'' but this is only because; 
The basic mystery of Christianity i s not that God has 
created a world d i f f e r e n t from himself . . .but rather that 
the grace which in the last analysis is identical with God 
himself, has permeated the world with God's own presence.®^ 
This w i l l become clearer when we look in more d e t a i l at Rahner's 
understanding of grace. 
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Despite their differences, the views of the experience of God of 
John of the Cross and Rahner are, as we have seen, actually 
complementary. For St John, working within the framework of 
Thomistic psychology, experience of God can be f i r s t experienced 
either i n the i n t e l l e c t or the w i l l , but is more often experienced in 
the w i l l as a movement of love. For Rahner, also, the experience of 
God can begin from either knowledge or love, but Rahner does not 
adhere s t r i c t l y to Thomistic psychology. 
In a Thomistic understanding of man there is one substantial 
form and man i s the unity of body and soul, a composite substance. 
The soul is not somehow alien to the body as in Platonism. But 
although Aquinas emphasizes the unity of man he holds that there is 
a re a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the soul (the human substance) and i t s 
faculties or powers of acting (accidents). Most of the accidental 
powers of human substance are organic or material but the soul 
possesses two immaterial, inorganic powers, an i n t e l l e c t u a l power of 
conceptual abstraction and judgment ( i n t e l l e c t ) and a v o l i t i o n a l 
power of free choice and decision ( w i l l ) . Aquinas' approach was an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t one in that he stressed the primacy of the i n t e l l e c t 
over the w i l l . 'For he maintained that whereas the w i l l tends 
towards i t s object the i n t e l l e c t possesses i t in cognition, and 
possession i s better than tending towards'.®^ But Aquinas' view 
that man's fu l f i l m e n t consists of the i n t e l l e c t u a l vision of God did 
not exclude love. Complete love i s the fulfil m e n t of complete 
knowledge. Both John of the Cross and Rahner, working within this 
framework, speak of knowledge through love or loving knowledge. 
Both authors believe that union with God involves the 
a c t i v i t y of the whole s p i r i t , and that i n t e l l e c t and w i l l 
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are involved i n a mutually conditioning way as loving 
knowledge. Both authors believe that the last word i s with 
love.^''' 
Therefore Rahner describes s p i r i t as 'being one in the 
"perichoresis" (circumcession) of knowledge and love'.®® The act of 
love is a crucial factor i n knowledge of God and one that we have 
seen to be at the heart of charismatic experience.^® We shall see 
in the next chapter how Rahner broadens his metaphysics of 
knowledge into a metaphysics of love. I t i s this development that 
provides the basis for our understanding of Rahner's theology as a 
charismatic theology. 
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Chapter 4 
HUMAN BECOMING AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 
In Hearers of the Word Rahner broadens his metaphysics of knowing 
into one of knowing and w i l l i n g in freedom and love, present in 
Sp i r i t but not developed. In S p i r i t knowledge was seen as desire 
and s t r i v i n g and action, and as such the w i l l was an i n t r i n s i c part 
of the act of knowing,' But freedom was also an i n t r i n s i c element 
i n knowledge: 'The transcendence beyond the other of sensib i l i t y , 
which i s the return of the s p i r i t to i t s e l f , can be called 
Thomistically the freedom of spirit',=^ In this way Rahner lays the 
foundations f o r his understanding of human freedom and personhood. 
Love - the essence of human becoming and 
of knowledge of God 
We have seen how love i s the defining characteristic of the 
charismatic experience; we have also seen the incarnational and 
practical nature of the charismatic experience, i t i s to do with 
'walking i n love' involving decision and choice. We must show how 
these two aspects are at the heart of Rahner.'s theology. The basic 
concept i s that man becomes aware of his personhood through his 
free self-determination and through his responsible behaviour 
towards God, whether he understands i t e x p l i c i t l y as that or not,=' 
Man's exercise of free decision i s understood i n a twofold manner, 
f i r s t l y as an act whereby man is either i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y set 
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before God and secondly as an act by means of which man 'disposes 
of himself as a whole'.'* Human freedom means that 'man begins his 
existence as the being who i s radically open and incomplete' and 
when 'his essence i s complete i t i s as he himself has freely created 
it'.® The exercise of freedom then, i s not ju s t one particular act 
among others but i s 'a transcendental characteristic of the being of 
man i t s e l f , 'the freedom of being itself.® Human freedom reveals 
the same structure of transcendentality as human knowledge, 
orientation to oneself and orientation towards God: 
In i t s o r i g i n a l nature, however, the free act i s not so much 
the delimitation of something d i f f e r e n t or alien to i t s e l f , 
but i s the f u l f i l m e n t of i t s own nature. A free act is a 
taking possession by a thing of i t s e l f . . . Thus i t is a 
coming to oneself, a being present to oneself, within 
oneself.'' 
Whereas the concept of freedom in S p i r i t was restricted to the 
po s s i b i l i t y of knowledge, i n Hearers the concept i s extended to man 
as a person. The argument i s based on the same premises but in 
Hearers Rahner develops his understanding of man's freedom in the 
context of w i l l i n g and loving. Although S p i r i t is res t r i c t e d to the 
metaphysics of knowing there i s a development in Hearers to 
consider the human subject as a whole, man who i n freedom makes not 
just individual decisions but im p l i c i t i n them makes decisions which 
determine his own nature.^' 
Man's becoming personal consists of a free decision that shapes 
and determines the whole of what man i s and can be before God: 
'Thus the free decision tends to dispose of the operative subject as 
a whole before God.'® This free decision i s a 'spiritual act' but 
not a purely s p i r i t u a l act because as we have seen man i s material 
s p i r i t , not pure s p i r i t . For Rahner there can be no crude dualism 
between flesh and s p i r i t . Human s p i r i t as material s p i r i t is 
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f l e s h . T h e dualism that there i s is rather a dualism of what man 
is prior to his e x i s t e n t i a l decision and what he i s aft e r i t , ' ' But 
this i s not to be understood i n an in d i v i d u a l i s t i c sense since the 
'other' of S p i r i t , whereby human being comes to i t s e l f , is in r e a l i t y 
a 'Thou'. 'The personal s p i r i t i s a s p i r i t referred to others', thus 
man's becoming as personal s p i r i t is only realized through love of 
others.'^ This i s not one act amongst other acts but is 'man 
himself i n his t o t a l achievement'''® I t is 'the all-embracing basic 
act of man which gives meaning, direction and measure to everything 
else."* This act of love for another i s the basis of man's 
transcendentality as a knowing and w i l l i n g subject. Love sums up 
the person as s p i r i t , i t i s an opening of oneself, an entrusting to 
the other, free s e l f - g i v i n g and abandonment, an ecstasy (ecstasis),'® 
In this free s e l f - g i v i n g there i s the f u l l realization of the human 
person; freedom has i t s goal i n sel f - g i v i n g love. 
Freedom i s always se l f - r e a l i z a t i o n of the objectively 
choosing man seen in view of his t o t a l realization before 
God. In th i s way, considered as the capacity of the 'heart', 
i t i s the capacity of love.'® 
As human knowledge i s grounded in God, freedom i s only possible 
in orientation to the absolute horizon. Freedom i s the poss i b i l i t y 
of saying yes or no to God himself. In the same way that in 
knowledge objects are known in the context of the pre-apprehension 
of being so too 'freedom towards the encountered individual beings 
i s also a freedom towards the horizon'.''^ But as in knowledge God 
is not apprehended as one object amongst other categorical objects 
so i n freedom God i s not willed or chosen as one object among 
others. There i s a difference between the transcendental horizon 
and the concrete object. The transcendental horizon is the condition 
that makes the concrete object comprehensible and i t i s only in the 
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concrete object that the horizon i s encountered; the transcendental 
horizon requires a categorical object,^ ^' In this way the exercise 
of freedom and consequently of love, i f this freedom i s used in a 
positive not negative sense, i s a relation primarily to the concrete 
object, which as we have seen means in terms of human becoming the 
'Thou'. On this basis Rahner can say, 'The or i g i n a l relationship to 
God i s . . . love of neighbour'.''^ Not that this i s seen i n a narrow 
sense of personal relationships but rather man i s understood as a 
'p o l i t i c a l being' for love i s understood as a 'p o l i t i c a l love' which 
makes a l l mankind his neighbour and theology must always be 
p o l i t i c a l theology.^" This i s both because of man's essential 
constitution as a social being as outlined in Hearers but also 
because society i t s e l f has changed in recent years and has entered 
a 'post-individualistic' phase 
Rahner's aim in Hearers was to show that h i s t o r i c i t y i s 
ontologically a part of human being and therefore h i s t o r i c a l 
occurrences are fundamentally part of the human person As 
Rahner argued i n S p i r i t , to say that man i s s p i r i t is to say that he 
enters into the otherness of matter, into the world. In other words 
man i s 'sensate s p i r i t u a l i t y ' ; 'man, precisely as spirit, lives in this 
world'.^ '® The whole man i s s p i r i t ; s p i r i t i s not a separate element. 
As such he i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y related to others; he must go out into 
the world and cannot remain i n isolation because that would be a 
denial of his essential constitution as s p i r i t - 'Man i s real only as 
a part of humanity'.^^'^ For Rahner, as for Heidegger, temporality i s 
the process by which an individual realizes himself. This is a 
process of s e l f - c o n s t i t u t i o n involving others with whom an 
individual i s essentially related,^® 
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In this way Rahner has concluded his metaphysical anthropology 
as a metaphysics of an obediential potency. This is concerned with 
the whole man, in his knowing and wil l ing transcendence who in 
history must listen for God. In terms of the later Rahner this is 
the supernatural existential.^^® Metz's notes in the 1963 edition of 
Hearers indicate the broader understanding of man which is implicit 
in Hearers which is explici t ly developed in the later Rahner. Metz's 
revision of Hearers involved an attempt 'to bring the Thomistic 
concept of the concrete world "up to date" with the more original 
concept of a personal world'.^^ In in the later work such as 
Foundations history is an essential part of man's becoming, whether 
good or bad. His freedom is mediated by the concrete reality of 
history and his knowledge of God comes through an encounter with 
the concrete reali ty of the world of things and people.^® The 
emphasis is on the a posteriori and categorical rather than the a 
priori and transcendental, on man's historical existence in i t s 
to ta l i ty . I t is in this historical context that man becomes 
responsible for his own salvation, not as something which he 
receives from 'outside', but his own self-realization and self-
acceptance within the concrete possibilities offered him in his 
history. ' I t is in history that the subject must work out his 
salvation by finding i t there as offered to him and accepting it.'^® 
Since the human subject who is involved in salvation has history as 
an intrinsic element then history i t se l f is the history of salvation. 
World history is not identical with salvation but co-existent, 
salvation history takes place within world history.^*^ This world 
history is also the place of God's revelation.®^ 
Although Rahner has not moved away from the basic philosophical 
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foundations of Spiri t (knowing) and Hearers (willing)' he has 
developed a more concrete approach to man as an historical, social 
and personal being. The question in the later Rahner is not so much 
about the relationship of man's sp i r i t to matter as of the origin of 
his sp i r i t from matter; the emphasis is more explicitly 
incarnational. In Spirit Rahner's concern was to show how 
sensibility originates from sp i r i t . His starting point was spi r i t 
which was what is immediately given in self-reflection and he 
explained i t s relation to matter, sp i r i t in the world. He is now 
working from material and historical human nature. The 'early 
Rahner' (up to the Second Vatican Council) concentrated on the 
structures of the knowing subject; the later Rahner concentrates 
more on the subject in his changing and pluralistic historical 
context. The emphasis on historici ty is derived from Heidegger. 
We have already seen, both for Rahner and for St. John of the 
Cross, that love is not only an intrinsic part of human becoming, i t 
is also an integral part of knowledge of God. We saw, when we 
looked at the link between sanctification and charismatic experience, 
the distinction between a 'true' proposition and merely a 'right ' one. 
For Rahner there are ultimately no 'propositions in themselves' since 
they were 'always in their concrete presence an act of man'. 
Knowledge, therefore, is only realized and f u l f i l l e d in actions that 
express that knowledge, that are 'in sympathy' with i t ; the same is 
true of a person's response to another's actions. For a free act to 
be understood by another person he must enter into sympathy with 
i t , he must love i t : 
Now this free action of God is luminous for us only when 
we do not merely take i t as fact. We must also r a t i f y i t 
in our love for i t , thus re-experiencing i t , as i t were, in 
i t s origin and i t s production. . . . In f ina l analysis 
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knowledge is but the luminous radiance of love.®^' 
Thus since knowledge is understood as the self-presence of a 
being, a taking possession of oneself, and since this self-presence 
only comes through a loving entering into the free action of God, 
then love is seen to be the l ight of knowledge. Love is not 
something added on to knowledge but i t s condition and cause; 
Knowledge, though prior to love and freedom, can only be 
realized in i t s true sense when and in so far as the 
subject is more than knowledge, when in fact i t is a freely 
given love.®® 
Man's love for God is not something that comes after his knowledge 
of God, i t is that which makes knowledge of God possible, and 
although an essential part of man's being, i t can either be accepted 
by man in his free decisions and actions or rejected. In this way 
man does not just make good or bad decisions but himself becomes 
either good or bad. In other words, by performance of human 
freedom one performs oneself, according to the ontological law of 
one's being, 'the true order of love'.^"^ Human transcendence towards 
God involves a free decision that is not just a consequence of 
knowledge but determines i t . 'The concrete knowledge of God is 
always determined from the start by the way in which man loves and 
treasures the things presented to him'.^^ Thus a real knowledge of 
God involves a 'conversion', a commitment of the whole person in a 
free decision. For Rahner this is merely a philosophical attempt to 
grasp the meaning of the words: '"He who does what is true comes to 
the light." (John 3:21)'.=" -^
Rahner's thought is more in line with Blondel's than Marechal's 
at this point. Though Marechal criticized Kant's excessively 
rationalistic view of the operation of the intellect by arguing that 
knowing is bound up with the dynamism of wil l ing and thus even 
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love, Blondel developed this- further. Both Marechal and Blondel 
reach the Inf in i te from daily experience but differently - Marechal 
in that we af f i rm and Blondel in that we act. For Blondel action is 
'a synthesis of wi l l ing , knowing and being . . . the precise point 
where the worlds of thought, of morality and of science converge'."^^ 
J. Donceel sums up the difference well; 
But what Marechal wins thus in clari ty and conciseness, he 
loses in warmth and existential concreteness. Blondel is 
nearer to real l i f e , with i t s activity, i t s love, i t s feelings 
and emotions.^® 
The similarity of Rahner's and Blondel's understanding of 
knowledge can be seen in the following passage of Blondel's; 
I t is not merely by seeing, but by living that we advance 
into being as we perform, as i t were, a leap of generosity 
beyond the reach of intellectual justifications. To possess 
is more than to af f i rm, but one affirms better only by 
possessing more: we cannot have a better intellectual grasp 
of being without grasping i t more solidly in our acts.®^ 
Blondel distinguishes between our knowledge of God's existence and 
knowledge of the being of God. The former is implied in the 
dynamism of our 'wil l ing w i l l ' , a given of human nature, i t requires 
no 'option' or choice. We only know the being of God, that God not 
only exists but is 'for us', 'our God', through our 'willed w i l l ' , when 
we act upon and live up to our knowledge of God's existence. This 
requires decision and action, Blondel's 'option fondamentale';^° 
Thus, at the very moment when we seem to touch God by a 
stroke of thought, he escapes i f we do not keep him, i f we 
do not seek him through action. His immobility can be 
aimed at as a steady target only by a perpetual movement. 
Wherever we stop, he is not; wherever we keep marching, he 
is. We must always proceed beyond, because he is always 
further.^^ 
Therefore Blondel can say: 'Knowledge, which before the option 
was simply subjective and propulsive, becomes after the option 
privative and constitutive of being', i t is privative in that i t 
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deprives a person of knowledge of God, but i t is constitutive in 
that i t establishes a knowledge of God.'*'^  
Thus Rahner's metaphysics of an obediential potency is similar 
to Blondel's 'option fondamentale'. Both of these are in essence 
concern with acting or 'walking' in love and i t can therefore be said 
that Rahner's understanding of human becoming is in essence a 
charismatic understanding. 
Transcendental experience - the conceptual vehicle for 
Rahner's understanding of human becoming 
and knowledge of God 
This knowledge of God in freedom and w i l l is bound up in Rahner's 
thought with the notion of transcendental experience. We touched on 
this when we looked at Rahner's understanding of experience of the 
Spirit and we must now look at i t in more detail. Whilst in Hearers 
freedom was the basic fact that man becomes aware of, in 
Foundations the starting point is man as a person and subject; as in 
Hearers, so too in Foundations, the primary access to God is man's 
w i l l and freedom. However in Foundations the transcendental 
experience of God is more explicit ly bound to the categorical 
encounter with the concrete world, both the world of things and in 
particular the world of persons, the experience of the Thou of 
another person.'^ -^ In Foundations the transcendence of love defined 
in Hearers in relation to the essential hiddenness of being is now 
seen in terms of the Holy Mystery.'** 
At the beginning of Foundations Rahner sums up the basic 
argument of Spirit but this time concludes his discussion with a 
definit ion of the term transcendental experience. 
We shall cal l transcendental experience the subjective, 
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untheraatic, necessary and unfailing consciousness of the 
knowing subject that is co-present in every spir i tual act of 
knowledge, and the subject's openness to the unlimited 
expanse of a l l possible reality."*^ 
I t is this transcendental experience that constitutes human being as 
spir i tual . But there has been a development in his thought since 
Spiri t . Whereas Spirit started from the knowing subject and 
affirmed the necessity of God for the objectivity of knowledge,-*® in 
Foundations Rahner starts from the knowing subject who already has 
an implicit 'original knowledge', at a deeper level than conceptual, 
scientif ic knowledge.'*'^  This original knowledge is not an 
experience of discovering something that we have not known before. 
This transcendental experience is not simply awareness of the a 
priori structures of human knowing but an openness to the whole of 
reali ty. 
Transcendental experience is the experience of 
transcendence, in which experience the structure of the 
subject and therefore also the ultimate structure of every 
conceivable object of knowledge are present together in an 
identity.^® 
In fact there is ambiguity in his use of the word 
'transcendental' and according to one cr i t ic i t has a twofold 
meaning; on the one hand i t means 'the quality of a particular mode 
of knowledge' and on the other hand 'the quality of a particular 
mode of being that is connected with the transcendental mode of 
knowing'.49 According to the f i r s t , transcendental refers to the 
non-objective, unthematic original knowledge in which knowing 
subjects know themselves, a l l of reality and God (i.e. i t is 'co-
present in every spir i tual act of knowledge' and of course for 
Rahner every act of knowledge is a spir i tual act). The opposite of 
this mode of knowledge would be 'conceptual', 'thematic', 'objective' 
and 'categorical' knowledge. In the second sense transcendental does 
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not refer to this non-objective sort of knowledge but rather to 
what Van der Heijden calls the 'transobjective', and the realities to 
which this second usage relate 'do not coincide with the entire 
extent of the horizon [of knowledge] and thus can be gathered into 
basic groups within the horizon'.^" 
Although some ambiguity is present in these usages i t is 
important to understand the distinction between them in order to 
understand Rahner's definit ion of experience of the Spirit which he 
develops in his later work. As we have seen the basic change in 
orientation in Rahner's thought is from an examination of the 
transcendentality of human knowledge to the transcendentality of 
human acting, in freedom and love. I t is the second usage which 
Rahner uses for his understanding of the experience of the Spirit. 
However, he does not see them as contradictory but rather the 
second usage as a more precise use of the f i r s t , the f i r s t usage 
referring to the conditions of possibility of experience and the 
second referring to experience. The following passage illustrates 
the f i r s t usage of the term 'transcendental': 
I t is an experience because this knowledge, unthematic but 
ever-present, is a moment within and a condition of 
possibility for every concrete experience of any and every 
object,^' 
And the following passage il lustrates the second usage of the term: 
But there is not just the purely objective 'in i t s e l f of a 
reali ty on the one hand, and the 'clear and distinct idea' of 
i t on the other, but there is also a more original unity, 
not indeed for everything and anything, but certainly for 
the actualization of human existence, and this is a unity of 
reality and i t s 'self-presence' which is more, and is more 
original, than the unity of this reality and the concept 
which objectifies it.-^ '=^ 
Not everyone sees an ambiguity here. K. Weger sees the difference 
more in terms of the one being implicit and the other being 
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explicit . So in his definit ion of Rahner's understanding of 
transcendental experience Weger says: 
I t takes place as a very concrete everyday experience, even 
though i t is d i f f i c u l t to express verbally. I t occurs 
anonymously and implici t ly in every spir i tual activity. I t 
also takes place in a clear and more systematic form in 
those events in which man, who is usually involved in the 
individual tasks and objects of everyday l i f e , is to some 
extent thrown back on himself and is no longer able to deal 
with everything that otherwise normally concerns him,®® 
This notion of unthematic or 'original knowledge' in Rahner 
causes Fergus Kerr to assert that Rahner, 'after having studied with 
Heidegger, shows very considerable resistance to the master's main 
thoughts'.'^'' Kerr argues that whereas Heidegger starts from state-
of-mind, mood, feeling, 'prior to a l l cognition and volition, and 
beyond their range of disclosure',®^ Rahner's starting point is human 
cognition, in particular the Vorgriff as part of human cognition. As 
a consequence for Heidegger, our judgments, cognitions and volitions 
are embedded in our emotional response to the way things are and 
happen to us. Only then does Heidegger introduce the notion of 
Vorgriff but then in terms of the practical understanding that takes 
place through our involvement within the world and not from any 
standpoint outside it,^® Whereas for Heidegger man is being-in-the-
world interpreted in terms of care, for Rahner he is constituted by 
the Vorgriff and a l l other aspects of his existence are Interpreted 
in the l ight of that. 
I f Kerr's argument is correct i t undermines our assertion that 
Rahner's thought is rooted in an incarnational spir i tual i ty that 
stresses involvement and decision, leading to love, the heart of 
charismatic experience. However, what lies behind Rahner's thought 
is not cognition but experience of mystery. The purpose of Rahner's 
mystagogy 'is to enable people to interpret correctly their deeper 
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experiences', to in i t ia te them into the experience of mystery.®'' 
This is not the introduction of something external, but the 
awakening and disclosure of something already present. I t is an 
encouragement of what Heidegger calls 'primordial' or 'essential' 
thinking, a more passive thinking that listens, a meditative thinking 
rather than the busy and active calculative thinking of rational and 
scientif ic thought. I t brings the deeper questions to the surface, 
rather than just responding to the superficial ones. This 
corresponds to what Gilkey calls 'the dimension of ultimacy' and 
what Tracy calls the 'experience of the uncanny' and is what Rahner 
calls transcendental experience or unthematic knowledge as opposed 
to categorical or thematic knowledge.^® Consequently Bacik can 
describe Rahner's notion of transcendental experience in Heidegger's 
terms as 'a mood or vague feeling';^® and Rahner himself can 
interpret unthematic knowledge in terms of both transcendental 
philosophy and depth psychology.*" 
Kerr asserts that Rahner 'rapidly leaves time and place behind' 
but for Rahner transcendental experience is always and necessarily 
bodily, social and historical; there are 'no purely internal processes 
in a properly metaphysical sense'.^^ Thus Rahner can assert: 
In reali ty man as physical and as belonging to the 
historical dimension actually f u l f i l s the ultimate 
transcendental structures of his own nature not in the 
abstract ' in ter ior i ty ' of a mere attitude of mind, but in 
intercourse with the world.'^^ 
Bernard Lonergan would want to qualify Rahner's direct approach 
to God as the Absolute Mystery who reveals himself as the 
unobjective horizon in every act of affirmation. For Lonergan a 
much more detailed analysis of man's consciousness and cognitional 
structure is required.*^'® Whereas Lonergan stresses the potential 
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nature of pre-conceptual knowledge, for Rahner i t already has a 
fullness, since i t can never be f u l l y captured by 
conceptualization.^'* The differences in thought beween the two men 
are not as great as might f i r s t appear. Rahner emphasizes that 
there is a 'more' or 'fullness' in experience that is not expressible 
in conceptual terms; i t is pre-conceptual. However the 'pre' does 
not signify that i t is at an i n i t i a l stage prior to being raised to 
conceptual knowledge, i t is not what Kerr calls 'cognitive and 
incipiently conceptual grasp'. I t is in fact the very opposite since 
i t indicates the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge, William Dych 
suggests that this is similar to Lonergan's treatment of 
intersubjectlve meaning.^'® For both Rahner and Lonergan self-
awareness and awareness of the world are both elements in human 
knowing,^''^ For example a baby learns both to distinguish things in 
the world by organizing and unifying a mass of stimuli and also to 
distinguish himself from the world, 
A child does not learn as a detached observer, watching l i f e 
pass by, rather the world of which he is becoming aware is affecting 
him. He becomes aware of objects and himself in a relationship not 
as two separate things; there is both awareness and af fec t iv i ty . 
There is a unity of knower and known, of awareness and affect iv i ty 
in concrete l i f e . This is not to deny the difference between them 
but 'rather to assert their mutual interaction and interdependence 
in the concrete l i f e of the knower and the concrete process of his 
knowing'.^'^ There is not just knowledge acquired from 'without', 
from learning from teachers or books but also knowledge from 
'within' from being in existence, communicated not by words or 
concepts but by l i f e i t se l f . This is Rahner's 'original knowledge', 
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that experience 'in which what is meant and the experience of what 
is meant are s t i l l one'.*^' I t is not Cartesian individualism nor 
empiricism but an articulation of the concrete unity of lived 
experience. 
Holy Mystery - the goal of human becoming 
and knowledge of God 
As we have said, human transcendence is orientated towards the Holy 
Mystery. This Mystery is the goal to which the 'fundamental upward 
movement of man's sp i r i t leads', thus i t is at the root of a l l 
knowledge and freedom.'^^ By using the word mystery Rahner is not 
envisaging a provisional concept that w i l l later be clearly 
u n d e r s t o o d T r u e knowledge is not a mastery of the objects known; 
this is a secondary form of knowledge. Rather knowledge is 
primarily 'the presence of the mystery i t s e l f not a mastering of a 
reali ty but a being mastered by that reality.'^' We have already 
seen how man as sp i r i t , in knowing and wil l ing, is a being of 
absolute and unlimited transcendence. But the 'whither' of this 
transcendence is best described not as 'God' because the word 
Implies a conceptual understanding, a secondary reflection on the 
immediate transcendental experience, which though necessary cannot 
sum up the absolutely and positively in f in i t e . I t implies the 
concept is at our disposal, whereas the whither of transcendence is 
'that which disposes of as silently and ceaselessly at the very 
moment when we begin to dispose of anything,' i.e. when through 
judgment we understand something.^^ 
Rahner chooses the term 'holy mystery' to describe this whither 
of transcendence.^® There are various terms, both theological and 
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philosophical, that could be used,^^ The trouble with the 
theological terms is that they either conjure up in people's minds 
a l l sorts of concepts, both from historical tradition and also the 
individual's own experiences, which distort the true meaning of the 
word; or else they suggest that people can have a clear conceptual 
grasp of what is meant by them, The philosophical terms on the 
other hand are for many people today only empty terms which bear no 
relation to their experience. Rahner's aim is to f ind a term that 
w i l l point everyone to their own experience of transcendence, free 
from any conceptual baggage and for him the best term is mystery, 
or rather holy mystery, for what else could we call the ground and 
horizon of human freedom and love?^^ 
Rahner's essay on mystery, 'The Concept of Mystery in Catholic 
Theology', marks a significant stage in Rahner's thought whereby his 
'metaphysics of knowledge is deepened as theological anthropology 
into a metaphysics of mystery'.^^ This transition in his thought 
'indicates continuity with the past as well as a new, holistic 
breadth of thought that surpasses the intellectualism of the early 
writings' and forms the basis of his mystagogical approach,^^ 
I t is on the basis of the term holy mystery that Rahner 
develops his theological anthropology. In his understanding of the 
traditional concept of the beatific vision: 
, , , the 'Perfect beatitude granted to man by God consists 
in immediate access to God; i,e, God himself is the 
fulf i lment of man. But this Immediate vision does not 
entail a doing away with the mystery but is rather the 
abiding presence of the mystery.'^*' 
Man's transcendental openness is f u l f i l l e d in a loving 'ecstasis', a 
giving away of the self in love to the holy mystery that surrounds 
us.^^ The mystery is 'the sole peace' of him who trusts himself to 
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i t , loves i t humbly, and surrenders himself to i t fearlessly in 
knowledge amd love'.®'^' 
Rahner's emphasis on mystery has an important application to 
much contemporary charismatic experience. Often the emphasis on 
direct experience of the Spirit means that people eclipse the 
mystery since they believe they have 'a direct and immediate 
revelation from the deity.' This can lead to a new form of 
ontologism, which replaces an orientation to the uncontrollable and 
incomprehensible mystery with a 'controlling, manipulating and 
demanding att i tude' .®' 
The strength of a mystagogical approach is that: 
. , . i t gives us a way to interpret and integrate a l l 
experience, i t encourages us to raise the fundamental 
questions of l i f e , i t accounts for the in f in i t e longings of 
the heart, i t encourages us to break out of the prison of 
self, i t gives us a language for speaking about the kind of 
experience which evades scientif ic analysis, i t makes us 
aware of what is already presupposed in our activity, i t 
encourages the celebration of our hopes and dreams, i t 
offers an explanation of our deepest anxiety, i t keeps open 
the possibility of further self-actualization. In brief, the 
claim is that a recognition of mystery enriches human 
life.'^'^ 
I t is in terms of mystery that Rahner interprets experience of 
the Spiri t , the charismatic experience of the cross and resurrection 
of Christ, an experience not of control or grasp but of surrender to 
that which is always more than man, to the mystery of God: 
The cross means the demand, never more to be veiled, for 
man's unconditional surrender to the mystery of existence 
which man can no longer bring under his control because he 
is f i n i t e and gui l t laden. Resurrection means the 
unconditioned hope that in that surrender man is 
definit ively accepted by this mystery in forgiveness and 
blessedness, that where man lets go completely,' the 
precipice disappears.®® 
This concept of mystery is the basis for Rahner's 
anthropocentric approach. I t is the mystery that defines both God 
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and man, i t is both the goal and the root of man's knowledge and 
freedom and hence love. 'Man is there, because his real being, as 
sp i r i t , Is transcendence, the being of holy mystery'.^-'^ The 
absolute mystery is that which underlies our existence, our 
theoretical knowledge and our actualization of l i f e . This is what is 
meant by God, not a proven external reality which is then introduced 
to one's own thought and decision processes but a discovery of an 
existing element of one's own being,^-® The substitution of the word 
'mystery' for 'God' also enables Rahner to develop his understanding 
of God's self-communication. God as the mystery is present as our 
innermost reali ty whilst at the same time remaining 
incomprehensible. 
Over and above his 'instrinsic' status as mystery, God can 
be mystery only in virtue of a quasi-formal causality in 
which he makes not some entity different from himself, but 
rather himself . . . the specification of the creature.®® 
In the concept of mystery the anthropocentric and theocentric 
approaches are united, man's goal in the mystery and the mystery at 
the heart of creation. The mystery of God and the mystery of man 
form an abiding unity in difference. Man is the being constituted 
by holy mystery: 
Man is a mystery. Indeed, he is the mystery. For he is 
mystery not merely because he is open in his poverty to the 
mystery of the incomprehensible fullness of God, but 
because God uttered this mystery as his own,®'^  
In the l ight of these words we must now turn to the pivotal point 
of Rahner's theology, that of God's self-communication in grace. I t 
is his understanding of this that lies at the heart of his 
understanding of experience of the Spirit . 
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Chapter 5 
THE GIFT OF GRACE - GOD'S SELF-COMMUNICATION TO MAN 
For Rahner the essence of the Christian Gospel is that God is not 
only present 'in the mode of distant presence as the term of 
transcendence' but also 'really present as one communicating 
himself'.'' The former mode shows the hiddenness of God, or rather 
the ultimate blindness of man's knowledge, the latter that God can 
actually choose to speak and thus reveal far more of himself than 
is attainable from human knowledge.^ I t is here that we arrive at 
the heart of Rahner's theology; the self-communication of God in 
grace is the basis of his understanding of the Trinity, creation and 
the incarnation. As we have seen, the experience of grace is also 
at the heart of the charismatic experience. I t is the centrality of 
grace for Rahner's thought that makes his theology a truly 
charismatic theology. 
Rahner's basic aim in his theological system is to rethink the 
relationship of divine activity and human activity in the 
evolutionary world view. His metaphysics of knowledge provides him 
with the method, allowing him to make systematic connections among 
doctrines, and the conceptual vehicle for asserting the universality 
of grace. In other words his metaphysics of knowledge is the 
conceptual instrument and his evolutionary view of the world is the 
conceptual framework for his theological anthropology.^ Rahner's 
metaphysics of knowledge is linked with his theology of grace. The 
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identification of the gracious God with the horizon of Being enables 
Rahner to say that men are the objects of divine grace whether or 
not they are aware of this. The God of grace is the horizon of a l l 
human act ivi ty and the condition of knowing.'^ 
For Rahner a f u l l understanding of grace can only be attained 
by using the language of self-communication, of love and personal 
intimacy.® Grace is the self-communication of God, i t is not words 
about God but God himself; 'the giver in his own being is the g i f t ' 
present as a 'divinizing' presence in man which brings about i t s own 
fulfilment,*^ Rahner's attempt at a new understanding of grace is 
motivated by his appreciation of modern man's situation. Modern 
man's thinking Is 'existential'; he is not Interested in a 'mysterious 
superstructure' of an extrinsic understanding of grace, i.e. a 
concept of grace which is external to him, but in the realities of 
his own experience.'' 'One strives to "experience" the reality of 
grace precisely there where one lives one's own existence'.® Thus 
Rahner is attempting to recast the traditional understanding of 
grace, too often understood in impersonal and static terms, in a way 
relevant and meaningful to modern man. He is addressing the 
question: 'How can Catholic theology bring to l ight the 
existentialist and personalist elements implicit in the theology of 
grace in an age in which the real is experienced existentially and 
socially?'•^ 
This self-communication of God does not mean that the mystery 
has become clearly and unambiguously expressed, but rather that the 
mystery i t se l f is communicated, God is present as mystery. '° This 
means that a person's experiences of God's self-communication are 
not unambiguous, not open to any other interpretation. However i f a 
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person is offered an interpretation along these rethought Christian 
lines, he w i l l f ind a jus t i f icat ion for his own decision to trust in 
the mystery of • God, in surrender of his self-centred existence to 
the forgiving and liberating love of God. 
God's gift of grace - the supernatural existratial 
Grace is not, therefore, an external superstructure but rather the 
•innermost entelecheia'; the ultimate purpose and fulfi lment of grace 
signified by the beatific vision is already immanent and present in 
man.^' This Is expressed in Rahner's doctrine of the supernatural 
existential. The term 'existential', used extensively by Heidegger, 
refers to man's ontological constitution as human being, prior to 
any free decision; ' I t is an aspect of human nature precisely as 
human'.''^ When this is f i r s t discussed Rahner speaks of i t in terms 
of an 'ordination to', 'capacity for ' or 'potency for ' grace; the 
supernatural existential is a predisposition towards or desire for 
grace, rather than grace i t s e l f . ' = 'The capacity for the God of 
self-bestowing personal Love is the central and abiding existential 
of man as he really is. '^* But phrased in this way, i t fa i l s to 
solve the problem Rahner intended i t to, that of how grace can be 
both intrinsic and unmerited. By making i t a desire for grace in 
man's nature 'as he really is ' Rahner removed the extrinsic view of 
grace where man has no natural desire for grace but i t is purely 
and simply a g i f t of God, but i t is hard to see in this way of 
expressing i t how grace remains unmerited. I f God has created man 
with such a natural desire then surely God must necessarily f u l f i l 
this desire? Grace would then be merited.^ ^ However, Rahner's 
usual formulation of the supernatural existential is somewhat more 
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successful in the attempt to avoid both extrinsicism and the denial 
of the gratuitousness of grace. 
The supernatural existential in the usual usage is the actual 
of fer of grace i t se l f , which is nothing less than the self-
communication of God himself, traditionally called uncreated grace. 
I t is 'the existential of man's absolute immediacy to God in and 
through this divine self-communication'.'^ Grace is therefore not a 
'thing', but an offer , 'a standing invitation to accept 
divlnization' ." ' This is not an of fer , in the sense of something that 
is not yet given but rather an offer in the sense of a real self-
communication that has already taken place, actually present in 
every person as part of their humanity. 'In this sense everyone, 
really and radically every person, must be understood as the event 
of a supernatural self-communication of God'.'® Therefore grace is 
a supernatural existential; God's self-communication is intrinsic to 
the whole of creation, i t constitutes part of man's nature.'^ The 
'self-bestowal of God, in which God bestows himself precisely as the 
absolute transcendent, is the most immanent factor in the 
creature'.^"^ 
But at the same time this most immanent factor 'is precisely 
not an element of this essence and this nature which belongs to 
it ' .= ' ' Grace is a supernatural existential. Grace, as God's loving 
self-communication, must be unexacted. Love, as the free-self-
giving of a person, can be refused.^^^ I f i t is demanded as a 
necessary requirement i t cannot be love. In order for the grace to 
be a supernatural existential i t is necessary that creation is 
possible without grace; grace must retain i t s gratuitous 
c h a r a c t e r A t the same time grace must not be extrinsic to the 
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human constitution. Rahner's way round this dilemma is by viewing 
pure nature as a 'remainder concept (.RestbegrifD'.^'^ I t can only be 
used in a theological sense, not in the sense of something actually 
existing. 
Our actual nature is never 'pure' nature. I t is a nature 
installed in a supernatural order which man can never leave, 
even as a sinner and unbeliever. I t is a nature which is 
continually being determined (which does not mean just i f ied) 
by the supernatural grace of salvation offered to it.*® 
But although pure nature is never actually encountered i t is 
nevertheless an essential concept. I t does not exist but i t is a 
theological necessity that i t could exist, in order to maintain the 
gratuitous nature of grace.^ "^ 
As Rahner himself acknowledges his position is similar to 
Blondel's. Blondel resembles a l l Scotists in stressing the primacy 
of the w i l l and love over the intellect, rather than the Thomist 
view where knowledge and reason are primary, the intellect 
presenting objects to the wil l .^ '^ According to the Scotist position: 
Human natural desire for God is distinct, not because i ts 
desire is 'ontologically' any different from tendencies in 
material things, but only because the attainment of the 
object of i t s desire can only be granted by the grace of 
elevation to the supernatural order 
Blondel distinguished between the will ing w i l l and the willed w i l l . 
The wil l ing w i l l naturally tends towards i t s supernatural goal. The 
willed w i l l is free to respond to objects or courses of action 
presented by the intellect and to follow the wil l ing w i l l . Only the 
willed w i l l leads to the ultimate option to open oneself to the work 
of the supernatural, man's option fondamentale, which is the choice 
or refusal of the supernatural, the choice of l i f e or of betraying 
one's humanity. This choice requires a supernatural g i f t from God 
to be consummated. Thus God is the natural end of man, but 
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attaining God requires supernatural means. Also since the will ing 
w i l l has a natural desire for the supernatural, nature already has a 
supernatural 'dimension' in i t , i t is not pure nature but 
'transnatural'. As Blondel expresses i t ; 
What has often been Ignored is the fact that previously to 
habitual grace there is another grace, a f i r s t vocation, a 
state which results from the loss of the i n i t i a l g i f t , but 
which contains a need and an aptitiude for recovering i t . ^ ^ 
This, as Rahner acknowledges, is similar to his own view of the 
supernatural existential.=^° 
But on what basis is pure nature distinguished from human 
natureT^^' I f God's self-communication in grace is the basis of 
creation, in what sense can creation be envisaged without i t? 
Rahner is not using 'existential ' in Heidegger's sense since an 
existential is an ontological part of man; man would not be man 
without i t . But Rahner wants to insist man could have existed 
without the supernatural existential, i t relates to concrete human 
beings not human being as such.^ "^ However, Anne Carr presents a 
solution to this problem by seeing the supernatural existential as; 
God's grace in his self-giving action, as universally 
present in an abiding historical situation. Nature is the 
theological term for the conditions of possibility within 
creation . . . for the reception of Christ and the grace 
which he media tes.^^ 
There is an unresolved tension as to whether there is a 
temporal or a logical difference between nature and grace. Thus 
nature as a remainder concept, a world without grace, does not exist 
but is important as a logical concept for our own understanding of 
ourselves.^'^ But elsewhere Rahner implies a temporal distinction: 
God has created the servant only in order to make him his 
child; but he was able to create the child of grace, in 
distinction to his only-begotten Son, only by creating the 
addressee without claim to sonship, i.e. the servant.^® 
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Rahner works with a concept of 'double gratuity' , two distinct g i f t s 
from God, creation and elevation. However a concept of double 
gratuity requires a temporal or a logical (whatever that might be) 
gap between created and elevated nature. But Rahner seeks to 
preserve both the primacy of actual historical nature and of i t s 
elevation by grace. He wants to deny a temporal difference because 
he wants to maintain a unified process of development from God's 
primal decision to create, therefore there can only be a logically 
possible pure nature, not an actual one. However, a logical 
explanation is not suff ic ient , i t has no real content and does not 
solve the problem, i t only circumvents i t . But, as William Shepherd 
argues, the concept of double gratuity is not necessary. There is 
no need to preserve a temporal distinction; rather God can, in one 
act, 'create a being, consisting of both a natural and a supernatural 
element',^® Since creation is in Christ man can exist from the 
beginning in the situation of both pure nature and supernatural 
existential.®'^ Thus as 'a complex whole, the created world process 
is modally supernatural, though not entitatively supernatural'.^® In 
other words the supernatural existential refers to the mode of God's 
activity towards the human situation in i t s entirety, his 
'existentieW situation in Heidegger's terms; i t is not simply a 
component of his created nature. The supernatural existential 
nevertheless remains an existential (part of man's constitution 
before any personal appropriation of i t ) because i t refers to the 
mode of God's act ivi ty in creation rather than of man's response. 
Shepherd points out that this confusion in Rahner's thought 
stems from the fact that he works out his technical doctrine of 
grace in the traditional static framework of the post-Tridentine 
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scholastic view of the world which is hierarchal and vertical, not an 
evolutionary framework which is developmental, unified and 
horizontal. He calls the traditional framework 'loci theology': 
Loci theology was appropriate in the context of a 
Weltanschauung which considered that the world order was 
not unitary and developmental, but rather was a 'stage' 
between heaven and hell in which there are static epochs 
differentiated ontologically. Man before sin differed from 
man after sin. Man after sin but before Christ differed 
from man af ter Christ. Souls are created individually by 
God, and souls are saved individually by God at death. The 
world is man's arena for soul-saving; i t is not an intrinsic 
and constitutive factor in his very being and his destiny.^"® 
Shepherd draws the distinction betwen Rahner's doctrine of 
nature and grace and his theology of nature and grace.**^ In the 
technical doctrine man's being is divorced from his situation; man 
is made up partly by a supernatural element and partly by a natural 
one. 
Nothing in the technical doctrine or in i t s traditional 
presuppositions can force the restricted reference of such 
a concept as the supernatural existential into a broader 
context. Precious l i t t l e , therefore, is said about God's 
activity; the focus is on man's being, his capacities, his 
constitution.'*' 
The traditional technical framework tends to separate man from his 
situation and is concerned with man's being rather than, as in the 
evolutionary framework, recognizing that 'man is a product of the 
past (not the product of direct divine interference with natural 
processes)'.-*^ However in his theology as a whole Rahner works 
within a modern evolutionary world view, seeing man in the context 
of his entire situation. Whereas in his technical framework the 
supernatural existential refers to a component of his ontological 
makeup, in his theological framework i t refers to an aspect of the 
human condition or situation.-*^ The supernatural existential is not 
a 'thing' but a mode of act ivi ty; the technical doctrine fa i l s to 
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bring this out. 
Since the supernatural existential really is the self-
communication of God then i t can be understood in terms of 
revelation. Therefore, just as the supernatural existential is a 
part of a l l humanity, so too revelation must be universally present. 
I f this is so, then i t follows that what we normally call 
revelation and revelation-history is in reality the 
conceptually concrete, propositional and divinely controlled 
'thematization' of the universal gratuitous revelation.*'* 
In fact Rahner's theology of revelation has a double aspect, the 
universal transcendental and the special categorical.'*® 
Transcendental revelation is constituted by: (1) God as the a priori 
horizon of our knowing and loving; (2) the supernatural elevation of 
human nature. The conceptualization or thematization of this is 
special revelation. I t is only through historical revelation that 
we can explici t ly recognize our unthematic experience and Christ is 
the yardstick by which transcendental revelation is measured; the 
Christ-event is the lens through which the l ight of revelation must 
pass.'*^ Both are aspects of the one revelation of God. The one God 
communicates himself to man in Spirit (as universally available 
grace) and in word (as definite, historical norm). 
The supernatural existential can also be understood in terms 
of objective jus t i f ica t ion. Before man's free acceptance and 
actualization of jus t i f ica t ion he is already objectively jus t i f ied: 
'One is a Christian in order to become one'.'*'' 
Prior to any subjective appropriation of salvation, man is 
inwardly determined by a supernatural existential, which 
consists of the fact that Christ in his death ' jus t i f ied ' 
s i n fu l man. . . . This intrinsic abi l i ty . . . can be simply 
called the supernatural existential of being (objectively) 
redeemed or of being (objectively) justified.*® 
Thus uncreated grace, general revelation and the supernatural 
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existential are different aspects of the same concept. The 
supernatural existential is understood not in the technical sense 
but in terms of Rahner's overall theological thought, not as part of 
man's make up but as the act ivi ty of God to man's situation not to 
his being. God is present to a l l men in that he forms the condition 
for man's openness to him. But also, since uncreated grace is the 
communication of the Holy Spirit , Rahner, 'without perhaps being 
f u l l y cognizant of i t , ' equates the Holy Spirit with general 
revelation, uncreated grace and supernatural existential:'** 
Holy Spirit , uncreated grace, general revelation, objective 
jus t i f ica t ion, supernatural existential - a l l these terms 
are f ina l ly precisely equivalent in Rahner's work; a l l these 
are systematically erected from a pervasive Christocentrism; 
a l l f ind their formulations on the basis of a metaphysics 
of knowledge which speaks of an ultimate 'participative' 
horizon encompassing a l l human knowing and acting 
Thus a l l these aspects of God's self-communication in grace, 
including experience of the Holy Spirit , are rooted in a 
Christocentricism which, as we have seen, is the yardstick for a l l 
charismatic act ivi ty. Rahner, in his understanding of grace wants to 
maintain that God's self-communication to man constitutes a 'new' 
relationship. Yet at the same time this cannot involve a change in 
God, since he is immutable, nor can i t involve a change in man, since 
such a change could only result in the type of relationship that is 
constituent of man as f i n i t e creature, that of being 
transcendentally referred to the in f in i t e ; then grace would not be 
intrinsic. Such a change would be brought about by eff icient 
causality, where the cause is different from the effect.^ ' But for 
Rahner grace is truly God's self-communication and he uses the 
scholastic notion of formal causality where the cause is the effect, 
i t does not cause something different from i t se l f in the normal 
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understanding of causality but the cause is a constitutive element 
in that which is caused; in Rahner's terms the giver is the gift.®=^ 
The model of formal causality is used only with 'a dialectical and 
analogous modification' and hence is prefixed with 'quasi' to signify 
the analogous nature of the concept as applied to God.®^ Without 
this prefix the notion of formal causality could imply a pantheistic 
type of divinization. I t is the model of quasi-formal causality that 
Rahner uses for his understanding not only of grace, but also the 
Trini ty , incarnation and creation.®* 
God's gift of grace - creation 
Rahner understands creation in terms of the concept of 'creative 
transformation' which means that within the world something totally 
new arises from the creative process; creation is an ongoing 
process.®® God 'inserts' his divine causality into f in i t e causality 
and consequently creatures, enabled by God, actively transcend their 
own reali ty. But how do the two causal agencies of Creator and 
creature relate? The answer is in Rahner's metaphysics of 
knowledge. The condition for any instance of knowing is the horizon 
of Being, i t is the ground of human striving to know and is both a 
constitutive factor and a transcendent one. Likewise i t is the 
condition and possibility for human action and is involved in i t . 
However, the f i n i t e agent actually does the acting. God acts in the 
mode of f i na l causality not ef f ic ient causality, but i t is a special 
mode of f i na l causality because, as in the metaphysics of knowledge, 
God is not only the condition but is also included in a l l acts. I t 
is , as we have seen, what Rahner calls quasi-formal causality; 
Shepherd's term for this is 'actuating causality' and this brings out 
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the meaning better.^® 
God as most immanent - and yet precisely for that reason 
absolutely superior to the world - confers on f in i t e beings 
themselves a true active self-transcendence in their change 
and becoming, and is himself ultimately the future, the 
f ina l cause, which represents the true and really effective 
cause operative in a l l change.®'^ 
Rahner understands God's relationship with the world in terms of 
a dialogue in which man plays an active part; he is not a puppet but 
'a real co-performer in this humano-divine drama of history'.^® This 
dialogue is understood in a unique and analogical sense.®* In his 
explanation of this unique relationship of God with the world Rahner 
wants to assert the truth in both dualism and pantheism and avoid 
the errors of both. Dualism is wrong i f i t conceives of God's 
relationship with the world in terms of two categorical objects, 
seeing God as a part of the whole. Rather, God is an 'inner 
constitutive element' in creation; in him 'we live and move and have 
our being'.®*^ Yet at the same time, against pantheism, God and the 
world must be different .^ ' 
Expressed another way there is a dialectical relationship 
between God's immanence and transcendence.^^ God's immanence must 
be asserted in order to maintain a genuine seJf-transcendence and 
his transcendence asserted in order that what is attained is 
genuinely new; sp i r i t really does come from matter.^^" Spirit is not 
'a chance stranger on earth' but the goal of creation and man is the 
point at which 'the basic tendency of matter to f ind i t se l f in spi r i t 
by self-transcendence' is realized.®'* 
There is not, therefore, a 'particular factor called God, who 
makes himself f e l t as one reali ty among others'.®® In the usual 
understanding of the word a difference between two objects implies 
a space in which they can be differentiated. That space, or 'horizon 
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of the transcendent' is God and is 'the condition of the possibility 
for a l l categorical distinctions and divisions'.®® God enables the 
categorical difference to be determined, he ' is this difference in 
himself and as such he cannot be differentiated since he is that 
which differentiates; 'the boundary which delimits a l l things cannot 
i t se l f be bounded by a s t i l l more distant limit'.®'' God is therefore 
not present as something which can be differentiated, and so at our 
disposal, but present as that which differentiates. He is 'always 
present only as that which disposes'.®® The fact that God 
establishes the difference, that the creature in i t s own independent 
reali ty is dependent on God, means that genuine, autonomous reality 
and radical dependence are two sides of the same coin and they vary 
in direct, not inverse, proportion.®* In other words through quasi-
formal causality, or actuating causality, a person's actions are 
totally his own and total ly the work of grace since the grace that 
transforms him is a constitutive principle of his being. 
Therefore God is not a cause in the world but causes the world; 
he is not a link in the chain of causality but is the condition of 
possibility of the chain. God's presence and actions take place 
'precisely in and through the presence of the f in i t e existent'.''^ 
Thus 'special "interventions" of God' which take place in the world 
religions are to be understood as specific manifestations of the 
underlying ground of the act of loving self-communication of God 
that is intrinsic to the created order. 
Rahner gives the example of seeing a good idea as an 
inspiration of God.'"' On one level this good idea must have 
originated from myself. In a causal sense i t s origin can be traced 
back to concrete worldly factors that determine my existence, 
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whether they be physiological, psychological or whatever. In this 
sense the idea i s a product and function of myself not an 
intervention. However this concrete world and i t s inner worldly 
causality i s the place where and the means by which my relationship 
with God takes place. God i s not present as categorical object but 
in and through a l l categorical objects, he i s paradoxically 
'everywhere insofar as he grounds everything, and he i s nowhere 
insofar as everything i s created'.''^ The fact that God i s present 
i n and through the f i n i t e existent means that there i s a 'mediated 
immediacy' of God by the categorical object.''^^ But this does not 
mean that every categorical object, by vi r t u e of the fact that i t i s 
there, mediates God's presence, Rather i t i s our att i t u d e towards 
the categorical object that makes a mediation possible, since i t i s 
our a t t i t u d e which determines whether or not we have a 
transcendental experience, and i t i s that transcendental experience 
that mediates God to us. 
Something f i n i t e as such, insofar as i t appears as a 
def i n i t e , individual thing within our transcendental horizon, 
cannot represent God in such a way that, by the very fact 
that i t i s given, the very self of God i s also present in a 
way which goes beyond the possibility of mediation in our 
transcendental experience. . . . The individual existent in 
i t s categorical i n d i v i d u a l i t y and limitations can mediate 
God to the extent that in the experience of it the 
transcendental experience of God takes placeJ"^ 
As we have seen the specific nature of the transcendental 
experiences 'vary a great deal i n individual persons corresponding 
to the differences i n the i r h i s t o r i c a l existence'.''^ But the moment 
that by my a t t i t u d e and action I relate to the world in a way that 
leads to an experience of transcendence then the good idea takes on 
a new significance, In fact the whole of my existence takes on a 
new significance. I can and must say of my good idea: 
I t i s willed by God in this positive significance as a 
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moment of the one world established in freedom by i t s 
ground as the world of my subjective relationship to God, 
and in this sense i t i s an 'inspiration' of God ... in this 
way everything can be regarded as a special providence, as 
an intervention of God, presupposing only that I accept the 
concrete constellation of my l i f e and of the world in such 
a way that i t becomes a positive, s a l v i f i c concretization of 
my transcendental relationship to God in freedom7^ 
Therefore when discussing the nature of prayer as 'a dialogue 
with God' Rahner does not interpret new insights and impulses as 
'charismatic interventions of the Holy S p i r i t "from without'" since 
this ignores the fact that primarily such experiences are a person's 
own, from his or her own psyche and subconscious.^'' However, 
though we cannot experience prayer as dialogue with God in the 
sense that God says something to us, we can in the sense that we 
experience ourselves as the ones spoken by God: 
I f we say that what God primarily says to us is ourselves 
in our decreed freedom, In our decree-defying future, in the 
f a c t i c i t y (that can never be t o t a l l y analysed and never 
functionally rationalized) of our past and presents® 
I t i s a relationship of partnership and dialogue but not 
understood as univocal to human partnership and dialogue. Rahner's 
theology of grace as the self-communication of God already given i n 
creation and man, though not necessarily actualized, means that a 
person i n his unique and h i s t o r i c a l existence can admit this and 
realize that the gratuitous grace of God's self-communication really 
belongs to his particular concrete existence. Then he does not hear 
something i n addition to himself but 'hears himself as God's address, 
heavy with God's self-promise, i n the grac e - f i l l e d self-communication 
of God by f a i t h , hope and love'.'^^ 
As we said i n the Introduction, Rahner does not want to put 
people o f f praying but wants people involved i n contemporary 
charismatic movements to get r i d of the mythological and 
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interventionist understandings of God's a c t i v i t y i n the world that 
they sometimes have. In actual fact, this new understanding, which 
may i n i t i a l l y lead to disillusionment, w i l l hopefully be a return to 
a new sort of naiVety where prayer i s again experienced as dialogue 
with God, 'because that i s what i t i s in truth'.®° 
God's gift of grace - some problems in Rahner's thought 
there are, however, a number of inconsistencies and contradictions 
i n Rahner's understanding of grace apart from the one we looked at 
earlier. Rahner r i g h t l y wants to preserve the freedom of God with 
regard to creation, not to l i m i t God by making creation a constraint 
of necessity upon him, but he f a i l s to make this clear. Creation 
without grace i s 'only a derivative, r e s t r i c t e d and secondary 
p o s s i b i l i t y ' which i s based on the primary p o s s i b i l i t y of creation 
with grace.®'' But how can creation without grace be a real option 
on i t s own i f by d e f i n i t i o n i t is based on the poss i b i l i t y of 
creation with grace; and how can creation with grace be primary i n 
that everything else i s based on i t i f the secondary po s s i b i l i t y can 
in theory exist without i t ? Either the primal act is that 'in which 
everything else i s i n fact given' or i t i s not.^^ As we shall see in 
the next chapter, creation with grace i s creation in Christ, but in 
what sense, i n Rahner's phrase, i s Christology the beginning and end 
of anthropology i f men can exist without the incarnation ever taking 
place?®® How i s i t true that men 'ultimately exist because the Son 
of Man was to exist' i f men can exist ' i f the Logos had not himself 
become man'?®'* However, as we shall see, there i s a way to avoid 
them by seeing necessity as an enlarging, not a l i m i t i n g , factor. 
When talking about 'anonymous Christianity', the concept that the 
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grace of salvation exists i n the world and in a person even before 
i t i s e x p l i c i t l y recognised, Rahner distinguishes between grace as 
merely offered and grace as e x i s t e n t i a l l y accepted: 
Terminologically, however, i t i s better not to c a l l this 
e x i s t e n t i a l l y (but not existentielD 'Christian' position on 
the part of every man 'implicit' or 'anonymous' Christianity 
s t r a i g h t away. Otherwise we obscure the radical distinction 
between grace merely offered and grace ex i s t e n t i a l l y 
accepted i n f a i t h and love.®® 
Man's free decision makes a rea l difference to the mode of presence 
of grace: 'grace i s always the free action of divine love which i s 
only 'at the disposal' of man precisely in so far as be is at the 
disposal of this divine love'.^^ However, grace i s no 'thing' but a 
'mode of being' or 'a particular condition'; i t i s a particular way of 
being a s p i r i t u a l person. Grace i s not added to the person but only 
exists because the person exists; grace 'exists by affecting a 
s p i r i t u a l , personal substantiality, by being the divinizing condition 
of the latter'.®'' Therefore i f grace i s the self-communication of 
God i t can only exist i f someone exists to whom i t can be 
communicated.®® But i f grace really i s no 'thing' but a mode of 
being a s p i r i t u a l person, i t i s hard to understand how i t can exist, 
be present, before a person has begun to li v e that mode of 
existence, has said 'yes' to God and allowed grace to become the 
divinizing condition which i s the very existence of grace. 
Taylor describes the d i f f e r e n t modes of presence as follows: 
On the transcendental level, grace i s the g i f t of God's love 
that is given i n each moment with existence i t s e l f and that 
is unthematically appropriated or, in a self-contradictory 
fashion, refused. On the categorical level, grace is the 
event of the e x p l i c i t appropriation of divine love as 
mine.^"^ 
However, Rahner elsewhere argues that there i s no transcendent 
experience without a complementary h i s t o r i c a l expression. The 
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experience of transcendence i s a dynamic concept given within the 
experience of categorical objects,^° But how can a something that 
is i n essence a dynamic concept, i.e. i s not 'some r e i f i e d objectivity 
"in man'", exist and be rea l l y present before the dynamic realization 
of i t ? ^ ^ I f grace i s not 'a neutral state' described by the formal 
categories of t r a d i t i o n a l ontology, but requires personal categories 
of love, personal intimacy and self-communication to describe i t , how 
can i t be present i n a subject who has rejected such personal 
categories or i s in d i f f e r e n t towards them?^^ 
The problem i s partly caused by the fact that Rahner wants to 
preserve God's immutability, and avoid positing change i n God. So 
although he uses the language of love and self-communication he 
uses them i n a re s t r i c t e d and less than personal sense. In his 
e f f o r t to preserve the i n t r i n s i c nature of grace Rahner emphasizes 
the 'real presence' of God's self-communication, prior to and 
irrespective of any response on man's part, as a communication that 
has already taken, place.®® In other words God has already f u l l y 
communicated himself; a l l that matters now is man's response, with 
no change involved i n God. But self-communicating love involves 
relationship and change; love involves reciprocity and suffering; 
I t i s this side of love which i s often overlooked or 
misinterpreted, and i t i s of especial importance. I t i s the 
other side of the category of individuality. In love we 
give of our personal being and uniqueness. But we do not 
love unless our personal being is transformed through the 
relat i o n to the other 
Rahner's emphasis on the t o t a l givenness of God's s e l f -
communication means that although he acknowledges the fact that the 
experience of grace i s radical transformation his overall thought 
does not bring this out. A common experience in both mysticism and 
the contemporary charismatic movement i s that of experiencing the 
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love of God, being 'bathed in love', something that surpasses one's 
own capacity to love. We touched on this i n the t h i r d chapter when 
we looked at the link between charismatic and mystical experience. 
Rahner's emphasis, however, i s always on the givenness of God's love, 
not on the experience of finding a love far greater than one's own. 
Thus he can say: 'The only ultimate structure of the person which 
expresses i t perfectly i s the person's basic capacity for love, and 
this capacity i s boundless'.^® But people do not tend to experience 
themselves as boundless love but rather experience the love of God 
as something that transforms their own i n a b i l i t y to love.^^' 
The problem i s also caused by the fact that Rahner has an 
inadequate concept of the personal nature of the Holy S p i r i t . We 
w i l l not substantiate this assertion t i l l we examine Rahner's 
understanding of the T r i n i t y , but what i t leads to i s the lack of a 
clear d i s t i n c t i o n between man's experience as s p i r i t and man's 
experience of the Holy S p i r i t , Consequently Rahner talks about 'a 
nature which i s continually being determined by grace', a 'natural 
s p i r i t u a l a c t i v i t y ' which i s characterized by man's essential 
openness and also about a 'supernatural fulfilment' of this 
openness.®'^  He then goes on to describe both the openness and i t s 
f u l f i l m e n t in the same terms: 
And yet the basic essence of man, his nature as such 
openness (transcendence) can be perfectly well established. 
The i n i t i a l elements of such fu l f i l m e n t are already present: 
the experience of i n f i n i t e longings, of radical optimism, of 
unquenchable discontent, of the torment of insufficiency of 
everything attainable, of the radical protest against death, 
the experience of being confronted with an absolute love 
precisely where i t i s l e t h a l l y incomprehensible and seems to 
be s i l e n t and aloof, the experience of a radical g u i l t and 
of a s t i l l abiding hope etc,^^ 
But i n what sense can these experiences be considered as the 
fu l f i l m e n t , however p a r t i a l , of man's essential openness? And in 
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what sense are they experiences of grace i n terms of a loving 
personal relationship? Dennis Edwards calls such experiences of 
transcendence 'moments of "grace"' but he uses grace i n this sense 
in a general, not specifically Christian sense, of 'something which 
comes to us in surprising and mysterious ways', unexpected and 
unasked for, beyond our expectations and hopes.®® He divides these 
experiences into two groups: f i r s t l y experiences pointing to the 
superabundant richness of l i f e , the awareness that 'all is given' and 
secondly to experiences of the limitations of our existence. For 
the former he gives the examples of interpersonal love, chi l d b i r t h , 
c r e a t i v i t y , forgivenness and the beauty of nature. For the l a t t e r he 
gives the examples of vulnerability, death, f a i l u r e , loneliness and 
alienation. Both types of experience are in fact experiences of 
l i m i t , but i n the former type the experience of l i m i t is im p l i c i t , 
and the experience of transcendence Implies a l i m i t to be 
transcended.^ °° 
But to what extent are these experiences experiences of grace? 
Theology has t r a d i t i o n a l l y distinguished d i f f e r e n t aspects of grace. 
The ones which concern us here are: uncreated grace which i s the 
g i f t of God himself; created grace which i s the transforming effect 
of grace i n man; and prevenient grace which i s the action of God on 
man enabling him to respond to God and respond with a new way of 
l i f e . Such experiences could be considered experiences of grace in 
a 'specifically Christian sense' i f they were to be conceived i n 
terms similar to prevenient grace; but they could not be considered 
as experiences of grace i n terms of uncreated grace since, as we 
have seen, the loving self-communication of God (i.e. uncreated 
grace) involves reciprocity and suffering - to be a f u l l 
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communication i t requires a response. Using the term in this f u l l 
sense i t can be said: 
Grace i s not something isolated in i t s e l f that stands apart 
from other things, Grace i s a mode of being that things 
take on when they come into contact with the love of God 
and are suffused with his mystery,'°'' 
Though this i s the very thing he wants to avoid, the implication 
of Rahner's understanding of grace i s that grace is a thing in 
i t s e l f rather than the transformation i n the creature. By wanting 
to preserve both the i n t r i n s i c nature of grace and the immutability 
of God he rejects the t r a d i t i o n a l distinctions i n grace as not doing 
justice 'to the unity and nature of the one grace which divinizes 
the essence powers and a c t i v i t y of man' and sees that grace i n 
terms of uncreated g r a c e , m a i n t a i n i n g that this can exist in the 
mode of of f e r , acceptance or rejection. But a reciprocal 
relationship involves response, whether positive or negative, i t 
cannot exist merely as offer. 
The gift of grace - the Incarnation and redemption 
Grace, for Rahner, has a radically Christocentric nature. Creation 
and the communication of grace i n the supernatural ex i s t e n t i a l are 
understood i n terms of the incarnation, God's loving self-expression 
i n the incarnation i s 'the primal act of God', the basis for a l l 
other acts. Consequently the p o s s i b i l i t y of creation is based on 
the incarnation, even though the fact of creation i s prior to 'the 
actual realization of the se l f - e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n of God in the 
Incarnation'."^^ 
The Incarnation of the Logos (however much we must in s i s t 
on the fact that i t i s i t s e l f an h i s t o r i c a l , unique Event in 
an essentially h i s t o r i c a l world) appears as the 
ontologically (not merely 'morally', an afterthought) 
unambiguous goal of the movement of creation as a whole, in 
relat i o n to which everything prior i s merely a preparation 
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of the scene.^ "^ "^  
The incarnation i s not a 'subsequent addition' to creation but 
rather creation i s conceived as the condition of the poss i b i l i t y of 
the incarnation. Creation and incarnation are not two separate acts 
of God but two moments or phases i n God's self-communication. 
Through grace in creation God has become an 'intrinsic principle' i n 
this world, the history of the world has become his 'very own 
history'. The incarnation i s consequently both the origin and the 
goal of creation.^ °* 
Since God's self-communication has both i t s or i g i n and i t s goal 
in the incarnation, grace has a 'radically Christological 
character'.^ "'^  Rahner i s anxious to avoid both the errors of 
doceticlsm and monophysitism and assert that Christ was both t r u l y 
God and man, not God disguised as a man. The doctrine of the 
incarnation affirms a genuinely autonomous individual, not a 'puppet 
on strings'."^'"' Although the r e a l i t y of Christ's incarnation i s an 
'i n t r i n s i c a l l y unique' mystery, i t i s to be understood as the 
ontologicai, as opposed to merely moral, goal of creation. The 
hypostatic union that takes place i n the incarnation i s not so much 
something that distinguishes Jesus from us but the beginning of the 
divinization of the world as a whole. Since the world i s a place 
where everything i s related to everything else, every action has a 
'knock-on' ef f e c t in the interconnectedness of the chain of 
causality, then i t i s not 'pure fantasy' to conceive of evolution as 
having i t s goal i n Christ, since when Christ became man he assumed 
a human history i n a l l i t s interconnectedness.'"® 
For Rahner, 'Jesus i s the man whose l i f e i s one of absolute 
unique self-surrender to Qod'.'"^^ This statement i s only f u l l y 
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understood i f i t i s realized that i t presupposes God's se l f -
communication and that therefore an absolute self-surrender enables 
an absolute self-communication whereby the r e a l i t y of the 
communicator becomes the r e a l i t y of the receiver, i n an ontological 
sense. Rahner immediately qualifies this statement, which could be 
interpreted as an adoptionist position, by saying that i t does not 
adequately distinguish Christ's relationship with God as unique from 
a l l others and therefore ontic statements are necessary. However, 
without such an ontological formulation the ontic statements easily 
become docetist or m o n o p h y s i t i s t . ' T h e y are interpreted in terms 
of Christ performing a redemptive a c t i v i t y rather than in terms of 
the de i f i c a t i o n of the world.''' 
Though the t r a d i t i o n a l ontic formulations are necessary they 
s t i l l need interpretation. How can the Chalcedonian understanding of 
Christ's nature as adiairetos (unseparated) be preserved along with 
the understanding of Christ's nature as asynchytos (unmixed)?''^' 
How i s an unseparated and unmixed unity to be conceived? What i s 
needed is a r e d e f i n i t i o n of unity. I t i s not to be conceived as a 
uniting of two previously existing and separate things, a 'united 
unity' but a 'uniting unity'. That which makes Christ's human nature 
exist i s the same as that which unites the nature with God, i n other 
words, 'the Logos creates by taking on'.'''=' Thus: 
When God wants to be what i s not God, man comes to be. 
... I f God himself i s man and remains so for a l l eternity; 
i f therefore a l l theology i s eternally anthropology; i f i t i s 
forbidden to man to think l i t t l e of himself because he 
would then be thinking l i t t l e of God; and i f this God 
remains the insoluble mystery: then man i s for a l l eternity 
the expression of the mystery of God which participates for 
a l l e t e r n i t y i n the mystery of i t s ground.'"'^ 
Man only exists as an e x i s t e n t i a l being, because God willed to 
exist. Rahner, following Heidegger's understanding of existence, 
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does not inter p r e t human existence as an 'absolutely terminated 
quantity' but 'a r e a l i t y absolutely open upwards' which receives i t s 
f u l l r ealization i n the incarnation.'' ^  Given this essential nature 
of human existence i t i s possible that someone 'by being man in the 
f u l l e s t sense (which we can never at t a i n ) , i s God's Existence into 
the world'.''® 
The c e n t r a l i t y of Christ for Rahner's theology i s brought out in 
William Shepherd's description of Rahner's christological thought: 
'Christ i s ontologically, noetically and redemptively the 
determination of r e a l i t y ' . ' " ' Ontologically he i s so, in that the 
corporeal, material embodiment of Christ makes the ontological 
presence of God and uncreated grace present. Noetically he i s so, in 
that the Christ-event makes i t known that the transcendent horizon 
i s the gracious God, general revelation is dependent on special 
revelation. Redemptively he i s so, in that God's forgiveness i s not 
an a r b i t r a r y event, but the g i f t of God from the beginning. 
How then are sin and redemption understood i f the incarnation 
is God's o r i g i n a l act of creation? The incarnation includes both 
creation and redemption as two of i t s moments. Redemption, 
therefore, i s not understood in terms of a moral or legal 
transaction, such as mere ac q u i t t a l from g u i l t but i s seen as the 
communication of God's grace. ' I t i s not Christ's action which 
causes God's w i l l to forgiveness', rather redemption i n Christ 'was 
already effective from the beginning of humanity'.''® 
Thus Rahner can say that, prior to any subjective appropriation 
through f a i t h , man i s already 'justified'.''® Man as an individual 
i s r e a l l y and intimately connected with Christ, and Christ's death i s 
a constitutive part of each man. Redemption i s not simply a matter 
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of man, i f he so chooses, making a decision to involve himself with 
the process of redemption. I t i s not a question of two neutral 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s for man's decision, salvation or damnation; God is an 
inte g r a l part of the decision process, not overriding i t but as that 
'which effects the acceptance of what i t offers'; i n a very real way 
'God has done something to me i n Christ before I do anything'.'^"^ 
For Rahner this notion i s based on the interdependence of the whole 
of the created order. Though we can and must of course say that, 
for instance, 'This chair i s not part of my body', when we actually 
t r y to define i n terms of physics what that actually means, the 
issue i s not nearly so clear. Modern science would seem to support 
Rahner's view because, since Einstein, matter can be understood as 
energy and vice versa; ultimately physicists are unable to define 
matter.'^' Thus Rahner can say: 
In a certain sense - and I am exaggerating here, in order 
to make what I want to say clearer - we are a l l l i v i n g in 
one and the same body - the world. And because this is so 
. . . something of the nature of ori g i n a l sin, and something 
of the nature of redemption can exist too.'^^ 
There i s therefore no pure 'inwardness' that is unaffected by that 
which i s 'without'; there are no spheres of existence that can be 
completely separated in an e x i s t e n t i a l cleavage: 
Two thousand years ago someone died on the cross in a l l 
the darkness of his death out of love for the Father. And 
this took place from the very outset i n a sphere which i s 
my own r e a l i t y . How I am now to react to i t is another 
matter.' 
The terras sanctification, divinization and self-transcendence a l l 
relate to the same process. Rahner often uses the term s e l f -
transcendence but he understands i t i n the theological sense of 
growth i n grace, of sanctification and divinization. Man as an 
embodied h i s t o r i c a l being achieves his transcendence through the 
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material world. The world is not the arena for displaying 
internalized goodness or sinfulness but i s an i n t r i n s i c factor i n 
determining goodness or sinfulness. In other words, 'Sin takes place 
in sin,' not in 'a merely transcendental i n t e r i o r i t y of a noumenal 
subject but in the works of the flesh which are obvious and 
tangible'.'^* 
As we have seen, in freedom man is constantly faced with the 
choice of saying 'yes' or 'no' to God. In freedom man does not so 
much 'do something' but rather 'does himselP; he performs himself i n 
f r e e d o m . ' A person's negative or s i n f u l free decision i s 
therefore a f a i l u r e to dispose of himself, and salvation and 
damnation are not the external reactions of a judging or rewarding 
God but are the product of man's freedom,''^ ® Self-realization i s a 
task man cannot avoid, either a se l f - r e a l i z a t i o n towards God or a 
se l f - r e f u s a l towards God. A rejection of God's self-communication 
i s i n actual fact a rejection of man in himself, i t is 'metaphysical 
suicide' since the purpose for man's creation i s divinization.' 
For Rahner there i s a duality between person and nature. Man 
is a person 'in so far as he freely disposes of himself by his 
decision' whereas his nature i s that 'which must be given prior to 
this disposal of himself, as i t s object and the condition of i t s 
possibility'; therefore man becomes personal through the process of 
self-determination through d e c i s i o n . ' S i n and g u i l t are therefore 
related to a person's decision, to his use of freedom in his personal 
responsibility before God. But because of the differences i n nature 
due to d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l and social circumstances, heredity, 
psychological conditioning, etc., we can never be certain, however 
objectively bad i t might be, that an action is a realization, or 
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actualization, of sin and g u i l t . No matter how much society needs 
to judge, and must judge in order to maintain order, we can never be 
sure that such an action was the result of a culpable decision 
against God.'^® 
Does Rahner succeed in his explanation of the incarnation? In 
the incarnation the human nature of the Logos i s not something that 
exists prior to His becoming man. Rather this humanity i s 
'constituted i n i t s essence and existence' by the self-expression, 
the self-utterance of God,'®'^ ' However Rahner wants to preserve an 
essential difference between Christ and the rest of humanity. 
Therefore he maintains that though the 'what' of Christ is the same 
as in us, i,e. human nature, the difference i s that i t i s Christ's 
self-expression but i t i s not ours.'=" But i f Christ's humanity 
rea l l y i s constituted i n essence and existence by God's s e l f -
expression i t i s hard to see how this human nature can be the same 
in us i f what constitutes i t essentially i s not present. I t i s 
understandable, given these presuppositions, that human nature could 
be the continuing manifestation of the primal self-expression of God 
and so Chris tology r e a l l y could be the beginning and end of 
anthropology.'^^ This could suggest that there is only a 
quantitative difference, not a qualitative difference between Christ 
and the rest of humanity. This i s what Rahner implies in places: 
He [Jesus] i s a moment of the history of God's 
communication of himself to the world. . . . Jesus is the 
one who - by what we c a l l his obedience, his prayer and the 
freely accepted destiny of his death - has achieved also 
the acceptance of his divinely given grace and direct 
presence to God which he possesses as man,''-'^ 
Thus Christ is part of the ongoing process of God's se l f -
communication which began before the incarnation. The incarnation 
i s therefore only 'in increasing measure' the concrete h i s t o r i c a l 
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manifestation of th i s continuing process of the bestowal of grace on 
mankind.'®'* 
But Rahner also wants to maintain that the incarnation is 
qu a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from our experience of grace, that i t is a 
unique event. Thus although the same grace is present in both, the 
difference i s that Jesus i s the pledge and we are the recipients of 
that grace; the incarnation i s 'a unique and quali t a t i v e l y 
incommensurable perfection', given only once i n i t s essential 
characteristics'.'®^ ^ 
Although Rahner maintains that our nature and Christ's nature 
are the same, he seems to imply the opposite in places. Rahner 
distinguishes between man as the self-utterance of God and man as 
'the paradigm of a possible utterance' of God - in order to t r y and 
reconcile the fact that God could have created man without the 
supernatural existential.'®® But this d i s t i n c t i o n implies 
differences in essence. The language of the pledge and the 
recipients also indicates this. To put i t another way the 
obediential potency for the hypostatic union i s the essence of man 
and the incarnation i s the f u l l e s t realization of that. But in 
Christ i t i s not the obediential potency which i s the essence of his 
humanity but the immanent self-utterance of God,'®^ William 
Shepherd argues i n a similar fashion when talking about the 
relationship between nature and grace: 
'Recipient' ('addressee') language in general i s specious i n 
this context, for i t implies temporal dist i n c t i o n among 
ontologically d i f f e r e n t 'epochs'. This sort of language and 
implication i s expressly denied in Rahner's rejection of any 
h i s t o r i c a l state of pure nature prior to grace.'®® 
I f human nature i s an obediential potency for the hypostatic 
union i t i s possible to envisage that this could be 'assumed' by the 
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Logos, whose nature i s the self-utterance of God, in order to bring 
human nature to i t s f u l l potential, though this could in theory 
remain u n f u l f i l l e d ; thus grace can retain i t s gratuitous character. 
This i n places i s what Rahner implies.'®'® But elsewhere he i s 
anxious to avoid the concept of assumption since i t implies a 
difference in essence between man and the Logos and the Logos could 
not assume human nature because this would constitute change i n 
God."^ '' 
Rahner t r i e s to maintain that the incarnation i s only 
quantitatively d i f f e r e n t and yet at the same time qualitatively 
d i f f e r e n t through emphasizing the concrete nature of world history 
in which the incarnation occurs. Although the hypostatic union is 
part of the overall process of God's self-communication in grace i t 
transcends this to become 'a unique event i n i t s own essence', i t 
'attains an irrevocable and irreversible character in history'.'^'' 
The instance which i s part of the whole world process becomes 
unique because of a proper regard for history; i t i s not 'acosmic 
and purely meta-historical'. Only i f history i s reduced to mythology 
can the incarnation be seen as something not unique.''*^ I t is 
Jesus' free obedience, prayer and acceptance of his own death, real 
human actions i n the spatio-temporal world, which bring about the 
uniqueness of the incarnation. 
But at other times Rahner disregards the concreteness of time 
and history i n his explanation of the incarnation. Christ has always 
been involved i n history as i t s innermost entelechy, the pos s i b i l i t y 
of creation, the beginning of anthropology."*® However, this view i s 
not without i t s problems. One can understand how an event in human 
history can have an effe c t for a l l that follows, given the 
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interconnectedness of human history, but how can this effect be 
retrospective? Rahner's answer is to conceive of time and history 
'theologically' in order to maintain that Christ has always been 
involved in history. But how can that be the case i f the unique and 
irreversible event in history of the incarnation has not yet taken 
place, i f Christ's humanity and God's self-expression are so united 
that the l i f e of Christ 'is human reality and so God's and vice 
versa'.''^^ On the one hand Rahner is emphasizing the traditional 
doctrine of Christ's pre-existence and on the other he is 
maintaining i t is the concrete nature of Christ's history that brings 
him into existence.'*^ 
In what sense is Christ's incarnation a unique event in the 
world i f God does not act in the world, i f interventions of God are 
mythological unless understood as concrete manifestations of the 
intrinsic process of God's self-communication in the world? I f God 
does not act in the world how is Christ 'a reality of God in the 
s t r i c t and real sense'? '^^ -^ Rahner is claiming that the incarnation 
is much more than merely a concrete manifestation of the overall 
process of grace but this does not f i t in with his understanding of 
God's causality. I t seems logical to conclude as Alexander Gerken 
does: 
. . . i t would be more consistent i f one drew the conclusion 
from Rahner's view that every historical event, with respect 
to i t s abi l i ty to bring the graciously elevated 
transcendentality of man to self-realization, is of equal 
value and that, therefore, even the Christ event and the 
form of Christ are replaceable.'"^'^ 
A key way for Rahner of understanding the incarnation and 
Trini ty is the theology of symbol.''*® Symbol is understood not in 
the sense of a sign of something where the sign and signified exist 
as two separate realit ies but in the sense of a genuine symbol 
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where the symbol and the symbolized are intrinsically connected, 
where 'the representation allows the other "to be there'".^'^'^ For 
Rahner, following traditional scholastic philosophy i t is an 
ontological principle that a l l things that exist are symbolic 
'because they necessarily express themselves in order to attain 
their own nature'.'^* This is not understood in terms of eff ic ient 
but formal causality. 
The 'form' gives i t se l f away from i t se l f by imparting i tse l f 
to.the material cause. I t does not work on i t subsequently 
and 'from outside' by bringing about in i t something 
different from i t se l f and alien to i t s essence. The effect 
is the cause i t se l f . . • .'•^^ 
Or to put i t round the other way: 'The symbol . . . is the self-
realization of a being in the other, which is constitutive of i t s 
e s s e n c e ' . ' ' T h e essence of a being is f u l f i l l e d in i t s self-
expression, in the symbol which enables i t to exist. The symbol is 
something different from, yet one with the essence. In order for 
this to be possible the essence is conceived as a plurality in unity, 
thus unity and difference increase in direct not inverse 
proportion.^ ®^  The being of man is 'self-possession' realized by an 
expression, 'a flowing outwards' and a return whereas material 
things express themselves but do not return to self. 
The Logos is the symbol of the Father, and therefore according 
to the theology of symbol, in a real and ontological sense, '"He that 
sees me, sees the Father" (Jn. 14:5)'.^®^ I t is the incarnation that 
allows God to exist: 'the Father is himself by the very fact that he 
opposes to himself the image which is of the same essence as 
himself, 
Rahner attempts to reconcile the doctrine of the immutability of 
God with the doctrine of the incarnation using this concept of 
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symbol through the assertion: 'God can become something, he who is 
unchangeable in himself can himself become subject to change in 
something else', God's immutability must be understood 
dialectically. '®^' But is the use of the theology of symbol helpful 
at this point? I f God the Absolute in his ' in f in i te and abiding 
unrelatedness' is primary then how can this include relatedness?^^'' 
How can that which is symbolized (i.e. unrelatedness) be present in 
the symbol? I t is a contradiction to maintain that the related can 
be derived from the unrelated without positing change. The 
unrelated cannot be both unrelated and related. I f the symbol is, 
as Rahner maintains, a real expression of God's essence then 
re la t iv i ty must be included in God's essence. 
Rahner refuses to allow mutability in God, ultimately resorting 
to dogma rather than logical explanation. ' I refuse, in the name of 
fa i th , to allow one or the other term [the mutability or the 
immutability of God] to be dropped'.^ He also recognizes the 
limitations of the use of the concept of symbol; 
An enquiry into the general sense of the word 'symbol' w i l l 
show however that the concept is much more obscure, 
d i f f i c u l t and ambiguous than is usually thought. . . . I f 
then the e f fo r t raises many problematical and unsolved 
points, the fair-minded reader w i l l not be surprised.^ ®^  
The concept of symbol only restates the problem without answering 
i t . In what sense is a real symbol really other than the essence 
and yet one with i t? 
One way of trying to make Rahner's theology of the symbol more 
comprehensible is by using Hegel's thought. There are certainly 
similarit ies between Rahner's ontology of the symbol and Hegel's 
phenomenology of sp i r i t in which reality is a dialectical process of 
self-possession or self-realization through self-alienation.'" ®° But 
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there are two distinct points of difference which prevent Hegel's 
thought being used to c la r i fy Rahner. Rahner avoids positing a 
temporal difference between the essence and i t s symbol; there is a 
logical but not a temporal difference. Being is plural in i t s unity 
and that is an ontological absolute, not a unity that becomes a 
plurali ty or a plurali ty that could become a unity. Hegel envisages 
a temporal process of self-possession through self-alienation.''^'' 
Rahner's thought would be logically more comprehensible i f 
understood in a temporal sense but to do so would be to postulate 
change in God, which he wants to avoid (and, of course, at the same 
time maintain, hence the contradictions). 
The other difference, following from the f i r s t , is that Rahner 
stresses the inner plurali ty of God as the means by which God can 
express himself outwardly. ' I t is because God "must express" 
himself inwardly that He can also utter himself o u t w a r d l y ' . ' B u t 
i t is conceptually i l logica l to envisage an inner self-expression, a 
flowing outwards that does not go out. Hegel maintains that God's 
self-expression in the world is necessary for God's self-
actualization. Again an interpretation in terms of Hegel's thought 
would make Rahner more logical but for Rahner i t would mean 
allowing a change in God in creation. We can conclude, with Martin 
D'Arcy: 
. . . i t is high time that God's immutability be reexamined, 
Karl Rahner does this provocatively; but though he breaks 
through the shell, no chicken so far as I can see emerges. 
He leaves us with the cryptic saying: 'God is immutable in 
himself, but mutable in another.' In the context of a Hegel 
and perhaps a Heidegger this might be informative, but i f 
i t is meant to be a new insight i t is too cloudy.'®^ 
Rahner fa i l s on a conceptual level to explain the incarnation 
satisfactori ly. Ultimately, he would argue, this does not matter 
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since what is important is an existentiell acceptance of the truth 
of the incarnation,^^-'* that God has accepted man in Christ and that 
therefore anyone who accepts his own humanity in f u l l and that of 
others accepts Christ. This is the existentiell truth of the 
incarnation and thus in a very real way whoever loves his neighbour 
has f u l f i l l e d the law. 'He who is at once nearest to us and 
farthest from us is always accepted and loved in every 
neighbour.'^®® The fact that Rahner fa i l s on a conceptual level to 
explain the mysteries of fa i th is, in a way, an inevitable result; 
they are mysteries not scientif ic concepts. Rahner is well aware of 
the impossibility of his task: 
. . . we should show again and again that a l l these 
theological concepts do not make the reality i t se l f present 
to man from outside of him, but they are rather the 
expression of what has already been experienced and lived 
through more originally in the depths of existence, We can 
to some extent become present to ourselves on a conceptual 
level, and we can try again and again to relate our 
theological concepts back to their original experience. 
Hence what we are trying to do here is both jus t i f ied and 
necessary. Should we f a i l , this failure could only be 
understood by Christians as the mandate and the task to try 
again and harder.'' 
We therefore need to look at another conceptual framework that can 
incorporate the intrinsic nature of God's gracious, and as such 
charismatic, involvement with the world whilst maintaining the 
loving personal nature of such an involvement. To this we must now 
turn. 
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Chapter 6 
GOD'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE WORLD 
Although Rahner's aim is to rethink the nature of God's relationship 
to the world he does not f u l l y follow through the implications of 
his thought. In his discussion of dualism and pantheism he rightly 
argues, on the one hand, against dualism, that God is not a 
particular entity to be differentiated from other entities in the 
world and related to i t in an extrinsic sense; and on the other 
hand, against pantheism, that the world and God are not to be 
equated. But although he wants to assert the intrinsic nature of 
God's relationship to the world he ultimately fa i l s , as we have seen, 
because of the negative implications for him both of the concept of 
change in God and the concept of necessary creation. Although 
having these contradictions because he always tries to keep one foot 
in the scholastic camp (and probably one eye on the censors) 
Rahner's system is 'profoundly different from any system ever 
conceived within the confines of Roman Catholicism because i t 
wholeheartedly appropriates a modern, evolutionary vision of the 
world for theological purposes'.' I t is this appropriation of the 
modern world view that makes Rahner's theological system a useful 
one for understanding God's charismatic action in the world. 
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Rahner ultimately fa i ls 
to provide a conceptual framework that is able to incorporate the 
personal and loving involvement of the Holy Spiri t . As this sort of 
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involvement is at the heart of charismatic experience we must look 
elsewhere for such a framework. 
Panentheism - involvement and necessity 
A helpful insight from process theology is that involvement, 
relationship and change can be seen as perfections rather than 
imperfections. A term used by process theology is 'panentheism' and 
we shall suggest that with qualifications i t is a helpful term for 
defining God's relationship with the world. I t is not a term that 
Rahner uses, though he expressed sympathy for the concept in a 
dictionary article he wrote; 
This form of pantheism does not intend simply to identify 
the world with God in a monistic fashion (God = the 'all ' ) 
but intends to conceive the ' a l l ' of the world ' in ' God as an 
inner modification and appearance of God, even i f God is not 
absorbed into the world. The doctrine of such a 'being-in' 
of the world in God is false and heretical (Denziger, 1728) 
i f and only i f i t denies the creation of the world by God 
and the distinction of the world from God (not only the 
distinction of God from the world); otherwise panentheism is 
a challenge addressed to ontology to think through more 
deeply and exactly the relationship between absolute and 
f i n i t e being (i.e. by grasping the reciprocal conditioning of 
unity and difference that increase in direct proportion).^^ 
In panentheism God both is and transcends the universe. But 
does this mean that God 'needs' the universe, that the world is 
necessary for God to be God? The word necessary is ambiguous; i t 
can mean 'unfree, coerced, imposed from without or from within' and 
in this sense i t is considered as imperfection. But i t can also 
mean 'not contingent, unable not to be' and in this sense can be 
considered as an ontological perfection.^^ In this second usage God's 
act of creation is 'a necessary effect of God's superabundant being 
and goodness'."* Thus God is God without the universe but he never 
exists without i t ; i t is a necessity of love, not constraint. 
Panentheism asserts that the universe is in God, not in a 
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spatial sense, but that there are reciprocal relations between God 
and the world. Traditional theism has not usually admitted this 
since substance thought equates Being, reality, with essential 
immutability. There is no potency, capacity for change, in God. 
But i t is possible to conceive of the universe as in God, as both a 
manifestation of God (a traditional doctrine) but also as a 
modification. of God. I t would not be 'the actuation of a potency' 
but what Joseph Donceel calls 'the result of a superactuality'.^ 
Consequently there is no potency in God; he does not need such 
relations to be God (against Whitehead, Hartshorne and Hegel). Thus 
the distinction between the panentheism that Donceel is arguing for 
and Hartshorne's is that for the latter creation is a necessary 
enhancement or completion of God and for the former i t is a 
necessary display of the in f in i t e richness of God. To put i t 
another way creation is constitutive of God in the latter and a 
consequence of God in the former."^ 
Since God creates out of nothing, nothing exists outside of the 
creative act. In one respect therefore, i t can be said that the 
creative act is identical with God, i f we look at i t from, as i t 
were, God's side. In another respect, i f we look at i t from man's 
side the creative act is the creature. Yet God is not the creatures 
nor the creatures God, rather in Louis Dupre's formula; 'The creature 
is the total otherness of God within the total dependence upon 
God'.^ 
Donceel maintains that Hegel, although not wishing to, fa l l s into 
the error of pantheism though acknowledging that many Hegelian 
scholars would disagree.® Nonetheless Hegel more than any 
philosopher has tackled the problem of the relation of the Inf ini te 
to the f i n i t e , and his thought therefore is very important to our 
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discussion. Hegel regards the f i r s t principle of the perennial 
philosophy, the principle of identity 'whatever is, i s ' as 
tautological and t r i t e . Hegel's basic principle is the principle of 
universal correlativity: 'Whatever is is both identical with i t se l f 
and not-identical with i t s e l f or 'everything is i t se l f precisely by 
being related to something else'.'^ 
There is no doubt that the principle of correlativity applies to 
a l l the beings we experience; I am only able to be myself by being 
related to other people, to the world and to God." '^ But does i t 
apply to God? I t would not i f i t means that God is only God by 
being related to something else, to the world. But i t can apply to 
God i f i t is interpreted as meaning that 'everything that exists is 
related to something else'. God does not need the non-Identity to 
reach Identity, contrary to Hegel; he is not related essentially, but 
in Donceel's phrase '"supereffluently," because the superabundance of 
his love leads him to share with them the fullness of his being.''^ 
Rahner is aware of the need to rethink the relationship of God 
to the world but he does not f u l l y follow through his suggestions. 
He is aware that the issue of the dialectical relationship between 
the immanence and transcendence of God in relation to the world 
needs to be tackled in order to 'attain an immanence of God in the 
world or an immanence of the world in God'. Rahner rightly 
maintains that the world is dependent on God but God is not 
dependent on the world. He points out that in our normal 
understanding of causality not only is the effect dependent on the 
cause but, in a manner of speaking, the cause is dependent on the 
effect , ' i t cannot be this cause without causing the effect ' . '^ But 
this is not the case in creation. The world as God's effect is 
dependent on God as cause, but God is not dependent on the effect, 
- 156-
he remains free with regard to the world; i t is a unique 
relationship.^ 
Instead of explicating this in a similar fashion to Donceel's 
'superactuality' Rahner resorts to scholastic thought. God is the 
absolute and the in f in i t e , 'the "Unchangeable", he who simply is -
actuus purus - who in blessed security, in the self-sufficiency of 
in f in i t e reali ty, possesses from eternity to eternity the absolute, 
unwavering, glad fullness of what he is'.'-* He reasserts, because of 
his desire to maintain the doctrine of the immutability of God, the 
scholastic principle that 'God has no real relationship with the 
world, and that i t is only the world that has the relationship to 
him'.''® A l l of God's dealings with the world remain free and 
unexacted; creation can lay no claim upon God, and grace is 
unmerited and unexacted. 
Like Donceel, Donald Gelpi also finds the term panentheism, with 
qualifications, helpful. Gelpi is very familiar with the work of 
Rahner;^ '^ ' he has also, unlike Rahner, had much personal and positive 
experience of the charismatic movement. Gelpi provides a helpful 
balance to Rahner since he not only stresses the christocentric 
nature of charismatic experience and the concept of entering into 
the death of Christ but he also stresses the transforming nature of 
the charismatic experience. 
Charismatic transformation - personal relatlcmship 
and change 
Like Rahner, Gelpi wants to rethink the concept of grace. Whereas 
for Rahner this is done in the framework of his metaphysics of 
knowledge using the transcendental method, Gelpi does this using the 
concept of gracious or charismatic transformation.'''' 
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According to Gelpi, from the second to the thirteenth centuries 
Christian theologians on the whole perceived the world Platonically, 
Grace was understood in terms of the Platonic doctrine of 
participation, by which a l l realities participate in a transcendent 
form located in the mind of God. Transformation by grace, i.e. 
divinization, tended to be understood in dualistic terms as the 
spiritualization of the human person. A Platonic conception of grace 
conceives of gracious transformation as an assimilation to the 
transcendent realm of the Spirit . Since this realm is essentially 
different from the realm of space and time then the experience of 
grace is understood in dualist terms. 
The Aristotelian scholasticism of the thirteenth century, with 
i t s rejection of the Platonic doctrine of participation, rethought 
the concept of grace. The essential form of things resides not in a 
transcendent divine mind but in the things themselves. Grace must 
be infused into the soul to effect an essential transformation from 
the natural to the supernatural. The natural faculties of the soul 
need to be elevated by grace to the supernatural order, which is an 
essentially different order. Although the metaphysical dualism of a 
Platonic viewpoint is diminished in a Thomistic Aristotelian system 
of accidental transformation i t nevertheless leads to formal and 
static categories of grace. 
Gelpi, however, wants to understand grace in terms of a 
transforming personal encounter with God whilst maintaining the need 
for a logical account of reality, conceived in relational rather than 
objective terms. He seeks to outline a metaphysics of grace, 
conceiving of grace as charismatic transformation, though not of 
accidents and substances. 
In developing his thought in terms of charismatic transformation 
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Gelpi engages process thought in a c r i t i ca l dialogue. Gelpi works 
from Alfred North Whitehead's principle that 'apart from the 
experiencing of subjects there is nothing, nothing, bare 
nothingness'."=' A l l reali ty is divided into what is experienced and 
the way experienced realit ies are experienced. Being is therefore 
experience and so I do not 'have' experiences but I 'am' an 
experience. Whereas in substance philosophy act follows being in 
process theology the reverse is true. Rather than action being the 
accidental expression of a fixed essential nature, every entity is a 
self-defining, creative process. 
For Whitehead atomicity is the ultimate reality, and only the 
physical actions that structure experience are f inal ly real; thus the 
continuities that shape experience are ideal and possible rather 
than completely and ultimately real. '® In Whitehead's thought man 
is a 'becoming', but Whitehead's conception of a person, which Gelpi 
defines as 'a nexus of many actual occasions with a certain kind of 
serial order', is inadequate to account for the unity and continuity 
in personal experience because i t is based on a nominalistic 
construct of experience lacking a concept of generality and 
c o n t i n u i t y I t cannot adequately account for the very thing i t is 
attempting to explain, the experience of process. Whilst process 
thought gives a better framework for understanding the dynamics of 
personal growth and cosmic evolution, substance philosophy accounts 
better for individual unity and real continuity in change. However, 
a substance universe does not satisfactorily account for personal 
growth and evolution, based as i t is on fixed essences, since a 
stable substance underlies every accidental change. Gelpi moves 
beyond both substance and process theology to 'a theory of 
emergence' 
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Gelpi uses Charles Pierce to crit icize Whitehead's understanding 
of experience. Whereas Whitehead conceived of experience as 
dipolar, Peirce conceives of ° i t as triadic composed of three 
relational feelings: evaluations (qualities) interactions (facts) and 
tendencies (laws).^^' These three realms of 'relational feelings' 
constitute human experience. 
In their experience people make evaluative responses to both 
themselves and their world by means of concrete sensations, 
eiaotions, images, memories, abstract conceptions, etc. They a l l 
mutually condition each other and together make up the realm of 
quality. 
Not only do human beings respond evaluatively to reality but 
reali ty also has a physical and unavoidable impact on them and we 
in our decisions and responses have an impact on reality. This is 
the realm of fact, Whitehead distinguished between i n i t i a l and f ina l 
facts.^ -'-^ '' Facts which have an impact on me independently of any 
evaluative response are i n i t i a l facts such as physical sensations 
environmental forces etc, I have no control over these. But these 
i n i t i a l facts give rise to evaluative responses which result in 
personal decisions and actions, where I interact with my environment, 
these are f i na l facts. 
But people are also, in a sense, a law unto themselves, meaning 
that each person is an autonomous tendency to respond evaluatively 
or decisively. Laws result from the decisions that express my 
evaluative responses, i.e. when a belief is fixed concerning a given 
reali ty then a tendency or habit to react a certain way is created. 
Through their habitual tendencies people define the selves that they 
are becoming. 
Therefore people are defined not by some essential form but by 
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their total history. The basic point is the same as Rahner's but 
the conceptual framework is different . Each self is the sum total 
of i t s history and each self 's history is the sum total of i t s 
experience. Individual selves emerge out of a dynamic interaction 
with one another. Each is limited by those that circumscribe i t and 
by which i t must define i t se l f in opposition, each exists in relation 
to the environmental forces that surround i t and penetrate i t . The 
character of every individual self is defined not by some essential 
metaphysical form but by i t s total history and environment. 
In substance thought environment is opposed to one's body. 
Individuation is by quantification of matter, and quantified matter 
exists in i t s environment like a letter in an envelope.^'" In Gelpi's 
'emergent' world decision Individuates and individuals are 
distinguished qualitatively not quantitatively. The achievement of 
individuality is a process of self-definition.^® Not only does a 
person exist in the world but his world exists in him, i t makes him 
what he is. A person does not lose his identity to the world with 
whom he interacts; people are autonomous individuals, but there is a 
mutual inexistence or interpenetration. The term 'mutual 
inexistence' is a translation of the Greek term perichoresis which 
comes from the t r ini tar ian theology of John of Damascus This 
w i l l become significant when we look at Gelpi's understanding of the 
Trini ty . 
Gelpi, following suggestions in Pierce, introduces the notion of 
plasticity into laws. They do not just represent regularity in 
activity but regularity for the condition and possibility for change 
and growth; laws 'endow experience with regularity and continuity 
in growth'.'-^''' Change, however, not understood as an essential 
transformation but as a 'transmutation'. The subject of the 
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changing process does not underlie the change but emerges from i t . 
The difference is relational not essential; selves relate to reality 
different ly , Gelpi gives the example that when an ar t is t adds 
something to a painting the result goes beyond the original painting 
and what is added. The whole painting changes because the 
relationship of the colours to each other has changed. In 
transmutation something analogous to this occurs in every change 
brought about by the inclusion of new feelings (of quality, fact or 
law) which change the entire experience into a different kind of 
experience 
This has important consequences for Gelpi's understanding of 
grace and i t s effects. He conceives of grace as transmuted 
experience which links individuals with God not by an accidental 
transformation of their essential nature but by their choosing to 
enter into the process of self-donation and love. Grace is 
conceived as participation in God, where participation is not 
conceived in terms of a metaphysical dualism but as the mutual 
inexistence, perichoresis, of socially interacting experiences. 
Through fa i th , I exist in God and God exists in me in a new 
way because through our interaction, through God's 
revelatory self-communication to me and my response in 
fa i th to God, the two of us experience one another 
different ly, Grace changes experience physically but that 
change is here interpreted as transmutation rather than as 
essential or accidental transformation. In a world of 
socially interacting experiences, grace results from an 
interpersonal encounter with a tripersonal God that sets 
one in a new kind of interpersonal communion with other 
selves.^® 
In a world of substance thought the concept of perichoresis was 
something of an anomaly, since while substances can be intentionally 
present to one another they do not normally exist in one another or 
interpenetrate one another. In Gelpi's metaphysics, since experience 
not substance underlies Being, both God and creatures are 
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experiences and can therefore be described as mutually inexistent, 
therefore God's relationship with the world can be understood in 
panentheistic terms, Gelpi gives five assertions that such an 
understanding ascribes to:®"^ ' 
(1) A l l things exist in God in the way that they are. There is 
no error in God's knowledge and experience of the world. 
(2) Realities, both people and things, exist in God but are 
relationally dist inct from him and from one another. 
(3) People may exist in God naturally, graciously or s inful ly . 
Gelpi considers that a theology such as Rahner's does not bring out 
these differences. However, although Rahner's terminology is 
different the concepts are actually similar. For Rahner there is a 
twofold modality to God's gracious offer of himself; i t can exist 
either merely in the mode of antecedent offer or also in the mode 
of response, either in acceptance or rejection. This offer as an 
element in man's transcendental constitution can easily be 
overlooked but in specific situations, as we have seen, i t comes to 
the fore and man responds either negatively or positively.^^ 
(4) The way people exist in God makes a difference to God. 
Since grace is conceived of in terms of interpersonal encounter, 
then as we have already seen, this involves change in God. Our 
actions in the world cause God pleasure or displeasure and our 
positive or negative responses to God's grace have the capacity to 
cause greater pleasure or displeasure. Rahner's understanding of 
sin does not bring out this aspect; sin is seen in terms of fai l ing 
to achieve self-transcendence, as 'metaphysical suicide'. Though 
this is helpful in that i t gets away from the judicial notion of God, 
i t f a i l s to do justice to the personal aspect of our relationship 
with God and to the fact that our s in fu l actions have harmful 
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effects, and are not just fail ings in self-realization. 
(5) The way we humans exist in God makes a difference to the 
way God exists in us. 
Gelpi is c r i t i ca l of the way process theology understands God's 
relationship to the world. The divine experience in Whitehead's 
thought is either atomic in structure or a single actual occasion of 
experience in process. But i f i t is the former there is no ultimate 
unity and i f i t is the lat ter i t is impervious to outside influence. 
In process thought experience, and thus God as an experience, is 
dipolar or 'bi-polar' in Hartshorne's phrase. He is both in abstract 
terms eternally f a i t h f u l , loving and perfect in relationships, and 
also in concrete terms active in these ways within creation. The 
priori ty is however not with former aspect ('primordial' in 
Whitehead's term) but with the concrete ('consequent') instances of 
his act ivi ty. God surpasses himself, becomes a fu l le r realization of 
himself within creation. In Hartshorne's panentheism God has an 
unchanging essence but nevertheless completes himself in an 
advancing experience; he needs the world to be f u l l y God.^ '^ ^ However 
the Christian understanding of God's involvement with the world is 
his sa lvif ic transformation of i t , he is not involved in order to 
become God.^ '^ ' 
God's trlnitarian Involvement 
In the l ight of the above we shall now examine Rahner's 
understanding of the Trini ty. For Rahner, the self-communication of 
God in grace, according to Scripture, has a threefold nature. God 
remains transcendent, yet is present or 'is there' and also brings 
about the acceptance of h i m s e l f I t is because our experience of 
God is threefold that we develop a doctrine of the Trinity; 'the 
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mystery of the Trini ty is the last mystery of our own reality'.^® 
I f God's self-communication is a true self-communication then what 
is revealed and what reveals must be the same, in other words; 'the 
"economic" Trinity is the "immanent" Trinity'.In a real self-
communication of God i t is axiomatic that 'God can reveal only what 
man is able to hear' or to put i t the other way round, man is 'the 
addressee who is, of his very nature, demanded by the divine self-
communication, which creates him as the condition of i t s own 
possibility'.""^ Thus not only must what is revealed bear a 
correspondence to that which reveals but also that which is revealed 
must bear a correspondence to that which receives the revelation. 
Consequently that which receives the revelation (man) must bear a 
correspondence to that which reveals (God). 
There are four basic pairs of aspects of man's experience and 
hence God's self-communication, these double aspects indicating the 
twofold nature of God the Father's self-communication which leads to 
the doctrine of the Trinity.®'^'' The four aspects are: 1) Origin-
Future - the world is created by God and moves towards i t s 
fulf i lment in God; man is created, has a beginning and moves towards 
a goal. 2) History-Transcendence - we experience the concrete 
object in the transcendent horizon and so a revelation of God 'can 
occur only in this unifying duality of history and transcendence 
which man is'.='-'* 3) Offer-Acceptance - man as a free being must 
relate to God in terms of an offer and the acceptance or rejection 
of that of fer . 4) Knowledge-Love - knowledge, 'the actuation of 
t ruth ' is ultimately f u l f i l l e d in love, or rather 'the actuation of 
love', loving actions.^* '^ Yet the two must not be confused for 
although knowledge is ultimately f u l f i l l e d in actions and not 
abstract thought, knowledge and love are s t i l l two aspects of man's 
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existence to which a revelation of God must correspond. 
The two sides of the four pairs of aspects represent the two 
modes of God's self-communication, the two processions of the 
Trinity.'^' One mode corresponding to the incarnation is that of 
origin-history-offer revealed as truth. God's self-communication as 
o f fe r is the origin and ground of creation and hence is the origin 
of world history. But how is this revealed as the truth? This is 
so because truth is not to be understood primarily as 'the correct 
grasping of a state of affairs ' ,^^ but a revealing in the sense of 
self-manifestation, a self-positing for others in truth, i.e. 
fidelity.^'^ Thus truth is what we do for others. In this sense 
God's revelation as origin-history-offer is made manifest as truth; 
i t is God's action in the world as a f a i t h f u l offer . 
The other mode, corresponding to the Holy Spirit , is that of 
future-transcendence-acceptance-love. Future is not understood 
merely as that which is s t i l l to come but the mode of God's self-
communication as man's fulf i lment , thus making transcendence 
possible, transcendence understood as man's essential openness to 
God as absolute future and also the possibility of accepting that 
future through grace, i.e. an acceptance brought about by God. This 
is f u l f i l l e d in love, for what else but love is this self-
communication that gives i t se l f as the possibility of i t s own 
acceptance?'*'^  Thus the two basic modalities of the one divine 
self-communication are truth and love, truth in history and love as 
the promise of the absolute future. The two modalities are neither 
separate nor the same, but mutually conditioning. Rahner sums up 
God's self-communication in the phrase 'the divine self-
communication occurs in unity and distinction in history (of the 
truth) and in the spirit (of love)".'^'^ Therefore to think of God as 
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sp i r i t is to think in terms of self-presence, knowledge and love, 
with knowledge and love being the two basic activities of spi r i t . 
Rahner's metaphysics of sp i r i t is not conceived of in terms of 
spir i tual substances or entities, but in activities, 'an authentic 
metaphysics of the sp i r i t tel ls us that there are two (and only 
two!) basic activit ies of the sp i r i t : knowledge and love'.'*^ 
In our experience of salvation history we experience the Spirit 
as the one God, the Son as the one God and the Father as the one 
God; there must be no t r i theis t ic implications.'*'^ To say that we 
experience three persons is a generalization subsequent to our 
experience which prevents a modalistic understanding and preserves 
the truth that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity.*® They 
are three not in the sense that they could be added up to make 
something different but that God is predicated three times, God the 
Father, the Son and the Spirit.'*^ This is to be understood in the 
manner of a threefold subsistence, 'three distinct manners of 
subsisting' rather than as three consciousnesses.®* However, Rahner 
maintains against Barth, that although the language of three persons 
is misleading, implying three consciousnesses, i t should be kept 
since 1500 years of tradition cannot be overturned.®' 
God's self-communication is really a seif-communication, not a 
communication of something created through eff ic ient causality and 
so i t must be understood in terms of quasi-formal causality.®^ I f 
there is a threefold nature to our experience of God's communication 
then, in order for this communication to be truly a self-
communication, there must not only be a distinction 'for us' but also 
'in himself'.®=^' However, Rahner qualifies this real distinction in 
God, in fact i t is only in the dimension of salvation history that 
'this distinction is truly "real"'.®'^ He who communicates and he who 
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is communicated are of the same essence and so the distinctions in 
God must be relative.^^ 
For Rahner the self-communication of God is understood in terms 
of love and in these terms everything else is understood.®^- Rahner 
distinguishes between two types of love, a metaphysical love and a 
'genuinely personal love'.^''^ A genuinely personal love is the free 
self-giving of a person, who is able to withhold this love, not an 
emanation of a nature-*'^ "' The distinction of the two meanings for 
the word love enables Rahner to assert that God is love (in a 
metaphysical sense) and yet preserve the gratuitous nature of God's 
loving self-bestowal of grace in creation (personal love). In this 
understanding the implication is that the personal love is superior 
to the metaphysical love. Elsewhere he explicit ly states this: 
'concrete love is something more (not less) than formally analyzed 
subjectivity (abili ty and need to love)'.®® In terms of human love, 
the 'act of personal love for another human being is therefore the 
all-embracing act of man which gives meaning, direction and measure 
to everything else'.^'° Thus a refusal of love could be 
characterized as inauthentic existence, but this seems to be the 
sort of existence that Rahner considers a possibility for God. 
One way of solving this dilemma would be the concept of 
intra t r ini tar ian divine love. Augustine argued that for God to be 
love there must have been an eternal uncreated object for his love; 
there must be one who loves, one who is loved and the love i tse l f 
between them. Thus the Spirit is the bond of love between the 
Father and the Son. Karl Barth develops a similar concept: 
I t is not part of God's being and action that as love i t 
must have an object in another who is different from Him. 
God is suff icient in Himself as object and therefore as 
object of His love.®' 
But although Rahner was influenced by Barth's concept of 'manner of 
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being' he does not share his concept of intratr ini tar ian divine 
love.*"'^ ' Rahner's starting point for the understanding of the Trinity 
is the economy of salvation; 
Insofar as he has come as the salvation which divinizes us 
in the innermost center of the existence of the individual 
person, we call him really and truly 'Holy Spiri t ' or 'Holy 
Ghost'. Insofar as in the concrete historicity of our 
existence one and the same God s t r i c t ly as himself is 
present for us in Jesus Christ, and in himself, not in a 
representation, we call him 'Logos' or the Son in an 
absolute sense. Insofar as this very God, who comes to us 
as Spirit and as Logos, is and always remains the ineffable 
and holy mystery, the incomprehensible ground and origin of 
his coming in the Son and in the Spirit , we call him the 
one God, the Father 
Rahner considers the psychological theory of the Trinity 
developed by Augustine to be inadequate because i t has 'forgotten 
about' economy of salvation and starts from 'seemingly almost 
gnostic speculation' about the inner l i f e of God.*^ * 
I f love is understood as the personal free self-giving then 
Rahner's concept of the distinctions in the Trinity, being the 
distinct manners of subsisting of the one God, and not persons in 
the sense of individual centres of consciousness, makes i t d i f f i c u l t 
to envisage a concept of intratr ini tar ian divine love.'^® Rahner does 
in fact talk of God's love for himself but no explanation is given 
of this.^^'' 
Rahner criticizes the psychological theory of the Trinity 
because i t is not based on human experience. Experience supplies no 
model to suggest that 'divine knowledge means an utterance, and not 
simply original self-presence in absolute identity'.^'^ He says in a 
footnote to this sentence, 'The same should be said about the Spirit 
as love'.^'^' In other words Rahner is arguing that human experience 
gives no model for conceiving of love as needing an object of love. 
But this is clearly not the case as Rahner himself shows in his 
understanding of human love as a free self-communication. 
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Furthermore, in his explanation of analogy Rahner says : 
I t is self-evident f i r s t of a l l that the ground of a reality 
which exists must possess in i t se l f beforehand and in 
absolute fullness and purity this reality which is grounded 
by i t , because otherwise this ground could not be the 
ground of what is grounded.^-® 
But i f this explanation of analogy is applied to his understanding 
of love, i t can be said that Rahner has failed to provide an 
adequate grounding for human love by regarding the essence of God's 
love in non-personal terms; he has tried to ground personal love in 
non-personal love, the fu l l e r in the lesser. Together with his 
reservations about the distinctions in the Godhead this leads to a 
weakness in Rahner's understanding of the personal nature of the 
Holy Spirit , Let us, therefore, reflect further on the use of person 
language with regard to the Trini ty. 
In his summary of the history of the term person in the 
doctrine of the Trini ty , Gelpi points out how i t was Boethius, at the 
beginning of the sixth century, who gave western theology i ts 
working definition of the term person as 'the individual substance 
of a rational nature'.'''^' However in the twelfth century, Richard of 
St. Victor redefined person not as a substance but as an existence. 
The term existence brought out the ecstatic nature of a person as 
being out of i t se l f and beyond i t se l f and the relational character 
of persons as ecstatic social realities, Richard also conceived of 
persons as unique individuals, each person having a unique and 
incommunicable individuality. His definition of a person was 'an 
intellectual nature existing incommunicably' and consequently his 
definit ion of a divine person was 'an incommunicable existence of 
the divine nature'.^' The relationships within the Trinity could be 
understood in terms analogous to human social experience. 
Walter Kasper has a similar understanding of the Trinity to 
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Gelpi and is also influenced by Richard of St Victor. Kasper's 
starting point for the understanding of the Trinity is not the self-
communication of the word but self-communicating love.^ =^ Augustine 
understood the Holy Spirit in terms of the mutual and reciprocal 
love between Father and Son and the Trinity in terms of the love, 
the beloved and love itself.^^ But he did not fu l ly develop his 
understanding of the Trini ty in terms of the concept of love alone 
but also of knowledge.^'* 
I t is Richard of St. Victor who develops the understanding of 
the Trinity in terms of love, not seeing the Spirit in terms of the 
mutual love of the Father and Son but seeing God as ecstatic love. 
God as love exists as Father, the giver of love. Son as g i f t of love 
received and then bestowed on the Spirit , the receiver of love. 
Kasper points out the centrality and importance of this image; 
Of the many images which scripture uses in describing the 
action and effects of the Holy Spirit (breath, air, wind, 
water of l i f e , f i r e or tongues of f i r e , ointment and 
anointing, seal, peace), the most influential in the history 
of theology has been the characterization of the Holy Spirit 
as g i f t and, in connection with this, as love."''^ 
Aquinas also recognized the relational character of the divine 
persons but s t i l l preserved the notion of substance, though not 
directly applying i t to the concept of person. He defined a person 
as 'that which subsists (distinctly in a rational nature)' and 
therefore defined divine persons as subsistent relations, a 
subsistence being 'that which is the subject that "stands under" the 
nature or substance'.^^' 
Both Gelpi and Kasper are influenced by Heribert Miihlen.''^ He 
builds on the work of both Richard of St Victor and Aquinas, and 
draws on the existential philosophy of Martin Buber in order to 
interpret the Trini ty in social terms. MUhlen distinguishes between 
personal and impersonal causality, seeing the Spirit 's work in terms 
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of personal causality which brings about a personal relationship. 
Gelpi describes Muhlen's notion of personal causality: 'In i t one 
person affects another but in such a way as to evoke from the other 
the capacity for free, conscious self-donation in the mutuality of 
love'7'^' In other words, as Edward Yarnold puts i t , the action and 
presence of the S p i r i t i s not best conceived as a local presence 
(i.e. within me), nor even as a dynamic presence (i.e. affecting me), 
but as a personal presence (i.e. present to me), i n i t i a t i n g a 
personal relationship. As Yarnold points out this relationship 
involves 'God's transforming love' which effects a change in man.^^ 
Rahner, however, i s wary of the term 'person' in the T r i n i t y as 
to him i t implies a difference in essence, di f f e r e n t self-presences 
and this compromises the unity of God: 
Furthermore, 'person' as a concrete concept, in contrast with 
'personality' ('subsistence', 'subsistentiality') means not 
formally the d i s t i n c t i o n as such, but those who are 
di s t i n c t . But ours i s a case where we should speak of 
three persons, yet not think of three who are di s t i n c t as 
multiplied also in their essence, as we may do without any 
d i f f i c u l t y in other instances, e.g. when we speak of 'three 
individuals'.®''' 
Rahner distinguishes between essential and notional (or 
relational) r e a l i t i e s . Essential r e a l i t i e s belong to the divine 
essence, notional to 'that which refers to the persons i n their 
distinction'.®^  The three persons are not essentially d i s t i n c t but 
only r e l a t i o n a l l y d i s t i n c t , constituted by 'relative oppositions'.®^ 
Rahner uses the term 'distinct manner of subsisting' to signify not 
di f f e r e n t persons (diff e r e n t subsistences) but dif f e r e n t 
personalities; God i s not three persons but 'three-personal'. Thus, 
Rahner can conclude 'the manner of subsisting i s d i s t i n c t through 
i t s r e l a t i v e opposition to another one; i t i s real through i t s 
id e n t i t y with the divine essence'.®'^  
As we have seen, Rahner's approach to the T r i n i t y emphasizes the 
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unity of God, and I t s s t a r t i n g point is the experience of salvation 
history. 
Here we experience the S p i r i t , and we experience him as God 
(who i s only one); we experience the Son, as God; and the 
Father, as God. When we generalize and say that we 
experience 'three persons', we do so subsequently to our 
experience,®'^  
Rahner's emphasis on unity and his anxiety to avoid the dangers of 
tritheism mean that the divine persons are moments in the economic 
self-communication of God, not subjects of an immanent s e l f -
communication.®^' Although i t i s axiomatic to him that the economic 
t r i n i t y i s the immanent t r i n i t y he emphasizes the economic at the 
expense of the immanent. But i f the divine hypostases are not 
subjects then they cannot act as subjects in salvation history. 
Although Rahner views the hypostatic union as a unique and 
unsurpassable mode of self-communication he does not s u f f i c i e n t l y 
define the uniqueness of Christ as the Logos, the second person of 
the T r i n i t y . The same i s true of his understanding of the 
experience of the Holy S p i r i t which he sums up as 'the fi n a l i z a t i o n 
of human existence towards the immediacy of God through God's se l f -
communication'.'^^' Thus Gelpi can describe Rahner's pneumatology as 
'relatively undeveloped' and JUrgen Moltmann can conclude that 
Rahner's understanding of the t r i n i t y 'ends i n the mystic 
solitariness of God'.®'' 
Both Earth and Rahner conceive of person in the modern sense of 
a self-conscious free centre of a c t i v i t y and individual 
personality.®® Given this understanding persons are seen as in 
opposition to each other, hence Barth and Rahner's problem with 
three-person language. Kasper sums up the argument well; 
With the modern concept of person as his s t a r t i n g point, H. 
MUhlen i n particular has taken an important step forward in 
applying personalist categories to the doctrine of the 
T r i n i t y . For what Rahner describes i s i n fact not at a l l 
the f u l l modern understanding of person but rather an 
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extreme individualism i n which each person i s a centre of 
action who possesses himself, disposes of himself and is 
set o f f over against others. But Fichte and Hegel had 
already moved beyond such a point of view. Ever since the 
time of Feuerbach modern personalism, as represented by M. 
Buber, F. Ebner, F. Rosenzweig and others, has made i t 
entir e l y clear that person exists only in relation; that in 
the concrete, personality exists only as interpersonality, 
subj e c t i v i t y only as inter s u b j e c t i v i t y . The human person 
exists only i n relations of the I-Thou-We kind. Within the 
horizon of this modern understanding of person, an isolated 
unipersonal God i s inconceivable. Thus i t i s precisely the 
modern concept of person that offers a point of contact for 
the doctrine of the Trinity,®^ 
With this understanding of person Kasper can use the doctrine 
of perichoresis to understand the T r i n i t y and our relationship with 
God and with other people. Perichoresis provides a model for the 
union between Christ and human beings (John 14:20, 17:23) and 
between human beings themselves (John 17:21). Perichoresis, as a 
concept of 'dynamic reciprocal penetration', means that i t i s 
possible that unity and independence increase in direct and not 
inverse proportion. Thus, 
Here once again i t becomes clear that the t r i n i t a r i a n 
mystery i s the deepest ground and ultimate meaning of the 
mystery of the human person and of the letter's f u l f i l m e n t 
in love.^"^ 
The mutual inexistence of the persons of the T r i n i t y , rather than 
being a mode of existence d i s t i n c t from and un i n t e l l i g i b l e to human 
existence, actually exemplifies a mode of existence common to every 
r e a l i t y . 
Gelpi also understands the T r i n i t y in terms of perichoresis 
Unlike Rahner, however, Gelpi can conceive of the divine persons as 
autonomous centres of existence for without autonomy they would 
cease to be persons, since without autonomy they could not i n i t i a t e 
a c t i v i t y such as procession, self-donation and mission. Autonomy is 
not understood i n terms of separation since autonomy does not 
separate but rather dissent does.®=^  The Godhead as a process of 
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eternal procession and mutual self-donation i s the supreme 
exemplification of interpersonal communion in love. Thus, 'the fact 
that the divine experience subsists as an eternal social process 
provides the pattern, the norm for the h i s t o r i c a l growing of human 
experience'.-""® We grow i n grace by entering into the process of 
self-donation and loving. Of course divine persons are not 
understood i n the same way as human persons are. Humans can never 
experience t o t a l mutual inexistence and perfect identity of l i f e in 
this world. But the mutual love and personal communion of the 
T r i n i t y i s analogous to human love and communion - or rather human 
love i s analagous to t r i n i t a r i a n love. T r i n i t a r i a n love i s the 
exemplification and perfection of personal existence. We become 
what we worship and, as Kasper points out, this reveals a serious 
weakness i n Rahner's t r i n i t a r i a n theology. How can a 'distinct 
manner of subsisting' be worshipped, invoked, adored or glorified?®'^  
But when we conceive of and worship God as the perfection of 
interpersonal communion; 
We are drawn individually and collectively into the 
supremely perfect communion of the divine persons, into the 
mysterious divine knowing that i s loving, into the purifying 
f i r e of a divine s e l f - g i f t so t o t a l that i t effects the 
perfect v i t a l i d e n t i t y of the divine persons and the death 
of every form of s e l f i s h human egotism.^® 
In other words we enter into a transforming personal relationship, a 
process of gracious or charismatic transformation. 
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Having established the importance of the notion of charismatic 
transformation brought about by the dynamic and personal nature of 
God's involvement with the world, we must now look at this notion in 
more d e t a i l . We w i l l deal f i r s t with Rahner, arguing that his 
thought i s weak in this area, and then with Gelpi for whom this area 
is central to his whole theology. 
Charismatic transformation - Rahner's understanding 
of growth in grace 
We have already seen the Christocentric basis of Rahner's theology 
and of his understanding of grace. God's self-communication in the 
incarnation was for the sake of our deification: 
Grace i n a l l of us and hypostatic union in the one Jesus 
Christ can only be understood together, and as a unity they 
si g n i f y the one free decision of God for a supernatural 
order of salvation, for his self-communication.^ 
Rahner's notion of the supernatural e x i s t e n t i a l means that a person 
is 'always a Christian in order to become one'; his relationship with 
Christ is always present as something a person has to realize and 
actualize throughout his l i f e . He must come to an existentiell 
realization of his e x i s t e n t i a l relationship with Christ; salvation, 
the presence of God is present as an undeveloped seed.== 
But there i s a constant discrepancy in Rahner's thought, between 
man's transcendental s i t u a t i o n and his concrete situation, between 
his e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n and his existentiell situation. On the one 
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hand the supernatural e x i s t e n t i a l is a given constituent in human 
nature, but on the other hand i t is a 'mode of being', dynamic 
concept.== But i t i s hard to envisage how a dynamic concept can 
exist undynamically, i.e. unrealized. This contradiction becomes 
apparent in Rahner's descriptions of human growth. The essence of 
human growth for Rahner i s entering into a relationship with Christ: 
the real t r u t h and r e a l i t y of Christian existence, and human 
experience i s nothing else but a challenge to entrust 
oneself to the development of one's own Christian existence 
in patience, openness and f i d e l i t y , and to do this u n t i l 
slowly, and perhaps painfully and with failures, this l i f e 
unfolds and develops into the experience of a personal 
relationship to Jesus Christ.'^ 
I t must be l e f t to each individual to discover in his own l i f e 
exactly what concrete experiences mediate the experience of his 
transcendental relationship with Christ; each must discover his own 
'exis t e n t i e l l mystagogy',® whereby he comes to an exlstentiell 
realization of his e x i s t e n t i a l possibilities,^' 
But there i s a discrepancy i n Rahner's thought as to how this 
comes about. On the one hand i t is seen in terms of the 
charismatic experience of entering into the death of Christ, 
emphasizing the existentiell aspect and on the other hand i t i s seen 
in terms of simply doing one's duty and behaving morally, 
emphasizing the e x i s t e n t i a l aspect. Examples of the f i r s t way 
emphasize the unconditional and absolute nature of selfless 
surrender and love,^ Loving actions done i n this way are not merely 
rat i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d or i n accord with Christian morality but a 
sharing of the dying of Jesus,® The person 'who responds to the 
world with genuine love ipso facto encounters i n i t the Cross of 
Christ and the inconceivability of God',^  Examples of the second 
way include: the notion of accepting one's existence 'without 
reservation'; the fact that acceptance of self i s acceptance of 
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Christ; the notion of quietly doing one's duty; and the experience of 
grace where someone affirms, either e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , moral 
values as absolutely binding."-'' Also the affirmation of one's self 
in duty which affirms some value means that absolute value i s 
affirmed since God i s the source of a l l cognition, v o l i t i o n and 
action. Moral acts include God as their transcendental condition and 
God participates i n a l l acts, through quasi-formal causality, making 
a l l good moral acts salvific.'*' 
I t is the sort of instances found in this second group which 
cause Gelpi to say that Rahner's theology of grace inspires a 
complacency and a continuity in a person's relationship with God, 
rather than the fact that 'a love relationship with the Christian God 
demands as much the discontinuity of dying as i t does the joy of 
continuous human development'.^ But to see Rahner's thought in 
terms of complacency and continuity i s to ignore what is really at 
the heart of his thought, the Ignatian piety of the cross. The 
following passage from Rahner about experiencing the Sp i r i t makes 
this clear: 
We can seek him only by forgetting self. We can find him 
only in seeking God and surrendering self in generous 
outgoing love, and without returning to self. Moreover we 
must continually ask whether anything l i k e that annihilating 
and enlivening experience of S p i r i t i s at work in us, so 
that we know how far we s t i l l have to go, and how distant 
what we presume to c a l l our 's p i r i t u a l l i f e ' s t i l l is from 
real experience of the Holy Spirit.^ 
The difference between the ways i s not in fact as great as i t 
may at f i r s t seem. In places the two notions, of acceptance of 
one's humanity and of the discontinuity of death, are seen as 
aspects of the same experience: 
And the grace of God and Christ are in everything, as the 
secret essence of a l l e l i g i b l e r e a l i t y : i t is not so easy to 
grasp at anything, without having to do with God and Christ 
- one way or another. Anyone therefore, no matter how 
remote from any revelation formulated i n words, who accepts 
his existence, that i s , his humanity - no easy thing! - in 
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quiet patience, or better, in f a i t h , hope and love - no 
matter what he calls them, and accepts i t as the mystery 
which hides i t s e l f in the mystery of eternal love and bears 
l i f e in the womb of death , , . says yes to Christ, even 
when he does not know that he does. For he who lets go 
and jumps, f a l l s into the depths such as they are, and not 
such as he has himself sounded.^'' 
Powerful and inspiring words but they need elaboration, something 
which Rahner never re a l l y does. What does the acceptance of one's 
humanity in f u l l r e a l l y mean, especially when i t is 'no easy thing'? 
As we have said before, Rahner is always trying to make theology 
relevant to people's experience, but his challenging and a l l -
embracing words can leave people with a sense of hopelessness, 
given the complexities of their own experience of their humanity. 
Gelpi's strength i s that he takes the complexities of human 
experience more seriously in his account of human growth. To grow 
in grace one must be able to: 'Know oneself, love oneself, forget 
oneself'.•• ^" Rahner stresses the aspect of forgetting onself and 
this i s , as we saw i n Chapter One, the essence of charismatic 
experience; but i f this i s done without the f i r s t two stages, the 
result i s the sort of s p i r i t u a l suicide we referred to in the same 
chapter. 
Charismatic transformation - Gelpi's understanding 
of conversion 
The notion of gracious s a l v i f i c transformation enables Gelpi to 
understand the whole of Christian experience in charismatic terms. 
Fundamental to his understanding of charismatic transformation i s 
the link between charismatic transformation and charismatic g i f t s . 
In Gelpi's experiential approach connections between g i f t s of the 
S p i r i t and transformation or sanctification by the S p i r i t are 
i n t e g r a l since the world is one of mutually inexistent experiences 
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and each experience has an effect on a person. This means that: 
'Far from being unrelated to the process of personal sanctification, 
a charism of service ought to be i t s specification and concrete 
personalization'.''^' Sanctification i s conceived in terms of the 
Pauline phrase 'to put on Christ', that i s to become Christlike. 
Thus charisms, as charisms of service are the concrete specification 
of the process of personal sanctification or growth in grace. The 
connection between charismatic g i f t s and charismatic sanctification 
does not mean that only the sanctified are charismatic but rather 
that the process of sanctification i s charismatic. 
Gelpi defines ' g i f t ' or 'charism' as 'a more or less permanent, 
enabling c a l l of the S p i r i t of Jesus' and follows the medieval 
theologians i n seeing the c a l l of the S p i r i t as twofold, to 
sanctification and to ecclesial and social service.^^ But they 
distinguished between the g i f t s (dona) of the Holy Spi r i t and His 
gratuitous graces (.gratiae gratis datae). The last-mentioned 
corresponded to the Pauline charisms and since, according to St. 
Paul, these become rubbish i f used without love then medieval 
theologians argued that the gratuitous graces or charisms are not 
related to the process of sanctification. For them growth in 
sanctification i s growth i n f a i t h , hope and love and medieval 
theologians associated the sanctifying g i f t s (.dona) with the seven 
'sp i r i t s ' of Isaiah l l : l f . i ^ ' 
For Gelpi, however, grace i s seen in terms of transformation, or 
transmutation, a more dynamic concept than perfection. The link 
between g i f t s and sanctification i s integral: 'In an experiential 
approach to the g i f t s , one does not have prophetic experiences, one 
is a prophetic experience'.''® And this i s true of a l l the g i f t s . 
Thus, since the g i f t of prophecy engages the whole person, i t i s , 
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l i k e a l l g i f t s , linked to the process of sanctification, The 
response to the prophetic impulse remains a human response, the 
response of someone in the process of sanctification, not already 
sanctified. This inevitably d i s t o r t s the t r u t h and f u l l meaning of 
the impulse. We established this link between g i f t s and 
sanctification i n Rahner's thought when we looked at self-realization 
and the charismatic experience i n Chapter Two, 
The Christian l i f e is a process of gracious transformation 
through a process of repentence, hope, f a i t h , love, ongoing 
sanctification and mutual service. Through baptism we enter into 
the death of Christ and through the power of the S p i r i t are 
conformed into his likeness: 
To experience God's constant leading as one grows through 
f a i t h in an understanding of the mind of Jesus i s to 
experience the 'gifts of sanctification'. Such an experience 
is legitimately termed charismatic, because i t i s the 
experience of an enabling and liberated c a l l , a permanent 
lure of the S p i r i t of Jesus 
Gelpi, unlike Rahner, has personal and positive involvement in 
the charismatic movement. However he sees limitations i n much 
charismatic piety. Charismatic experience focuses on feeling and is 
informed by f a i t h , and as we shall see the acknowledgment of 
feeling, of emotive factors, is an important part of experiencing 
grace. But a l l too often feeling can be closed to thought with 
disastrous results. The action of the S p i r i t can become confused 
with unconscious fears, resentments and repressions, and experience 
of the S p i r i t can turn i n t o a shallow emotional experience. 
Receptivity to God degenerates into emotional complacency. 
And divine sanction and inspiration begin to be claimed for 
human impulses of r i g i d i t y , anger, and apprehension. In 
charismatic prayer groups, this sad process can bear f r u i t 
i n fundamentalism, authoritarianism, and sexist 
discrimination 
A l l Christians are therefore called to be open to the Spirit's 
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charisms of sa n c t i f i c a t i o n and of service. Charismatic impulses are 
not seen as 'enthusiastic' and mindlessly emotional, equated with the 
unusual, the extraordinary or the miraculous. Rather than the 
charismatic experience being an optional extra to Christian piety i t 
is the essence of the Christian l i f e i t s e l f ; i t i s being conformed to 
the image of Christ. 
Gelpi develops the notion of growth and transformation in his 
theory of conversion. He i s indebted to Lonergan's insights 
concerning the role of conversion in foundational theology, but he 
sees the need to develop i t further.^^ Whereas Lonergan defines 
conversion as 'a transformation of the subject and his world', Gelpi 
defines i t in more specific terms as 'the decision to reject 
irresponsible choices and to assume personal responsibility for one's 
subsequent development i n some area of human experience'.^"^ He 
also distinguishes more clearly than Lonergan between natural and 
gracious conversion and between i n i t i a l and ongoing conversion. 
I n i t i a l conversion effects the transition from irresponsible to 
responsible behaviour; ongoing conversion means that we need 
constantly to l i v e out the consequences of the i n i t i a l conversion. 
Gelpi also sees the need to develop Lonergan's theology of 
conversion further since i t does not s u f f i c i e n t l y take into account 
the emotive or affective elements in conversion, remaining 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i n approach. Gelpi's understanding of experience 
recognizes two ways of judging r e a l i t y , logical inference and 
i n t u i t i v e or a f f e c t i v e judgments. A Christian pneumatology must be 
able to incorporate the a c t i v i t y of the S p i r i t at both levels. This 
is clearly seen in the common experience of speaking in tongues in 
the contemporary charismatic movement. Speaking in tongues has 
what W. HoUenweger calls a 'psychohygenic function': 'Man needs a 
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non-intellectual means of mediation and release. Certain people find 
this release through a r t , others through speaking i n tongues'. 
Arnold B i t t l i n g e r also sees this working of the S p i r i t in the 
unconscious, as bringing a person to a new wholeness, a new 
integration of the t o t a l psyche, 'a process which the church has 
tr a d i t i o n a l l y called sanctification'.^* 
Many of the 'gi f t s of the S p i r i t ' in the contemporary 
charismatic movement operate in the area described by words such as 
'mood', 'sympathy' or 'empathy'.=^^ They are to do with non-verbal 
communication rather than concepts or ratio n a l argument. 
The charisms of 'tongues', 'prophecy', 'discernment' and 
'healing' a l l evoke dimensions of the human personality 
which are often hidden or overlooked, opening up areas of 
personal interaction and providing means of expression at a 
level that l i e s 'too deep for words'.^^' 
John Taylor emphasizes that the Holy S p i r i t works through our bodies 
as much as our minds. For Greek philosophy reason was the only 
part of man that could know absolute r e a l i t y . But there i s 'more of 
a Dionysius than Apollo in the Holy Spirit'.^'^ Not that Taylor would 
equate the upsurgings of the subconscious with the movement of the 
S p i r i t , but nevertheless this i s very often where we experience him, 
not in controlled r a t i o n a l i t y but in our i n t u i t i v e , emotional and 
i r r a t i o n a l depths. This i s not to say our experience of God is 
i r r a t i o n a l and, as we shall see, Gelpi sees the need for our rational 
i n t e l l e c t to 'inform" these areas. Nevertheless these depth 
dimensions of human experience are very important points of contact 
for our experience of God and i t i s an area that Rahner does not 
rea l l y deal with. 
Lonergan o r i g i n a l l y conceived of three aspects of the conversion 
process: i n t e l l e c t u a l , moral and religious.^ -® Although a l l are 
interrelated they are nevertheless d i s t i n c t . He has since 
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acknowledged the need to add a fourth conversion, psychic (or 
affective) conversion.^® Gelpi, on the other hand, or i g i n a l l y 
conceived four aspects of the conversion process: affective, 
i n t e l l e c t u a l , moral and religious; he has subsequently seen the need 
to add a f i f t h , s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l . T h e f i r s t four belong to the area 
of personal conversion and we shall look at this area f i r s t , 
In a f f ective conversion a person takes responsibility for his 
subsequent emotional development, i n i t i a l l y principally involving 
dealing with repressed negative feelings such as unconscious rage, 
fear and g u i l t , and subsequently extending to a f u l l e r development 
of h i t h e r t o unexplored regions of his own unconscious psyche. In 
i n t e l l e c t u a l conversion people i n i t i a l l y take responsibility for 
assertaining the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of their beliefs and the adequacy 
or inadequacy of the frames of reference they use to formulate 
those beliefs, and subsequently go about changing them where 
necessary. In moral conversion people take responsibility for the 
motives and consequences of personal decisions. This involves 
moving away from childish and egocentric standards and recognizing 
the consequences for others and not just themselves. Gelpi's 
d e f i n i t i o n of religious conversion is more precise than Lonergan's 
and r e f l e c t s his concern to place the experience of grace i n 
concrete situations. Lonergan defines religious conversion as 'being 
grasped by ultimate concern' interpreted in a Christian context as 
the g i f t of grace through the Holy S p i r i t ; Gelpi defines religious 
conversion as 'the decision to respond responsibly to the free, 
gratuitous, h i s t o r i c a l self-disclosure and self-communication of God' 
and Christian conversion as 'the decision to respond responsibly to 
the d e f i n i t i v e , free, gratuitous, h i s t o r i c a l self-disclosure and self-
communication of God accomplished i n Jesus and in the illunminating 
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power of the Breath [ S p i r i t ] that proceeds from Him'.®' 
Lonergan envisages religious conversion normally occurring 
f i r s t , followed by moral and then i n t e l l e c t u a l conversion. 
I should urge that religious conversion, moral conversion 
and i n t e l l e c t u a l conversion are three quite d i f f e r e n t 
things. In an order of exposition I would prefer to explain 
f i r s t i n t e l l e c t u a l , then moral, then religious conversion. 
In the order of occurrence I would expect religious 
commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both 
religious and moral to precede i n t e l l e c t u a l . I n t e l l e c t u a l 
conversion, I think, i s very rare.-='^ 
For Gelpi, as for Lonergan, i n t e l l e c t u a l conversion informs the other 
conversions, since, despite the fact that a person operates on far 
more than a purely rat i o n a l level, there i s s t i l l the need for a 
correct understanding of these other areas.®^ In fact a correct 
understanding w i l l f a c i l i t a t e growth in these other areas, Gelpi 
distinguishes f i v e dynamics in the process of personal conversion:®'^  
(1) Affective conversion animates speculative, moral and 
religious conversion. The emotional side of human nature is bound 
up with a l l the other aspects of human nature. Repressed negative 
emotional attitudes d i s t o r t our perception of r e a l i t y , the conscience 
and the way we react i n situations, and in h i b i t s or dis t o r t s f a i t h 
and our experience and conception of God. 
(2) I n t e l l e c t u a l conversion, through the i n t e l l e c t u a l disciplines 
of psychology, ethics and theology, informs affective, moral and 
religious conversion.-'^ The aff e c t i v e l y converted person needs to 
understand the laws of healthy emotional development. The morally 
converted person needs to understand how to apply moral values in 
complex concrete situations, and the religiously converted person 
needs c r i t i c a l l y to understand his experience in order to avoid 
being a dogmatic fundamentalist, 
(3) Moral conversion introduces a sense of responsibility for 
others to aff e c t i v e and i n t e l l e c t u a l conversion, preventing them 
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from being simply s e l f i s h self-development or acquiescence into 'an 
unhealthy infantilism'.®^ 
<4) Religious conversion, especially Christian conversion, 
transmutes aff e c t i v e , i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral conversion. Affective, 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral p o l i t i c a l conversion can a l l occur naturally. 
Emotional, psychological or neurotic c o n f l i c t can result in affective 
conversion < i n i t i a l and ongoing). A natural, humanitarian love of 
others may result in an i n t e l l e c t u a l or moral conversion. Affective 
conversion may need to precede religious conversion as disordered 
emotional impulses may block the impulses of the Sp i r i t . On the 
other hand religious conversion enables the transforming power of 
the S p i r i t to heal emotional disorders. Created grace is 'the 
transmutation of human experience in fai t h ' , i.e. grace perfects 
nature, but understood in terms of an ent i r e l y new relationship with 
God.-'^  
Religious conversion always therefore results from the 
action of uncreated grace (God) and transmutes experience 
by infusing created grace (the difference in the believer an 
ongoing l i f e of f a i t h makes).^® 
Not every human experience i s a religious one. Human 
experience takes on a religious dimension when i t asks the ultimate 
question, 'Does human l i f e have any ultimate meaning or purpose?'.^^ 
A religious act of f a i t h i s the decision 'to admit into one's t o t a l 
environment the S p i r i t of God as a permanent, efficacious, healing 
and transforming force.'*° Infusion of created grace is understood 
as the transformation of the self resulting from a decisive response 
in f a i t h to the saving and efficacious impulses of the Spirit."*^ 
For Gelpi, Rahner's transcendental Thomism and the supernatural 
e x i s t e n t i a l do not make this clear. 
(5) Christian conversion mediates between affective and moral 
conversion since i t begins in the converted heart and ends i n 
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commitment to love in action. Religious experience becomes 
Christian 'when one i s led to af f i r m Jesus as the normative 
h i s t o r i c a l embodiment of divine atoning love and the S p i r i t of Jesus 
as the source and agent of such love in the redeemed'.•^^ For 
Rahner, revelation makes e x p l i c i t the transcendental orientation of 
man to God and Christ. However Zaehner's study of mystical 
experience concludes that experience of God and Christ terminates 
the mystical quest only i f i t has been motivated by f a i t h in Christ 
from the start.^® As far as Gelpi is concerned, although Rahner 
appeals to experience, experience undermines his view.'** Christian 
mysticism, Gelpi argues, i s not rooted in a dynamic orientation of 
the i n t e l l e c t towards God but i s an experience of loving encounter, 
an experience of the transforming power of love.'*® 
The dynamics of the conversion process mean that unless 
conversion occurs at a l l the levels i t is to a greater or lesser 
degree inauthentic,'*'^ For example a person converted morally but 
not a f f e c t i v e l y may well be insensitive to the effect that his 
decisions have on the feelings of others, j u s t i f y i n g i n s e n s i t i v i t y 
with abstract moralizations. A reli g i o u s l y converted individual who 
is i n t e l l e c t u a l l y unconverted w i l l be prone to dogmatic 
fundamentalism and a rel i g i o u s l y converted but affectively 
unconverted person w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y distinguishing neurotic 
tendencies from the f e l t impulses of grace. 
The above four areas of conversion belong in the personal realm; 
there i s also the realm of soc i o - p o l i t i c a l conversion.'*'" Although a 
person may take responsibility for the consequences of personal 
decisions f or his environment, he may not have acknowledged 
responsibity for other people's decisions and their consequences for 
his environment, i n other words a responsibility to change that 
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environment and i t s structures. A person who has undergone 
personal conversion but not so c i o - p o l i t i c a l conversion w i l l lack f u l l 
authenticity, and although he may function well at an interpersonal 
level he w i l l l i v e a privatized existence and w i l l be unable to 
relate to public and impersonal problems. Socio-political conversion 
therefore authenticates personal conversion by deprivatizing i t . 
At the same time personal conversion at a l l four levels also 
authenticates s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l conversion. Affective conversion 
authenticates s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l in that prejudice and discrimination in 
the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l realm may well be an expression of emotional 
problems. I n t e l l e c t u a l conversion authenticates socio-political 
conversion i n that unquestioned dogmatism and r i g i d ideologies lead 
to oppression and exploitation. Moral conversion authenticates 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l conversion i n that unjust or amoral attitudes create 
tyranny and oppression. Religious conversion authenticates socio-
p o l i t i c a l conversion i n that i t relativizes a l l social and p o l i t i c a l 
causes and ideologies by confronting them with the t o t a l demands of 
the Kingdom of God. 
Gelpi's understanding of the fi v e aspects of conversion 
enables him to take far more seriously the complexities of human 
experience. The inadequacies of Rahner's pneumatology which we drew 
attention to i n the previous chapter means that he f a i l s to provide 
a conceptual framework that i s able to incorporate the personal and 
loving involvement of the Holy S p i r i t in human growth. Gelpi's 
understanding of the nature of conversion through charismatic 
transformation provides a far more adequate account of Christian 
experience than Rahner's understanding of how a person comes to an 
existentiell realization of his e x i s t e n t i a l situation. 
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Chapter 8 
THE CORPORATE MATURE OF CHARISMATIC EXPERIEMCE 
Linked to the discussion i n the previous chapter on socio-political 
conversion i s the need to see charismatic experience in corporate 
terms, not purely i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c terms. Therefore in this f i n a l 
chapter we w i l l examine the corporate nature of charismatic 
experience. As we have seen, Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge i s 
the conceptual apparatus f or understanding both grace and the 
experience of the S p i r i t , and his transcendental method enables him 
to assert that God i s i m p l i c i t l y affirmed i n a l l our knowing and 
acting. For Gelpi grace as radical transmutation locates the 
experience of God in interaction with revelatory events, personally 
appropriated i n f a i t h . Though this may sometimes occur i n sol i t a r y 
contemplation through the direct action of God, i t i s usually 
mediated through the graced community of believers.'' 
The charismatic experience - transcendental and historical 
Earlier we argued for the incarnatlonal character of Rahner's 
understanding of grace. Rahner emphasizes that any experiences of 
grace that occur outside the visible Christian Church are based on 
the specific and h i s t o r i c a l nature of the revelation in Christ, 
because grace has an incarnational character.^ But although Rahner 
emphasizes the concrete nature of experience of the S p i r i t and the 
fact that i t involves the whole person In his interaction with the 
world, he also maintains that i t i s something that occurs at 'the 
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innermost core of our existence' and i s 'incommensurable with 
ordinary everyday encounters with specific realities'.® This i s 
because, on the one hand, he interprets experience of the S p i r i t i n 
terms of his epistemology, i n terms of the Vorgriff, and on the 
other hand, i n terms of e x i s t e n t i a l commitment and decision, i n other 
words both i n terms of knowledge and In freedom. I t i s the same 
ambiguity that we saw when we discussed transcendental experience 
earlier. We said then that Karl Weger did not see an ambiguity in 
usage because he understood the concrete experiences to be 
e x p l i c i t expressions of the im p l i c i t transcendental experience. But 
experiences that are dependent on both the concrete h i s t o r i c a l world 
and free human decision cannot be e x p l i c i t expressions of an 
experience which i s independent of both, which i s simply 'there', 
before any concrete experience and response to i t ; the two types of 
experience are of fundamentally d i f f e r e n t orders. Rahner gives the 
example of l i g h t from the sun, not the direct l i g h t that we perceive 
when we look at the sun but rather the phenomenon of l i g h t . We do 
not actually see l i g h t i f we are not looking at i t s source; we only 
see objects by means of the light.-* Other images are the horizon in 
which things are distinguished, the measure by which things are 
measured, the boundary by which things are delimited.^ To see i t i n 
terms of an e x p l i c i t expression of something i m p l i c i t causes this 
confusion since the two types of experience are of a dif f e r e n t 
order 
According to Rahner i t does not actually matter i f we cannot 
answer the question as to whether or not the transcendental 
experience of the S p i r i t occurs Independently of any concrete 
expressions since the fact that experience of the S p i r i t occurs in 
concrete situations indicates that i t also occurs i n a transcendental 
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dimension. 'Everyday r e a l i t y then becomes i t s e l f a pointer to this 
transcendental experience of the. Spirit'.'' But the fact that an 
experience of the S p i r i t i s given within concrete experiences i s not 
proof that i t can be experienced without them. Rahner wants to 
keep this option open, however, because this i s how he interprets 
mystical experience of God. 
Rahner's understanding of experience of God i s in fact in three 
stages. The f i r s t stage i s a universal and unthematic experience 
which i s the basis and condition of a l l knowledge and to which no 
categorical object i s attached.® The second stage i s the mediation 
of t h i s experience through categorical objects by which man becomes 
aware of this transcendental experience.® The th i r d stage is a 
mystical experience of God in the s t r i c t sense of the term which i s 
qu a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t (within the natural order) from the 
experience of God as horizon of being and knowing, though s t i l l 
based on i t . ' " 
Ignatius saw the impulses of the S p i r i t discerned in the 
"Exercises' as 'from without', but Rahner considers such an 
understanding mythological, Rahner's problem i s how to reconcile the 
two.'' His answer i s in terms of his transcendental epistemology, 
which means that the three types of experience above are a l l of the 
same order. No special intervention of God i s required since a l l 
three are based on the o r i g i n a l 'intervention' of God, His s e l f -
communication i n the supernatural ex i s t e n t i a l . This i s clearly 
shown i n an interview Rahner gave: 
I f Ignatius of Loyola i s convinced that, at least during the 
Sp i r i t u a l Exercises, the Creator deals directly with his 
creature, then there i s such a thing as a mystical 
component to Christianity. I f i n other words, we do not 
only have objectivized and verbalized concepts of God in our 
consciousness - while he himself nonetheless remains at an 
i n f i n i t e distance and our thoughts only point in this 
direction - but i f we do have an immediate, preconceptual 
experience of God through the experience of the lim i t l e s s 
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breadth of our consciousness, then there is such a thing as 
a mystical component to Christianity.^^ 
We saw i n the second chapter how the Immediate experience of 
God, the consolation without cause, was of fundamental importance 
for Ignatius' method of making an election. For Ignatius: 'there i s 
no longer "any object" but the drawing of the whole person . . . into 
the mystery of God'.'"^  This experience i s interpreted by Rahner in 
terms of his understanding of the pre-conceptual and unthematic 
experience of God that occurs in transcendental experience. 
What Rahner envisages taking place in the experience of 
consolation without cause i s that within this one universal mode of 
knowledge the awareness of the horizon or goal of transcendence can 
increase more and more and the conceptual object can become more 
and more transparent, almost en t i r e l y disappearing. The goal of 
transcendence i t s e l f becomes the 'focus of awareness',^'* not a 
conceptual knowledge of God, not ontologism, but a 'becoming 
conscious of the transcendence'.''^ D. Edwards describes this focus 
of awareness as that 'which bypasses conceptual cognitive processes, 
but i s s t i l l a normal human awareness*. He continues; 'Rahner's 
transcendental theory allows him to deal with the human experience 
of God through a normal psychological process (transcendental 
awareness) which i s yet t o t a l l y other than discursive and conceptual 
cognition'.'® 
By using his transcendental method Rahner has neatly accounted 
for specific experience of God without resorting to an 
interventionist understanding of the specific experiences. In fact 
i t i s rather too neat. I t does not leave room for an experience of 
the S p i r i t conceived in terms of personal relationship. Nor does i t 
leave room for the notion of transforming encounter which, when 
understood i n the panentheistic terms that were defined in Chapter 
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Six, do not involve the mythological interventions that Rahner is so 
anxious to avoid. Rahner's all-embracing explanation of experience 
of the S p i r i t does not leave s u f f i c i e n t room for specific personal 
encounters. 
Rahner's explanation, as we have seen, i s based on a particular 
epistemology. We w i l l now look at a d i f f e r e n t epistemology which 
allows a more corporate understanding of experience of the S p i r i t . 
A corporate epistemology versus an 
Individualistic epistemology 
Gelpi uses C.S. Pierce to show the deficiencies of Kant's account of 
the workings of the human mind and consequently of the 
transcendental method.'"' According to Pierce Kant had assumed that 
there was only one kind of inference, or argument, that of deductive 
inference (or predictive), which predicts the concrete data that w i l l 
follow from a particular hypothetical classi f i c a t i o n of data. Pierce 
however considered there to be three kinds of inference. Abductive 
(or hypothetical) inference classifies data in need of explanation 
according to a particular hypothesis or rule assumed to be true. 
Deductive inference c l a r i f i e s the meaning of the rule by predicting 
the sort of data that one could expect to find on the basis of the 
hypothesis. Inductive inference v e r i f i e s or f a l s i f i e s the deductive 
inferences in accordance with r e a l i t y . Of the three forms of 
inference, only the second, deductive inference, has logical necessity 
within the whole process of inference. No abductive inference has 
any guarantee of lo g i c a l l y necessary v e r i f i c a t i o n and an inductive 
inference i s always open to modification in the l i g h t of new data or 
a new hypothetical model for understanding r e a l i t y . As a 
consequence the transcendental method, using j u s t deductive 
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inference, cannot be held to have proven anything. I t i s not 
possible to deduce a priori the univeral structure of the human mind 
by merely r e f l e c t i n g upon one's own thought processes. A priori 
arguments o f f e r only unverified hypotheses. Like any hypothesis the 
transcendental method needs deductive c l a r i f i c a t i o n and inductive 
v e r i f i c a t i o n . 
But i f Kant's transcendental deduction yields only a 
hypothesis, not a conclusion, i t i s actually a hypothesis 
posing as ai conclusion, an abduction masquerading as an 
induction even as i t calls i t s e l f a deduction.'® 
Pierce's position was one of 'contrite f a l l i b i l i s m ' . There is no 
'privileged, indubitable s t a r t i n g point for human speculation; rather 
we begin thinking about any problem in media res'.'® 
Minds convinced both of their f a l l i b i l i t y and of their 
conditioned h i s t o r i c a l character do not seek for r e a l i t y , 
t r u t h , goodness, and God primarily i n the varied and 
undependable structures of Individual human subjectivity. 
They seek them instead i n the social corrective of shared 
systematic enquiry.^*^' 
In defence of Rahner i t needs to be pointed out that his 
s t a r t i n g point f or his theology is not the transcendental method. 
His aim i s 'to give people confidence from the very content of 
Christian dogma i t s e l f that they can believe with i n t e l l e c t u a l 
honesty'.^' His s t a r t i n g point for his theology i s revelation but 
his explanation of i t is i n terms of the transcendental method. He 
wants to show 'what i s experienced aposteriorily as transcendentally 
necessary'.^^ Nevertheless Gelpi's cr i t i c i s m of the transcendental 
method as being too i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c remains valid. 
According to Pierce there are four possible ways of determining 
one's personal belief: u n c r i t i c a l tenacity, on the basis of a higher 
authority, taste (personal preference for one belief amongst others) 
and shared systematic enquiry.^® Tenacity, authority and taste can 
a l l r e s u l t i n a stubborn dogmatism, either because of the refusal to 
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admit to other beliefs apart from one's own, or of a chosen 
authority, or because of a canonizing of personal prejudice, A 
shared systematic enquiry i s therefore the most objective way of 
forming beliefs. In other words i t i s a communal task, involving 
personal commitment to a shared systematic enquiry.^-* 
Therefore reason i s not the subjective thinking capacity of an 
individual being but a social process involving dialogue. For Pierce 
reason 'eschews the " s p i r i t of Cartesianism". I t does not seek for 
t r u t h i n the solitude of one's study but i n active dialogue with 
other minds intent on answering the same question'.^*^ 
The charismatic experience - individual or corporate? 
This has important consequences for an understanding of the 
charismatic experience for i t highlights the importance of the 
corporate nature of the charismatic experience, or, to put in 
d i f f e r e n t terms, the importance of the charismatic community. This, 
as we have seen, i s a fundamental concept for Paul. The shared 
conscious l i f e of the community transcends and i s qualitatively 
d i f f e r e n t from the individual consciousness. 
Individual consciousness, for example, results from the 
a b i l i t y to distinguish one thing from another and to grasp 
the relationship among distinguished r e a l i t i e s . The shared 
awareness of communities by contrast results from a 
complex process of investigation, planning and practical 
collaboration.^ ®^ 
No individual experiences the S p i r i t in f u l l nor has an 
indubitable insight into the workings of the S p i r i t and so needs to 
be corrected by and learn from the other members, thereby 
participating i n the l i f e of the charismatic community of f a i t h . 
The charismatic experience, therefore, consists of the mutual sharing 
and participation i n the charismatic g i f t s of the Christian 
community which results in the growth of the individuals. The 
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growth demanded by the c a l l to sancification i s therefore communal 
as well as individual. The community i t s e l f i s created by the 
individuals and the individuals also relate to the community as the 
source of their own growth in grace. There i s therefore a 
d i a l e c t i c a l relationship between the Christian community and the 
individual; 
In a theology of grace as transmuted experience, Christian 
f a i t h consists i n the f i r s t instance i n the social process 
by which the Christian community achieves ecclesial s e l f -
consciousness through the sharing of a l l the charisms of 
sanctification and of service. In the second instance i t 
consists of the achievement of personal self-understanding 
as a Christian through active participation i n such a 
charismatic community of f a i t h . ^ ^ 
Rahner's concept of anonymous Christians underemphasizes the 
importance of this with i t s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c approach, emphasizing 'a 
transcendental theism " i n the heart's depths'" and man's individual 
acceptance of himself as acceptance of Christ.=^ ® This is not to say 
that Rahner is not open to the communal approach; the transcendental 
experience i s mediated by the categorical and the interpersonal: 
The act of personal love for another human being is 
therefore the all-embracing act of man which gives meaning, 
direction and measure to everything else. I f this i s 
correct, then the essential a priori openness to the other 
human being which must be undertaken freely belongs as 
such to the a priori and most basic constitution of man and 
is an essential inner moment of his (knowing and w i l l i n g ) 
transcendentality.^^ 
This understanding of the human constitution means that the 
communal nature of salvation i s also a fundamental concept for 
Rahner. As we have seen salvation i s seen in terms of becoming 
f u l l y personal. Therefore salvation and involvement with others, as 
an essential aspect of becoming personal, are bound up together.^^^ 
In Rahner's understanding of salvation 'everyone i s responsible and 
si g n i f i c a n t for everyone else'.=^^ Salvation occurs both in 
'subjective i n t e r i o r i t y ' and also in concrete history and 
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relationships which are the actualization of the former. As Rahner 
puts i t , 'a "transcendental experience" (of God and of grace) Is 
always mediated through a categorical experience i n history, i n 
Interpersonal relationships, and in society'; thus Rahner can say 'a 
Christian has to be an ecclesial Christian'.^^ 
Nevertheless Rahner's basic approach and transcendental method 
do re s u l t i n an emphasis on the individual and the private. As 
James Bacik says from his own accquaintance with Rahner, he has 
never really Integrated the communal and social into his own 
•theological psyche'. Even his recent work s t i l l uses 'the 
in d i v i d u a l i s t i c conceptual scheme taken from his metaphysics of 
knowledge i n order to explain human transcendentality'.^® 
Gelpi acknowledges that undoubtedly human beings experience 
mystery, but c r i t i c i z e s Rahner on the grounds that he: 
. . . he locates openness to mystery in the powers of the 
s p i r i t , and especially i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l preapprehension of 
Being as such. A more psychologically plausible account of 
the experience of mystery locates i t not in the i n t e l l e c t , 
f i n i t e as i t actually i s , but i n Imaginative and appreciative 
forms of knowing. I f anything. I n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y 
dissipates the human sense of mystery.^^'* 
But the heart of Rahner's understanding of knowledge of God i s 
not an i n t e l l e c t u a l preapprehension or 'pre-grasp*. The i n t e l l e c t i s 
not fundamentally the capacity to apprehend or grasp anything. 
Rather i t i s the 'capacity of the incomprehensible, as the capacity 
of being seized by what i s always insurmountable', or in Aquinas's 
terms, 'the capacity of excessus, as going out into the 
inaccessible'.®^ I t i s not primarily the power of grasping, of 
comprehending, rather i t i s the power of being grasped, the i n t e l l e c t 
only grasps i n the context of being grasped. I t is 'only in f a l l i n g 
into an unfathomable abyss that we grasp the individual r e a l i t y to 
which we think we can cllng'.®^ ' We situate and define objects 
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within frameworks which themselves are not situated and defined. 
The horizon of our knowledge i s the incomprehensible mystery of God. 
I f the experience of mystery i s not to be one of meaningless or 
absurdity then the mystery must not be seen as a barrier to 
knowledge but i t s f u l f i l m e n t and i t becomes i t s fulf i l m e n t only by 
'the act of self-surrendering love'.^'' The two faculties of knowing 
and loving must be rooted in a primordial unity and find expression 
i n act; knowledge i s completed in love. Thus man's awareness of 
mystery i s only completed when i t transforms i t s e l f in the act of 
self-surrender by which i t accepts the mystery in love.^ ® As Rahner 
puts i t ; 
Recourse to God as answer to the question of meaning of 
man i n his wholeness i s r i g h t and indispensable. But i t 
becomes the creation of a human i d o l i f i t does not bring 
man, forsaking himself, self-surrendering, and blessed only 
in that way, into the presence of the incomprehensibility of 
God.^ '^  
In conclusion, since t r u s t i n g surrender to another without 
reassurance i s , for Rahner, the essence of personal love, this means 
that knowledge of God is not, in essence, i n t e l l e c t u a l grasp but the 
ri s k of love.'*'^ ' This means that Rahner can say that anyone 'who 
responds to the world with genuine love ipso facto encounters in i t 
the Cross of Christ and the inconceivability of God';'*' not only 
because the grace of Christ i s an i n t r i n s i c aspect of the world, but 
also because love i s the way to knowledge of God and a genuine 
response of love i s t o t a l s e lf-giving. A person discovers God in 
the world, in the words we quoted earlier; 'only i f - radically - he 
walks i t s ways r i g h t to the end'.*=^  This i s the way of the cross, 
the way of t r u l y charismatic experience. This l i e s at the heart of 
Rahner's theology, making i t in essence a charismatic theology. 
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